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Abstract
In the last fifty years, scholars have widely studied Deliberative Democracy and
Deliberative Systems and proposed them as an alternative or integration to Rep-
resentative and Participatory Democracy. The latter can on one side deal with
communication challenges of diverse and pluralist modern Societies by opening
Democratic procedures to Citizens and engaging them in Democratic decision-
making procedures. On the other side, as like as Representative Democracies,
Participatory Democracies do not promote deliberations to foster Citizens to reach
a consensus on Societal issues. Indeed, Participatory Democracies are based on
intrinsic mechanisms of aggregation of votes, not optimized to fulfil the diverse cog-
nitive characteristics of Citizens, and are usually stand-alone processes that can not
be interconnected. Gamified Online Deliberative Systems can fill these gaps. The
first research goal of this work is to analyze Democracies, expose different models
of them, and investigate from different perspectives the causes of the current crisis
of Representative Democracies and the lack of Participatory Democracies models.
The second research goal is to analyze the literature on Deliberative Democracies
and Deliberative Systems in order to delineate a framework of requirements to im-
plement the features needed for legitimated Deliberative Systems. The framework
is then used to analyze a set of online tools for deliberation and cover the third
research question: understand if these tools implement legitimacy features of on-
line deliberation and can be connected to Deliberative Systems. The last research
goal of this work is to investigate the cognitive characteristics of Citizens involved
in deliberations and the motivations that may keep them continuously engaged
in Deliberative Systems. After having exposed Gamification theories, this work
proposes a fully gamified model for Online Deliberative Systems and describes a
practical implementation of the model.

Contents
Contents iv
List of Definitions v
List of Figures vii
List of Tables xix
1 Introduction 1
I Democracies and Deliberative Systems 17
2 Structures of Democracies 19
2.1 Defining Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Democracies Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Conceptions of Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.1 Substantial Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.2 Procedural Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.3 Substantial and Procedural Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4 Components of Democracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5 From Components of Democracies toward Models of Democ-
racies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3 Models of Democracies 43
3.1 Representative Democracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
i
CONTENTS CONTENTS
3.2 Direct Democracies and Participatory
Democracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2.1 The Ancient Athenian Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2.2 Participatory Budgeting in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.3 Participatory Budgeting in the European Union . . . . 58
3.3 Beyond Participatory Budgeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4 From Pseudo-Thin Democracies
Toward Full-Thick Democracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4 Deliberative Democracies 69
4.1 Theories of Deliberative Democracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 Critics of Deliberative Democracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3 Analysis and Examples of Deliberative
Democracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3.1 Deliberative Polling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3.2 The Deliberation Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.3.3 21st Century Town Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.4 From Deliberative Democracies Towards Deliberative Systems 93
5 Features of Deliberative Systems 99
5.1 Components of Deliberative Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.2 Features of Deliberations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.3 Features of Citizens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.4 Features of Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.5 Features of Decision-Making Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.6 Features of Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.7 Features of Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.8 Toward a Framework for Deliberative Systems . . . . . . . . . 115
6 Requirements of Online Deliberative Systems 117
6.1 Institutions, Web Design, and Deliberative Systems . . . . . . 117
6.2 Data, Documents and Deliberative Systems . . . . . . . . . . 125
CONTENTS iii
6.3 Deliberative Interaction, Deliberative Consensus and Deliber-
ative Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.4 Motivations of Human Beings and Deliberative Systems . . . . 137
6.5 Biases of Human Beings and Deliberative Systems . . . . . . . 145
6.6 A Framework for Online Deliberative Systems . . . . . . . . . 151
II Analysis of Online Participation and Delibera-
tion 155
7 Tools for Online Participatory Democracy and for Online
Deliberative Democracy 157
7.1 Selection of the Tools for the Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.2 Agora Townhall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
7.3 Airesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
7.4 DemocracyOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
7.5 GovTrack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
7.6 OurSpace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
7.7 WikiLegis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
7.8 Parelon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
7.9 Summary of the Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
III Models of Deliberative Democracy for Continu-
ous Civic Engagement 229
8 Games and Gamified Systems 231
8.1 Games and Gamified Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
8.2 Concepts of Gamification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
8.3 Players and Motivations in Gamification . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
8.4 Self Improvement and Gamified Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
8.5 Points, Badges and Leader-boards in Gamification . . . . . . . 255
8.6 Using Leader-Boards in Online Ballots . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
CONTENTS CONTENTS
8.7 Gamification in Online Democracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
9 Gamified Online Deliberative Systems 283
9.1 Preliminary Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
9.2 Definition of Gamified Online Deliberative Systems . . . . . . 285
9.3 Spaces and Dimensions in eGODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
9.4 The Deliberative Interactions Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
9.5 Players in eGODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
9.6 Goals of Players in eGODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
9.7 Progression of Players in eGODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
9.8 Gamified Sessions and Deliberative Interactions in eGODS . . 305
9.9 Example of a Gamified Session and Generic Rules of eGODS . 315
9.10 Towards an implementation of eGODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
10 WONSAMU, an eGODS implementation 335
10.1 Description of The System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
10.2 The On-boarding Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
10.3 The Deliberation Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
10.4 The Deliberation Chat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
10.5 The Discussion of Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
10.6 Legitimacy features of WONSAMU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
11 Conclusions and Future Works 371
Bibliography 377
Acknowledgments 409
List of Definitions
1 Definition (Game by Sid Meier) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2 Definition (Usability) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3 Definition (Democracy) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4 Definition (Legitimacy in the Cambridge Online Dictionary) . 26
5 Definition (Legitimacy in the Oxford Online Dictionary) . . . 27
6 Definition (Direct Democracy) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7 Definition (Participatory Democracy) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8 Definition (Deliberative Democracy by Parkinson) . . . . . . . 70
9 Definition (Deliberative Democracy by Gutmann and Thomp-
son) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
10 Definition (Deliberative Democracy) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
11 Definition (Deliberative System) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
12 Definition (Deliberative Interaction) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
13 Definition (Deliberative Consensus) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
14 Definition (Massive Multiplayer Online Games by Constance
Steinkuehler) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
15 Definition (Gamification by Sebastian Deterding et Al.) . . . . 239
16 Definition (Leader-Board) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
17 Definition (Sticked Leader-Board) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
18 Definition (Gamified Online Deliberative System) . . . . . . . 285
v
LIST OF DEFINITIONS LIST OF DEFINITIONS
19 Definition (Extension of Gamified Online Deliberative System) 286
List of Figures
2.1 The People in Not-Representative Democracies and Represen-
tative Democracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Democracies as boxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3 A graphical depiction of components and their relations in
Democratic processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.1 The diffusion of Democratic Governments around the world . 47
3.2 The decreasing of trust in the Government of United States of
America from 1958 to 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3 The Athenians Democracy System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 The number of participants of Participatory Budgeting in five
Cities of Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.5 The frequency of participation of Participatory Budgeting in
Belo Horizonte and Betim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.6 The spread of Participatory Budgeting initiatives around the
world at the end of 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.7 The number of Participatory Budgeting initiatives around the
world at the end of 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.8 The spread of Participatory Budgeting initiatives around the
Europe from 2000 to 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.9 The number of Participatory Budgeting initiatives in the Eu-
rope from 1991 to 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
vii
LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF FIGURES
3.10 Participatory Methods and Tools listed by the National Coali-
tion For Dialogue And Deliberation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.11 The ladder of Citizen Participation by Sherry Arnstein . . . . 66
5.1 Components of Deliberative Democracies . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.2 A Deliberative System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.1 The use of Internet in European Countries in 2005 and 2014,
according to the age of Citizens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.2 The use of Internet in European Countries in 2005 and 2014 . 120
6.3 The pyramid of diversity of population capabilities . . . . . . 123
6.4 Percentage of time spent online with mobile devices in nine
countries in the world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.5 The number of desktop and mobile users around the world
from 2007 until 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.6 Number of Countries that have enacted legislation related to
Governmental open data in 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.7 European Community Countries that supply portals to share
their open data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.8 Number of open data sets supplied by Italian Regions on Jan-
uary 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6.9 The impact of open data sets on the regional Gross Domestic
Product on January 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6.10 The chemical composition of Dopamine . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.11 The chemical composition of Oxytocin . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.12 The chemical composition of Serotonin . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.13 The chemical composition of Endorphin . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.14 The effects of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations on thoughts
of human beings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.15 Twenty biases that can affect individuals involved in decision-
making processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.2 The home page of the Agora project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
LIST OF FIGURES ix
7.1 The log-in page of the Agora project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
7.3 The visualization of the Agora project on small screens . . . . 163
7.4 The reply to a CURL query by the Agora system . . . . . . . 164
7.5 The response of a query to the Agora project . . . . . . . . . 164
7.6 A comment with a link in the Agora project . . . . . . . . . . 164
7.7 The creation of an input in the Agora project . . . . . . . . . 165
7.8 The voting system in the Agora project . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
7.9 The sorting of ideas in the Agora project . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
7.10 Browser and mobile version of Airesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
7.11 A responsive page in Airesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
7.12 The sign-in page of Airesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
7.13 The on-boarding system of Airesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
7.14 The common space of Airesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
7.15 The groups space of Airesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
7.16 Creation of proposals, ranks and comments in Airesis . . . . . 173
7.17 A custom type of quorum in Airesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
7.18 The history of the modifies of proposals in Airesis . . . . . . . 175
7.19 A list of proposals that reached the voting phase in Airesis . . 176
7.20 A screen-shoot of DemocracyOS in different devices . . . . . . 179
7.21 A screen-shoot of the home page of DemocracyOS . . . . . . . 180
7.22 A screen-shoot of an argument proposed in DemocracyOS . . 180
7.23 The form for the creation of arguments in DemocracyOS . . . 181
7.24 An argument in DemocracyOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
7.25 The creation of a topic in DemocracyOS - part 1 . . . . . . . . 183
7.26 The creation of a topic in DemocracyOS - part 2 . . . . . . . . 183
7.27 The creation of a topic in DemocracyOS - part 3 . . . . . . . . 183
7.28 A pool in DemocracyOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
7.29 The votes on a pool in DemocracyOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
7.30 A ballot in DemocracyOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
7.31 The votes on a ballot in DemocracyOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
7.32 A closed ballot in DemocracyOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF FIGURES
7.33 The commenting system in DemocracyOS . . . . . . . . . . . 186
7.34 The home page of GovTrack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
7.35 The log-in page of GovTrack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
7.36 The menu bar of GovTrack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
7.37 The resources that can be tracked in GovTrack . . . . . . . . 191
7.38 The list of hot bills in GovTrack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
7.39 Generic information of Bills in GovTrack . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
7.40 The work-flow of Bills in GovTrack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
7.41 The creation of a tracker in GovTrack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
7.42 A call to Congress in GovTrack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
7.43 Instructions to call the Congress supplied by GovTrack . . . . 195
7.44 The link to the U.S. Government Public Office in GovTrack . 195
7.45 The design of OurSpace for different platforms . . . . . . . . . 198
7.46 The log-in page of OurSpace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
7.47 The main page of OurSpace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
7.48 The creation of a topic in OurSpace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
7.49 The creation of a topic in OurSpace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
7.50 Information about a proposal in OurSpace . . . . . . . . . . . 202
7.51 The creation of a solution in OurSpace . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
7.52 The solutions proposed for a topic in OurSpace . . . . . . . . 203
7.54 The admin button to close a ballot in OurSpace . . . . . . . . 203
7.53 A ballot phase in OurSpace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
7.55 The points and levels of users in OurSpace . . . . . . . . . . . 205
7.56 The leader-board in OurSpace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
7.57 The main page of WikiLegis for the Brazilian Chamber of
Deputies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
7.58 The URI of a document in WikiLegis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
7.59 A report of a deliberation in WikiLegis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
7.60 The three sections of deliberation in WikiLegis . . . . . . . . . 210
7.61 The list of bills under discussion in WikiLegis . . . . . . . . . 211
7.62 The vote of a bill in WikiLegis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
LIST OF FIGURES xi
7.63 The creation of a modification proposal in WikiLegis . . . . . 212
7.64 The list of topics discussed in WikiLegis . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
7.65 The creation of a topic in WikiLegis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
7.66 The discussion on topics in WikiLegis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
7.67 The list of interviews in WikiLegis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
7.68 An interactive interview in WikiLegis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
7.69 The registration page in Parelon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
7.70 The user profile page in Parelon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
7.71 Features of Parelon and their usability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
7.72 The download of the Parelon database . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
7.73 Public and internal assemblies in Parelon . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
7.74 The creation of an issue in Parelon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
7.75 The request of a technical commission in Parelon . . . . . . . 222
7.76 The steps of deliberations in Parelon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
7.77 The list of proposed solution for an issue in Parelon . . . . . . 223
7.78 A supporter of a solution in Parelon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
7.79 The vote of an amendment in Parelon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
8.1 A screen-shoot of the famous first world of Super Mario Bros . 235
8.2 The number of minutes played to Angry Birds every day . . . 236
8.3 Facts about the Video Games market in 2017 . . . . . . . . . 237
8.4 The MDA framework in game design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
8.5 The hierarchy of gamification concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
8.6 List of mechanics, dynamics and components in gamified systems243
8.7 Concepts of gamification between systems and users . . . . . . 244
8.8 Types of players in classical game design . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
8.9 A synthesis of literature on types of players . . . . . . . . . . . 246
8.10 The hexad of players and motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
8.11 Gamified Components, mechanics and dynamics for each type
of player . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
8.12 The SAPS framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
8.13 Positive flow in Games and in Gamified Systems . . . . . . . . 251
LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF FIGURES
8.14 The progression to mastery in gamified systems . . . . . . . . 252
8.15 The on-boarding system of Plants Vs. Zombies . . . . . . . . 253
8.16 The scaffolding system of Plants Vs. Zombies . . . . . . . . . 254
8.17 The Batman On-boarding System in Slack . . . . . . . . . . . 254
8.18 Points, Badges and Leader-boards in SalesForce . . . . . . . . 257
8.19 Points, Badges and Leader-boards in CodeCademy . . . . . . 258
8.20 Points, Badges and Leader-boards in Samsung Nation . . . . . 258
8.21 Example of sticked leader-board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
8.22 The dedicated section of a symbol proposed for SOTY. . . . . 263
8.23 The page dedicated to discussion on nominations. . . . . . . . 264
8.24 The interface for voting symbols without discussion. . . . . . . 264
8.25 The interface for voting symbols after deliberation. . . . . . . 265
8.26 A symbol proposed for soty after the introduction of the leader-
board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
8.27 The timeline of total amount of votes in the SOTY ballot. . . 266
8.28 The amount of votes that were cast in each interval of four
hours in the SOTY ballot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
8.29 The amount of votes that were cast each day in the SOTY
ballot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
8.30 The timeline of votes for the winner of the SOTY ballot. . . . 269
8.31 The timeline of votes for the first competitor of the winner of
the SOTY ballot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
8.32 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “blacklivesmatter” in SOTY ballot . 270
8.33 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “Alan Kurdy” in SOTY ballot . . . . 270
8.34 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “Peace For Paris” in SOTY ballot . . 270
8.35 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “Je Suis Charlie” in SOTY ballot . . 271
LIST OF FIGURES xiii
8.36 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “Face With Tears of Joy Emojy” in
SOTY ballot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
8.37 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “Boat Full Of Syrian Refugee” in
SOTY ballot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
8.38 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “Donald Trump’s Combover” in SOTY
ballot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
8.39 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “Electric Charging Station” in SOTY
ballot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
8.40 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “Certified Vegan Symbol” in SOTY
ballot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
8.41 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “Spinning Wheel of Death” in SOTY
ballot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
8.42 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “The Button” in SOTY ballot . . . . 273
8.43 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “Emoji” in SOTY ballot . . . . . . . 273
8.44 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “Darth Vader Helmet” in SOTY ballot274
8.45 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “The Swipe” in SOTY ballot . . . . 274
8.46 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “Confederate Flag” in SOTY ballot . 274
8.47 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “ISIS/ISIL/Da’esh” in SOTY ballot 275
LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF FIGURES
8.48 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “Deep Dream” in SOTY ballot . . . 275
8.49 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “Representing Migration” in SOTY
ballot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
8.50 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “The Dress” in SOTY ballot . . . . . 276
8.51 Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS
scores change for symbol “Make America Great Again ” in
SOTY ballot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
8.52 The percentage of votes for symbols listed in specific positions
in the SOTY ballot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
9.1 A depiction of Gamified Online Deliberative Systems . . . . . 286
9.2 The Deliberative Space and its Sub-Spaces . . . . . . . . . . . 288
9.3 The Deliberative Interactions Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
9.4 The flow of Gamified Deliberations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
9.5 Non-linear progression of Player Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
9.6 The progression of Player Statuses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
9.7 The progression of Player Levels and Statues . . . . . . . . . . 303
9.8 The first step of a gamified session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
9.9 Example of range of the Consensus Power . . . . . . . . . . . 309
9.10 The second step of a gamified session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
9.11 The third step of a gamified session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
9.12 The status and the level of three players in a sample of Gam-
ified Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
9.13 The Deliberation Cards in a sample of Gamified Session . . . . 317
9.14 The creation of Deliberation Cards in an example of Gamified
Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
9.15 The visualization of Deliberation Cards for three different play-
ers in an example of Gamified Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
LIST OF FIGURES xv
9.16 The Consensus Power of a Deliberation Card in a sample of
Gamified Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
9.17 The initial status of the Deliberation Chat in a sample of Gam-
ified Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
9.18 Example of messages in the Deliberation Chat in an example
of Gamified Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
9.19 The creation of a Solution in the second step of an example of
Gamified Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
9.20 Two different solutions in an example of Gamified Session . . 326
9.21 Two different solutions in an example of Gamified Session . . 327
9.22 The final status of the Deliberation Chat in an example of
Gamified Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
9.23 The third step in an example of Gamified Session . . . . . . . 329
9.24 An abrogation proposal in a sample of Gamified Session . . . . 330
9.25 An modification proposal in a sample of Gamified Session . . . 330
9.26 Different proposals in an example of Gamified Session . . . . . 331
9.27 The list of proposals related to a partition in an example of
Gamified Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
10.1 A screen-shoot of the desktop and non-gamified version of
WONSAMU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
10.2 A screen-shoot of the mobile and non-gamified version of WON-
SAMU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
10.3 A screen-shoot of the main structure of the gamified version
of WONSAMU (Browser) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
10.4 A screen-shoot of the main structure of the gamified version
of WONSAMU (Mobile App) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
10.5 A screen-shoot of the on-boarding system of WONSAMU (Mo-
bile) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
10.6 A screen-shoot of the on-boarding system of WONSAMU (Browser)342
10.7 A screen-shoot of the ideas section when users are not able to
see the contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF FIGURES
10.8 A screen-shoot of the discussions section when users are not
able to see the contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
10.9 A screen-shoot of the proposals section when users are not
able to see the contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
10.10A screen-shoot of the form to change the user name . . . . . . 344
10.11A screen-shoot of the on-boarding system when users gain
their first Deliberation Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
10.12A screen-shoot of the on-boarding system when users click on
the points icon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
10.13A screen-shoot of the on-boarding system when users click on
the pencils icon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
10.14A screen-shoot of the on-boarding system to teach users the
cost of Deliberative Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
10.15A screen-shoot of the ideas section of WONSAMU and the
Deliberation Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
10.16A screen-shoot of the contextual on-boarding in WONSAMU . 348
10.17A screen-shoot of last part of the on-boarding in WONSAMU 349
10.18A screen-shoot of the ideas section in WONSAMU when the
on-boarding ends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
10.19A screen-shoot of the floating menu button in WONSAMU . . 350
10.20A screen-shoot of a flipped card in WONSAMU . . . . . . . . 351
10.21A screen-shoot of the motivations of an idea in WONSAMU . 351
10.22A screen-shoot of a Bill from the Italian Senate displayed in
WONSAMU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352
10.23A screen-shoot of the form to propose an idea in WONSAMU 353
10.24A screen-shoot of the list of Deliberation Chats in WONSAMU354
10.25A screen-shoot of a solution in WONSAMU . . . . . . . . . . 355
10.26The creation of a new solution in WONSAMU . . . . . . . . . 355
10.27An example of Deliberation Chat in WONSAMU . . . . . . . 356
10.28A reply with position change in WONSAMU . . . . . . . . . . 357
10.29A chat message with a normative reference in WONSAMU . . 358
LIST OF FIGURES xvii
10.30A technical approval in a Deliberation Chat in WONSAMU . 358
10.31The proposals section in WONSAMU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
10.32The creation of a modification proposal in WONSAMU . . . . 360
10.33The proposed modifications in WONSAMU . . . . . . . . . . 361
10.34The information about proposals of modifications in WON-
SAMU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
10.35The dedicated chat of a modification proposal in WONSAMU 362
10.36A proposal with overlapping modification in WONSAMU . . . 363
10.37An example of puzzling mini-game in WONSAMU . . . . . . . 364
10.38An example of document sorting in the puzzling mini-game in
WONSAMU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
10.39A screen-shoot of WONSAMU-Social . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
11.1 “La Fiumana”. the second version of “Il Quarto Stato” by
Pellizza da Volpedo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
11.2 Bansky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
11.3 The cover page of Batman N° 1, the New 52 . . . . . . . . . . 413
11.4 Lo Stato Sociale in Assago, April 22nd, 2017 . . . . . . . . . . 413
11.5 The best reward ever . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF FIGURES
List of Tables
2.1 Components of Democracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.1 From Non-Participatory Democracies to full Direct Democracies 67
5.1 The features of the deliberation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.2 Features of Citizens accessing Deliberative Democracies . . . . 107
5.3 Features of inputs accessing deliberations . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.4 Features of decision-making procedures in deliberations . . . . 111
5.5 Features of outputs created by deliberations . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.6 Features of Institutions involved in deliberations . . . . . . . . 115
5.7 Features of Deliberative Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.1 The requirements to implement legitimated online Delibera-
tive Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.1 A list of tools for Online Participatory Democracy and Online
Deliberative Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.2 The legitimacy features implemented by Agora Townhall . . . 169
7.3 The legitimacy features implemented by Airesis . . . . . . . . 178
7.4 The legitimacy features implemented by DemocracyOS . . . . 188
7.5 The legitimacy features implemented by GovTrack . . . . . . . 197
7.6 The legitimacy features implemented by OurSpace . . . . . . . 207
7.7 The legitimacy features implemented by WikiLegis . . . . . . 217
7.8 The legitimacy features implemented by Parelon . . . . . . . . 226
xix
LIST OF TABLES LIST OF TABLES
8.1 Gamified Components, mechanics and dynamics for each type
of player . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
8.2 The amount of votes for each interval of four hours in the
SOTY ballot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
8.3 The amount of votes for each day in the SOTY ballot. . . . . 268
8.4 Table of percentages of votes for symbols listed in specific po-
sitions in the SOTY ballot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
9.1 The transition of inputs from the normative sub-space to the
preferential sub-space in three instances of eGODS . . . . . . 288
9.2 Deliberation Tokens and Deliberation Inks for three examples
of eGODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
9.3 Category of players, roles and tasks in eGODS . . . . . . . . . 295
9.4 Category of players, roles and tasks of an eGODS for Legisla-
tive processes of Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
9.5 Category of players, roles and tasks of an eGODS for Business
Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
9.6 Category of players, roles and tasks of an eGODS for Social
Streets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
9.7 Primary and Secondary Goals for eGODS and players . . . . . 298
9.8 Goals of deliberations and goals of players of an eGODS for
Legislative processes of Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
9.9 Goals of deliberations and goals of players of an eGODS for a
Business Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
9.10 Goals of deliberations and goals of players of an eGODS for a
Social Street . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
9.11 Required points to increase Player Level in eGODS . . . . . . 302
9.12 Player Statues and their related Deliberative Powers . . . . . . 304
9.13 Players Levels and Players Statuses for three examples of eGODS305
9.14 Example of costs for the creation of Deliberation Cards . . . . 306
9.15 Example of costs of Normative Consensus and received Delib-
eration Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
Contents xxi
9.16 Example of costs to increase or to decrease the Consensus Power308
9.17 The status and level of three players in an example of Gamified
Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
9.18 The maximum amount of Deliberative Tokens and Delibera-
tive Ink for Players in a sample of gamified session . . . . . . . 317
9.19 The amount of Deliberative Tokens and Deliberative Ink for
Players in a sample of gamified session . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
9.20 The Deliberation Points of three players after they have per-
formed Deliberative Interactions in an example of Gamified
Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
9.21 The computation of the Consensus Power of a Deliberation
Card in a sample of Gamified Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
9.22 The Deliberation Points of three players after the first step in
an example of Gamified Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
9.23 The total amount of hours for the second step in a sample of
Gamified Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
9.24 The amount of time dedicated to the third step in an example
of Gamified Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
10.1 The results of an example of the puzzling mini-game in WON-
SAMU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
10.2 The legitimacy features implemented by WONSAMU . . . . . 370
xxii LIST OF TABLES
Chapter 1
Introduction
In 2009 the Members of the Parliament of the United Kingdom were
subject to a vast scale scandal related to their expense claims in the previous
year. It may seem that there is nothing uniquely worth of notice in the
previous statement but, in fact, the causes, motivations and results of that
scandal are tremendously related to the work that I have made during my
doctoral research, described in this thesis.
Although the scandal itself broke in 2009 the story started in 2005, when
the Freedom Of Information Act of the United Kingdom came into effect1.
Among other rules, the Freedom Of Information Act of the United Kingdom
states that the Members of the Parliament shall always supply receipts for
their expenses in order to make them publicly available for consultation by
Citizens2. After many deals among the House Of Commons, the Information
Tribunal and the Citizens of the United Kingdom, in June 2009 the expense
claims of Members of Parliaments were released in 458,832 documents. One
of the most-known newspaper of the United Kingdom, The Guardian, decided
1A time-line of the circumstances that led to scandal is available on The Telegraph
Web site at the following address: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-
expenses/6499657/MPs-expenses-scandal-a-timeline.html
2The full text of the Freedom Of Information Act of the UK is publicly available at the
following address: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/pdfs/ukpga 20000036
en.pdf
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to create a Web site in which Citizens would be enabled to check these
expense claims and highlight the ones that seemed to be unfair. After a
week, the Guardian released Investigate Your MP’s expenses3, a Web site
in which Citizens were enabled to check the expenses of the Members of
the Parliament by means of an interface and a process that looked very
similar to a game. In the first 80 hours more than 170.000 documents were
collaboratively analyzed by 22.440 Citizens. Several unfair receipts were
found and published and, as a result, several Members of Parliament were
requested to resign4.
I read the story of Investigate Your MP’s Expenses later, in 2013, in the
book “Reality is Broken: Why games make us better and how they can change
the world” by Jane McGonigal, right before reading a statement by Barack
Obama, talking about a kind of Democracy called “Deliberative Democracy”
in which Citizens are involved in continuous deliberations to solve the issues
of Society, rather than being involved only in one-shoot and sporadic ballots5.
I remember I thought: “Well, why not? After all, in role-playing games
deliberations come always before dices”. In that moment, I realized that my
mind already made a connection among Web applications similar to games,
collaboration, deliberation and Societal issues.
Later in the same year I obtained my Master degree and, after an initial
personal investigation of Democracy models, I submitted my application to
the doctoral program in Legal Informatics with the abstract of this research
program, that revolves all around the following research questions:
3More information about Investigate Your MP’s ex-
penses is available in the following article of The Guardian:
https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2009/jun/18/mps-expenses-
houseofcommons
4More information about the design and the statistic on the usage
of Investigate Your MP’s expenses are available at the following address:
http://www.niemanlab.org/2009/06/four-crowdsourcing-lessons-from-the-guardians-
spectacular-expenses-scandal-experiment/.
5I report the full statement at the very end of chapter 3.
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RQ-0: What is Democracy, and on which elements of Society does it rely?
RQ-1: Is Representative Democracy sufficient to fulfil the needs of current
diverse and pluralist Societies?
RQ-2: Which Democracy models can replace or integrate Representative
Democracies to fill their gaps?
RQ-3: What are the differences among Representative Democracies, Direct
Democracies and Participatory Democracies?
RQ-4: What is Deliberative Democracy, and what are Deliberative Systems?
RQ-5: Which legitimacy features must Deliberative Systems have, and what
are the requirements to implement them?
RQ-6: Are there Online tools for Deliberative Democracies or for Delibera-
tive Systems that implement the needed legitimacy features?
RQ-7: What are gamified systems, and how can they be used to implement
legitimated Online Deliberative Systems?
RQ-8: Is it possible to design a theoretical model of Gamified Online Delib-
erative Systems and Extensions of Gamified Online Systems?
RQ-9: How to implement Gamified Online Deliberative Systems and Ex-
tensions of Gamified Online Systems?
In the three parts of this thesis, I address all the above research questions
by studying, analyzing, criticizing and matching literature and my personal
explorations in diverse contexts of study: Philosophy, Laws, Legal Informat-
ics, Human Computer Interaction, Game-Design, and Gamification.
Chapter 2 is aimed to address the first one of my research goals and, so,
to understand what is Democracy from a philosophical and law perspective,
and what are the elements that constitute it. In order to address this re-
search question, firstly I have found different definitions of Democracies and
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matched them with definitions of concepts belonging to other contexts. More
specifically, I found that the most accepted definitions of Democracy revolve
around decision-making procedures aiming to solve conflicting interests of
Citizens by involving them in selecting options that they retain proper to
satisfy their needs. In these definitions, there is a certain lack of information
about the characteristics of options that Citizens can select, and the prop-
erties that outcomes of decision-making procedures must have. For these
reasons, I propose a definition of Democracy obtained by matching it with
the concept of “interesting choices” borrowed by game-design theories, and
the concept of “Usability” from studies on Human Computer Interaction.
The definition of Democracy that I give also highlights one of the con-
cepts on which Democracies must be built: the legitimacy, meaning that
regardless of their actual implementations, Democracies can subsist only if
they are legitimated. Scholars of Democracies have exposed different modes
to evaluate the legitimacy of Democracies. More specifically, the classical
theories of legitimacy can be dived into those that evaluate legitimacy by
considering the outcomes of Democracies, those that evaluate legitimacy by
considering the decision-making procedures of Democracies, and those that
evaluate legitimacy by considering both the procedures and the outcomes.
While from a classical perspective the legitimacy of Democracy is re-
lated only on decision-making procedures and the output they produce, new
scholars of Democracies introduced another parameter for the evaluation of
legitimacy, the inputs, theorizing a three-dimensional framework for the eval-
uation of legitimacy. This is particularly needed in those contexts, such as
the European Union, in which inputs can be very diverse and plural. How-
ever, as I argue in section 2.4, this three-dimensional framework is not enough
for a proper evaluation of legitimacy, due to the fact that it does not con-
sider the way inputs enter the democracies, what happen to outcomes after
they are produced by means of decision making-procedures, and how de-
liberation is performed in these decision making procedures. In a nutshell,
the three-dimensional-framework does not consider the Citizens who create
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inputs for the Democracies, the Institutions who handle the Democratic Out-
comes after they have been produced, and the ways the discussions occurs
in Democracies.
I conclude chapter 2 describing a set of six components among which the
legitimacy of modern Democracies should be evaluated. The components
of the framework and, so, of Democracies, are: Citizens, Inputs, Decision-
Making Procedures, Discussions, Outputs and Institutions.
In chapter 3, I answer research questions RQ-1, RQ-2 and RQ-3, starting
by exposing different models of Democracies and explaining how the com-
ponents that I have previously listed are involved in them. I start from
Representative Democracy that, nowadays, is the most common model of
Democracy used around the world, as I explain in section 3.1. Representa-
tive Democracies revolve around the concept that, since it is not possible to
involve all the Citizens in Democratic procedures, they must elect delegates
on the basis of their skills and by means of ballots based on the majority rule.
Although Representative Democracies are proved to be very effective in So-
cieties based on commerce, capitalism and development, they are currently
facing a world-wide crisis mostly due to the fact that representatives may
not act in transparent ways, causing problems such as the events happened
in the United Kingdom in 2009 that I have previously explained.
The current crisis of Representative Democracies is not only related to
their legitimacy. On one hand, Citizens are depriving Representative Democ-
racies of their legitimacy because they do not trust anymore representative
nor Institutions. On the other hand, Representative Democracies are becom-
ing technically ineffective to Govern globalized Societies. Indeed, the more
Citizens and inputs entering Democratic procedures are diverse and plural,
the more the system of delegation becomes quite complex to be handled in
legitimated ways. For instance, since one of the requirements for the le-
gitimacy of Democracies is a balancing in individuals involved in Political
discussions, delegates in Parliaments should match the demography of the
nations. And this is unfeasible both because it would be too expensive, and
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it would be quite impossible for Institutions based on slow bureaucracy to
follow the fast turnover of demography.
Also by leveraging on the crisis of representation, several political move-
ments raised overall the world, claiming the will to be governed by means of
new forms of Direct Democracies. These Democracies models differ from the
ones based on representation because they involve Citizens more frequently
into Democratic decision-making processes. As I expose in section 3.2, Di-
rect Democracies can be implemented in different ways, also in combination
with systems of representation like in Switzerland, where several referenda
are issued during a single year. Unfortunately, although Direct Democracies
based on referenda are a more transparent and legitimated way to achieve
Democratic decisions, they are still affected by the same issues of representa-
tive Democracies. For instance, as I have explained in sections 2.1, 3.1, and
3.2, there could be situations in which Citizens create Democratic outcomes
by means of a referendum but Institutions do not accept them, causing a loss
of trust and legitimacy for both referenda and Institutions.
Another Direct Democracy model is called Participatory Democracy, and
was originally implemented in South American and European Countries to
collaboratively discuss towns’ budgets, as I explain in sections 3.2.2 and
3.2.3. Practices of Participatory Budgeting are proved to be very effective
and trusted by Citizens, so much that they laid the foundation to the idea
that Participatory practices could be used for all Democratic decision-making
procedures, rather than simply using them for addressing economic issues.
Also by leveraging on the dissatisfaction caused by the economic crisis of
2008, several political movements and activist groups started to promote
Participatory Democracy as a solution for issues of Representative Democ-
racies.
Unfortunately, as I expose in section 3.4, Participatory Democracy also
present issues related to their legitimacy. Firstly, although some populist
parties can claim that Citizens are intrinsically motivated to be continuously
engaged in Participatory Democracies to replace corrupted politicians and
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Representatives, as I explain in section 6.4, it is proved that motivations
of human-beings to remain active in activities are quite complex. Secondly
and lastly, although Participatory Democracies involve Citizens in arguing
before taking decisions, in the end they are requested to express preferences,
meaning that the last word is given to the majority rule. This means that,
as I expose in sections 3.1 and 6.5, ballots can be cheated in the same way as
in Representative Democracies and, so, by exploiting traditional and social
media in order to create biased discussions and ballots.
Having acknowledged all the issues related to Representative Democracies
and Participatory Democracies, in chapter 4, I start answering research ques-
tion RQ-4, by exposing an alternative model of democracy, the Deliberative
Democracy, that could solve these issues.
Deliberative Democracy is a kind of Democracy in which Citizens are
engaged in genuine discussions aimed to reach a consensus. Although a
very first idea of Deliberative Democracy may be traced back to Aristotele,
as I explain in section 4.1, in the last fifty years, starting by theories of
Jurgen Habermas, Deliberative Democracies are receiving renewed attention.
Several scholars of Democracies models have studied the traits of Deliberative
Democracies and delineated four generations of theories about it.
The first and second generations of scholars of Deliberative Democracies
exposed the traits of deliberations from a theoretical perspective, mostly by
taking into account the normative and philosophical concepts related to the
legitimacy of Deliberative Democracies. While the first generation of schol-
ars focuses on more generic models of deliberations, without any concerns on
the demography of individuals involved in discussions, the second generation
strengthens the theories of the first one by demonstrating the feasibility and
the legitimacy of Deliberative Democracies also in those Societies charac-
terized by wide diversity and pluralism of Citizens. Eventually, after having
enumerated and deeply investigated several features that deliberation groups
must have, scholars of the first two generations of Deliberative Democracies
conclude that Citizens are likely to agree if they are properly driven to dis-
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cuss.
Classical theories of Deliberative Democracies, that I deeply investigate
in section 4.2, , received several criticisms, mostly concerning the Democratic
capacities of Citizens to deliberate, the actual improvements that Deliber-
ative Democracies would bring to the Society and, most important, some
critics are concerned by the fact that Deliberative Democracies would actu-
ally be dangerous for the Society. In other words, since not all the Citizens
can have a proper education to deliberate about complex topics, deliberations
could be flown into infinite arguing or, as well as in Representative Democ-
racies, there could be malicious individuals exploiting biases of human beings
involved in decision-making procedures, which could drive them to achieve
irrational choices.
Scholars of the third Generation of Deliberative Democracies, mostly
Dryzek, by proposing an actual implementation of Deliberative Democra-
cies and studying empirical results of their experiments, demonstrate that
the issues raised by critics can be solved by structuring the deliberation and
the consensus in specific ways. As I deeply cover in section 4.3, firstly scholars
demonstrated that by allowing Citizens to use diverse modes of communica-
tion, issues related to education and Democratic capacities of Citizens can be
overcome. This is due to the fact that individuals would use the communica-
tion style that they retain more appropriate to explain their ideas, regardless
to their education. Secondly, scholars demonstrated that by considering the
consensus as a form of composed consensus, also the issues related to infinite
deliberations would be addressed. In other words, although Citizens do not
reach a full consensus, they can agree on normative, epistemic or preferential
values, and this can be considered a consensus too.
However, as I explain in sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2, and 4.3.3, scholars of the
third generation still exposes empirical results of experiments made on small
sets of Citizens who deliberate on specific topics as in Participatory Budget-
ing. For this reason, they receive critics stating that, although Deliberation
seems to work better than representation, it could not be applicable on large
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scale Democracies, such as in whole Countries.
Scholars of the fourth generation of Deliberative Democracies solved this
issue by introducing the concept of Deliberative Systems. Very counter-
intuitively they expose that, by considering as feasible some of the features
exposed by theorists of the first and second generations, Deliberative Democ-
racies could also be effectively used at local or national level. More specif-
ically, scholars argue that by allowing asynchronous deliberations and dis-
tributing them among different places, it is possible to create the Deliberative
Systems and, so, models of Democracies that allow a continuous delibera-
tions by means of interconnected, open, accessible and unobstructed tools. In
Deliberative Systems, although Citizens deliberate on small issues related
to restricted areas, they contribute to the Democratic needs of their larger
geographic area.
In chapter 5, also in order to answer to my research question RQ-5, I
collect and summarize all the legitimacy features that scholars of the fourth
generations expose, and that Deliberative Systems must implement. Also, I
try to fill a gap in the state of the art of studies on Deliberative Systems.
Indeed, by matching the legitimacy features with the proper components of
Democracies they belong to, that I expose in section 2.4, I define a framework
to evaluate in a more simple way the legitimacy of Deliberative Systems by
evaluating legitimacy of their components one by one.
Eventually, to conclude the first part of this thesis, and to fully answer
research question RQ-5, I discuss a list of requirements to implement the
legitimacy features of Deliberative Systems, and I deeply explain how De-
liberative Systems deployed on the Internet and the Web can implement
asynchronous, continuous, ubiquitous and open deliberations. In section 6.1,
to reply to critics of Online Democracies stating that they can not be legiti-
mated because of the digital divide and other issues related to the accessibility
of the web, I expose the requirements for Institutions that want to foster De-
liberative Systems in their Countries, and the requirements for the design of
accessible and usable Web applications for deliberations.
10 1. Introduction
Having addressed the requirements to implement ubiquitous and contin-
uous deliberations, I move forward to explain how Deliberative Systems can
be interconnected by relying on, and by producing, data and documents se-
rialized by means of common standards for Linked Open Data, as I describe
in section 6.2. The use of these standards is also a fundamental require-
ment to implement traceable, transparent and reliable deliberations. More-
over, Linked Open Data allow Citizens to monitor the outcomes produced
by decision-making procedures in Deliberative Systems, the very first feature
that must be implemented to allow Citizens to change their opinions about
discussed topics.
Standards for Linked Open Data, especially for the markup of laws, are
the very first requirement for the implementation of Systems based on De-
liberative Interactions and Deliberative Consensus and aimed to more trans-
parent Democracies, as I expose in section 6.3. For instance, the Freedom
Of Information Act of the United Kingdom, that started the story of Inves-
tigate Your MP’s Expenses, is fully marked-up in AkomaNtoso, an OASIS
standard that I describe in section 6.2, is publicly available online and, thanks
to AkomaNtoso, is readable by both human-beings and machines.
However, on one hand, if the expense claims of Members of the Parlia-
ment of the United Kingdom involved in the scandal were serialized with a
standard for the Linked Open Data, probably the entire process of finding
unfair receipts would be simpler and faster. On the other hand, a sim-
plification of the process to find incriminated receipts of British politicians
would decrease the motivation of British Citizens to thoroughly search the
receipts. In section 6.4, I explain what are the intrinsic and extrinsic mo-
tivations that could move Citizens to participate in Deliberative Systems,
and why one of the fundamental requirements of Deliberative Systems is to
be designed to nurture these motivations. However, when human-beings are
involved in decisions-making processes, they are at risk of taking irrational
decisions because of their cognitive biases, largely studied in literature and
summarized in section 6.5. This may happen also, and in some situations
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more likely, when actions of individuals are rewarded to nurture their ex-
trinsic motivation, like in games that constantly reward players with points
or other stuff. Although cognitive biases are not always dangerous, and in
some situations can even be exploited to help Citizens to reach a consensus,
a Deliberative System that aims to implement legitimacy features must be
designed to properly avoid or exploit these biases.
I conclude the first part of this research work by matching the features
for the legitimacy of Deliberative Systems with the requirements that must
be respected to implement them and, in section 6.6, I expose a framework for
the evaluation of legitimacy of Deliberative Systems based on their features
and these requirements.
In the second part of this thesis, more specifically in chapter 7, I explore
the current state of the art of Online tools for Deliberative Democracies in
order to answer research question RQ-6. In section 7.1, I start the analy-
sis by listing the criteria that I used to select the tools for it and, after a
deep description of each of them, I asses their legitimacy by means of the
framework defined in section 6.6. Although the analyzed tools can not be
considered Deliberative Systems, because Deliberative Systems where firstly
introduced in literature very recently, by addressing their legitimacy with my
framework I investigate the possibility to connect these tools to other even-
tual Deliberative Systems. The outcomes of the analysis show that none of
the tools is designed to avoid or exploit cognitive biases, and to nurture in-
trinsic and extrinsic motivations of Citizens, with the exception of a system
that I describe in section 7.6, which uses a few sets of games elements for
this purpose.
Games and games elements, if used properly, are very effective to drive
individuals to perform specific tasks, for training purposes and to satisfy
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of human-beings. In chapter 8.1, I answer
research question RQ-7 by describing how theories of game-design gave the
birth to theories of gamification-design, a brand-new field of study in the
area of the Human Computer Interaction.
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In the last ten years, online games and particularly Massive Online Mul-
tiplayer Games, that I define in section 8.1 have significantly improved their
usage statistics, also due to the diffusion of mobile devices like smart-phones.
Several business companies, non-profit organizations and Institutions started
to think of ways to use mechanics of games to engage individuals in contexts
not strictly related to games, exactly like The Guardians did during the scan-
dal related to the Members of Parliaments of the United Kingdom. Following
this trend, as I explain in section 8.1, scholars introduced in literature the
gamification and, so, started to theorize and empirically analyze the effects
of the introduction of elements borrowed by games in other contexts.
Concepts and elements of Gamification were classified and deeply investi-
gated in order to understand how they can be applied to contexts external to
games, mostly to software and online platforms, in order to engage users to
remain active on systems and drive their behaviours. In a nutshell, gamified
systems are aimed to match specific elements of games, that I enumerate in
section 8.2, to different type of users, the players, in order to nurture their
specific intrinsic and extrinsic motivations to use software or Web applica-
tions, as I explain in section 8.3.
One of the intrinsic motivations driving the humans behaviour, regard-
less to the characteristics of individuals, is the mastering and, so, the need
to improve their own capacity and master specific tasks and knowledge. This
is particularly important in Deliberative Systems, because Citizens need to
have the proper deliberative capacities to contribute effectively and efficiently
to deliberations. In section 8.4 I explain how the deliberative capacity of Cit-
izens can be enhanced by implementing mechanisms of progression through
levels and statuses. Online Deliberative Systems must be designed to include
a first phase of on-boarding, in which Citizens are instructed on the basic fea-
tures of the system and, as soon as they improve their skills, Citizens must
be provided with new kind of Deliberative Interactions, by implementing
mechanisms of scaffolding.
While Citizens are involved in Deliberative Interactions aimed to reach
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Deliberative Consensuses, their extrinsic motivations and, so, their need to
receive feedback on their actions and rewards for them, must be constantly
feed-up. The most common elements that gamified systems use for this scope
are points, badges and leader-boards, that I extensively define and describe
in section 8.5. Although these gamified components can be very effective
to drive the behaviour of users, they must be used wisely due to two main
reasons. The first one is that points, badges and leader-boards can not be
inserted in systems as floating elements felt by Citizens as disconnected from
the other parts of systems. The gamification must be designed in order to
give reasoned and meaningful rewards to Citizens, according to explicit rules
specified by the system. The second reason is that these elements, if designed
improperly, may contribute to create biased deliberations and ballots.
During my research period at Stanford University, I developed a gami-
fied Web application to manage the ballot for The Symbol Of The Year, a
yearly ballot held by the Psychology department of the university. In sec-
tion 8.6 I describe how I have used leader-boards in the ballot structured in
specific ways, and how these leader-boards have contributed to drive electors
to change their opinions about their preferred symbols, and more naturally
agree on winners of the ballot. Although the system was also designed to fos-
ter deliberation among electors, it did not serve to this scope and Deliberative
Interactions were very scarce during the period of the ballot.
In chapter 9 I explore the literature on Gamification in Online Participa-
tory Democracies and Online Deliberations and, starting by literature and
lessons learned with the system for the election of the Symbol Of The Year, I
define, design and describe Gamified Online Deliberative Systems (hereinafter
GODS ) and extensions of Gamified Online Deliberative Systems (hereinafter
eGODS ).
The final goal of Chapter 9 is to answer to my research question RQ-
8 and, so, expose the specifics of completely gamified Deliberative Systems
called GODS and eGODS that I define in section 9.2. Having acknowledged
that gamified systems can foster Deliberative Interactions and Deliberative
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Consensus only if their design does not simply rely on points, badges and
leader-boards, in sections 9.3 and 9.4 I define the structure of spaces and
dimensions of eGODS by following common practices of game-design, and
in sections 8.3 and 9.6, I expose the different type of players that can be
involved in eGODS and their goals.
In order to give Citizens a feeling of continuity among the diverse actions
that they can perform in one or more eGODS, the gamified sessions must
follow standard guidelines and rules. More specifically, regardless to the final
aim of the Deliberative Systems, they must be designed to drive Citizens to
reach a consensus on three types of values. The first ones are the normative
values and, so, the “whys” of Citizens needs. The second ones are the epis-
temic values and, so, the “hows” Citizens intend to solve their issues. The
third ones are the preferential values and, so, the “what”, specific implemen-
tations of the solutions that are proposed for Societal issues. By reaching
these three kind of consensus, and by stepping through the gamified spaces
dedicated to them, Citizens progress in the system and, as a consequence,
improve their Deliberative and Democratic Capacities by being continuously
engaged in satisfying deliberations.
I conclude chapter 9 by deeply describing an example of a complete gami-
fied session in a eGODS aimed to drive Citizens to propose, discuss, and agree
on amendments to bills and laws that they retain useful to solve specific Soci-
etal issues. In chapter 10, in order to answer my last research question RQ-9,
I describe the interface and functioning of WONSAMU, an implementation
of eGODS for the process of amendment proposals that I have explained in
the previous statement.
In section 10.1 I describe the current status of the implementation of
WONSAMU and list its main features. To implement all the legitimacy fea-
tures of Deliberative Systems exposed in chapter 5, WONSAMU follows all
the requirements listed in chapter 6. Among the others, very worth of notice
are the way in which it uses and produces Linked Open Data, and its design
completely based on inclusive, responsive and usable standards frameworks.
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Also, by being gamified and based on properly designed Deliberative Interac-
tions and mechanisms to reach Deliberative Consensuses, WONSAMU fulfils
the requirements needed to nurture the motivation of Citizens and avoid the
most common cognitive biases.
As I describe in section 10.2, Citizens are welcomed in WONSAMU by
a thorough on-boarding system, teaching them the usage of the system and
driving them towards the first levels of the game aimed to the exploration
of deliberative functions and areas that WONSAMU supplies. After having
acquired basic knowledge of the system, as I describe in section 10.3, Citizens
can start to explore the needs of other Citizens and express their negative
or positive consensus on them. In WONSAMU, Citizens can interact with
other Citizens by means of special chats, defined in section 10.4, that extend
classical chats by supplying Citizens functionalities to change their opinion
in reply to a message, or to use different modes of languages like links to bills,
laws and videos. To avoid digressions and implement concepts of games and
gamification, WONSAMU supplies limited sets of token to Citizens, called
pencils and ink, and each interaction in WONSAMU has a cost in terms of
these tokens. By doing so, WONSAMU avoid digressions among Citizens and
common cognitive biases, by fostering Citizens to explore the topics discussed
in the system, while participating only in deliberations in which they are really
interested.
Gamified sessions in WONSAMU end with discussions of proposals aimed
to drive Citizens to collaboratively propose and deliberate on actual amend-
ments to laws that can satisfy their needs. I describe this process in section
10.5, in which I also show that, although WONSAMU implements balloting
phases based on the Combined Approval Voting described in section 8.6 and,
so, uses a form of majority rule to discriminate preferences of Citizens, the
decision-making procedures expose all the outcomes produced by Citizens
and assign to them a Consensus Power, that can be used by Citizens and
Institutions to understand the most preferred and discussed outcomes.
I conclude this work with section 10.6 and chapter 11, in which I ex-
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pose that, provided that Institutions allow GODS and eGODS to enter the
Democratic System, WONSAMU implements all the legitimacy features of
Deliberative Systems and could be a valid first implementation of Gamified
Online Deliberative System. Of course, further work and experimentation,
as listed in chapter 11, must be done in order to refine the functioning of
WONSAMU, and more generically of eGODS, and systematically use them
in Societies as a replacement or an integration of other models of Democra-
cies.
Part I
Democracies and Deliberative
Systems
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Chapter 2
Structures of Democracies
The aim of this chapter is to describe the concept of Democracy and the
other concepts related to it. Firstly, I define Democracies and I highlight the
main concepts that characterize Democracies. Secondly, I describe different
conceptions of legitimacy of Democracies. Thirdly, and lastly, I expose the
essential components of Democracies, and I clarify the reasons behind the
importance of analyzing them when assessing legitimacy of Democracies.
2.1 Defining Democracy
The word Democracy derives from the conjunction of the Greek words δῆ-
μος (de`mos), meaning the People, and κράτος (cra`tos), meaning power. The
word refers to a system of government characterized by popular sovereignty.
To define more accurately what a Democracy is, I will start by taking
into account the most powerful statement about Democracy in the modern
history. In the famous Gettysburg Address1, Abraham Lincoln have referred
1The Gettysburg Address refers to a speech made in November 1863 by the President
of the US Abraham Lincoln, during the dedication ceremony for the National Cemetery of
Gettysburg in Pennsylvania, that was the site of one of the most important and bloodiest
battles of the Civil War. A full draft of the Gettysburg Address is supplied by the site of
the US Library of Congress (https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/gettysburg-address/ext/trans-
nicolay-copy.html).
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to Democracy as the: “Government of the People, by the People, for the
People”.
The dictum means clearly that Democracies revolve all around the People.
In Democratic systems, Citizens can affect the public sphere of their countries
by participating in legislative processes directly, and so by taking part in
political decision-making, or indirectly, by delegating their power to other
people, or to other groups of people.
Although there are many different systems of Democracy, the distinction
between direct or indirect involvement of the People in Governmental activ-
ities, resolves in the very first classification of Democracy models. Models of
Not-Representative Democracies are those in which Citizens are designated
to Democratic decision-making processes. Models of Representative Democ-
racies are those in which Citizens choose who must participate in Democratic
decision-making processes [1, p. 1]. Figure 2.1a and Figure 2.1b show a de-
piction of Not-Representative and Representative Democracies.
Figure 2.1: The People in Not-Representative Democracies and Representative Democ-
racies
(a) Not-Representative Democracy
(b) Representative Democracy
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The etymology of the word Democracy, the assertion of Abraham Lincoln
about it, and the classification of Democracies in not-representative ones and
representative ones, underpin the very first traits of Democracies:
1. Democracies are made by Citizens;
2. Democracies are managed by Citizens, directly or indirectly;
3. Democracies are intended to produce useful outcomes for Citizens.
Of course, social, economic and historical events contributed to decline a
plethora of models both of Representative Democracies and Not-Representative
Democracies. Electoral Democracy, Parliamentary Democracy, Totalitarian
Democracy, Constitutional Democracy, and Internet based Democracies like,
e-Democracy and i-Democracy, are kinds of Representative Democracies.
The list of Not-Representative Democracies includes, as a limited exemplify-
ing set, Direct Democracy, Consensus Democracy, Participatory Democracy,
Deliberative Democracy, and Not-Representative Democracies based on new
technologies, like Liquid Democracy and e-Participation.
The alternation of different Democracies over time also produced more
complex definitions of Democracy rather than the simple definition “power
to the People”. A good definition of modern Democracies, extracted from
famous definitions by Joseph Schumpeter and Max Weber, is the following
one by Seymour Martin Lipset [2]:
“[A Democracy] is a social mechanism for the resolution of the
problem of societal decision-making among conflicting interest
groups which permits the largest part possible of the population
to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among
alternative contenders for political office.”
Despite this is a quite perfect and complete definition, it is more aimed to
Representative Democracies rather than Not-Representative ones, due to the
fact it involves the necessity to delegate the political office to someone. Also,
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it assumes that Citizens, or groups of them, have always conflicting interests.
However, the definition emphasizes three more key aspects of Democracies:
4. Democracies revolve their functioning around decision-making proce-
dures that are legitimated by Citizens, and so that are accepted as
proper by Citizens;
5. Democracies revolve around individuals or groups of them making choices;
6. Democratic decision-making processes result in one or more outcomes
that are useful for the Society, and Democracies may be enhanced by
the same outcomes.
By extracting these latter key aspects, and merging them with previous
three, the following may be a better definition of Democracy:
“A Democracy is a form of Government based on legitimated
decision-making processes that produce useful outcomes, for the
Society and for the Democracy itself, by allowing Citizens to
choose among different alternatives. These processes are, directly
or indirectly, designed, enforced, maintained and participated by
Citizens.”
Even if the above is a more generic definition that fixes issues in Lipset’s
one, it still raises certain ambiguities concerning the allowance of Citizens to
choose among alternatives. While freedom of choice must be inexorably as-
sumed, the set of alternatives must not contain options not germane to points
debated in Democratic decision-making processes. Also, and definitely more
important, the statement “to choose among different alternatives”, clearly
bestows more importance to have a set of defined alternatives, rather than
to have alternatives that may be relevant to Citizens. For the purpose to solve
these ambiguities, let’s just consider for a while Democracies as games2, and
2Although it may seem a rash parallelism, the idea of a comparison between systems
of Government, or their institutions, and games, is not new in literature. Huizinga in
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acknowledge one of the most elegant definition of games by Sid Meir3. He
defined games as the following [5]:
Definition 1 (Game by Sid Meier). Games are series of interesting deci-
sions.
According to Meier [6], interesting decisions, or interesting choices, have
the following attributes: (1) they involve some kind of trade-off; (2) they
allow deciders to express their personal style; (3) they are situational; (4)
they are persistent and affect the system for a period of time; (5) they are
informed.
Interesting choices perfectly fit in Democratic decision-making processes.
Indeed, when Citizens are demanded to democratically choose a preference
in lieu of another one, all the above five attributes must be met or, at
least, should be met. Firstly, Citizens must elaborate compromises to se-
lect their preferences. Secondly, they should opt for the alternative that best
expresses their ideas. Thirdly, Citizens’ choices must be circumscribed to the
Democratic decision-making process they are taking part to in that moment.
Fourthly, Citizens must be informed before being asked to select an alterna-
tive. Lastly, as long as Citizens are informed, they must be allowed to make
choices continuously and their decisions must have effects on the Society and
on the Democracy for a specific amount of time.
The definition of Democracy obtained by introducing the concept of in-
teresting choices, and by reformulating the previous one, is the following:
his work “Homo Ludens”, introduced for the first time his famous concept of the “Magic
Circle”, while he was underpinning shared features between play contexts and Courts [3,
p. 77]. For Huizinga, when Human Beings play, they enter in a Magic Circle, where
they acquire temporarily new identities, and differences and social ranks are abolished
during the whole playing period. And, for instance, Huizinga identified Courts of Justice
as perfect examples of Magic Circles.
3Sid Meier is one of the most famous designer and developer of strategy video games.
He created, among the others, Pirates!™ and Civilization™. The latter is deemed to be one
of the best strategy games ever and it is also the subject of famous studies on education
through games [4].
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“A Democracy is a form of Government based on legitimated
decision-making processes that are, directly or indirectly, designed,
enforced, maintained and participated by Citizens. A Democracy
engages Citizens to achieve interesting choices aimed to produce
useful outcomes, for the Society and for the Democracy itself.”
The above interpretation is great to define one of the two sides of Democ-
racies, and so to describe Democratic decision-making processes and all the
aspects of involvement of Citizens in them. Nonetheless, the definition still
has flaws regarding the other side of Democratic decision-making processes,
and so regarding their outcomes. As a matter of fact, the words “useful out-
comes”, are too much abstract to describe the outcomes that proper Democ-
racies should produce. To address this issue it is possible, again, to borrow
a definition from a context external to Democracies. Let’s consider the fol-
lowing definition of “Usability”, as specified by the ISO standard 9241-11
[7]:
Definition 2 (Usability). The extent to which a product can be used by
specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and
satisfaction in a specified context of use.
Although it is not a goal of this research to extensively explain what
Usability is4, we can highlight three aspects that are useful for a better de-
scription of the outcomes of Democratic decision-making processes: (1) the
“efficacy”, meaning that an outcome solves an issue; (2) the “efficiency”,
meaning that an outcome solves an issue in the best possible way; (3) the
“satisfaction”, meaning that Citizens are satisfied both by the outcome itself,
and by the process that drove them to produce the outcome. When talk-
ing of these concepts in relation to Democracy, not only they are useful to
4Usability refers mostly to computer software products and to their interfaces. A
software interface is usable if it allows its users to accomplish tasks effectively, efficiently
and in satisfying ways. There is a broad literature about Usability. See, for instance,
Bevan and Nigel, 2001 [8], to have a good starting point.
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give better specifications of the outcomes of Democratic processes, but also
introduce an important characteristic of Citizens involved in Democratic pro-
cesses. In fact, a proper Democratic decision-making process, must aim to
be satisfying for participating Citizens, and to produce effective and efficient
outcomes for the Society and the Democracy itself. By taking into account
all of the above, the definition of Democracies become:
“A Democracy is a form of Government based on legitimated
decision-making processes that are, directly or indirectly, designed,
enforced, maintained and participated by Citizens. A Democ-
racy engages Citizens to achieve interesting choices aimed to pro-
duce effective and efficient outcomes, for the Society and for the
Democracy itself, while keeping Citizens satisfied.”
Lastly, and very briefly, there is just one more word to add to the defini-
tion. Because Democracies are all about Society, and Society is a matter of
collaboration, it is a most-wanted requirement that Citizens approach Demo-
cratic decision-making processes in a collaborative way. Of course Citizens
may have conflicting interests, but this does not mean that they always have
to struggle in order to solve them. The more they collaborate, the faster
they will find a solution for issues.
Eventually, by adding this very last concept, Democracy is defined as the
following:
Definition 3 (Democracy). A Democracy is a form of Government based
on legitimated collaborative decision-making processes that are, directly or
indirectly, designed, enforced, maintained and participated by Citizens. In
Democracies, Citizens are engaged in creating, discussing, and selecting in-
teresting choices aimed to produce legitimated outcomes, that are effective,
efficient, and satisfying for the Society, and for the Democracy itself.
The above definition 3 includes concepts that deserve further investiga-
tion. A Democracy, no matter being a Representative one or a Direct one,
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needs to deal with these parameters. Next sections are aimed to more exten-
sively explain these concepts and how to analyze the legitimacy of different
models of Democracies by means of them.
2.2 Democracies Concepts
In the previous section, I have derived a definition of Democracies that
should be suitable to explain the complexity of Democracies. To achieve it,
definition 3 takes into account several concepts.
Firstly, and most important, it is related to the concept of legitimacy.
Secondly, it addresses a clear separation between Democratic decision-making
procedures, and Democratic outcomes. Lastly, the definition revolves around
two concepts related to Democratic outcomes, specifically their effectiveness
and their efficiency.
Different models of Democracies may be analyzed only after having ac-
quired a clear understanding of the above concepts.
The most important concept when talking about Democracy is its legiti-
macy. The word “legitimacy” derives from the Latin “legitimatus” that is the
past participle of “legitimare”, and so “make lawful, declare to be lawful”5.
The relationship between law and legitimacy is still preserved in the cur-
rent English acceptation of the word. According to the Cambridge British
Dictionary6, “legitimacy” refers to:
Definition 4 (Legitimacy in the Cambridge Online Dictionary). The quality
of being legal.
The above definition 4 is confirmed and extended by the Oxford British
Dictionary7, that defines “legitimacy” as follows:
5Legitimacy in the Online Etymology Dictionary
(http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=legitimate).
6Legitimacy in the Cambridge British Dictionary
(http://dictionary.cambridge.org/it/dizionario/inglese/legitimacy).
7Legitimacy in the Oxford British Dictionary
(https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/legitimacy).
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Definition 5 (Legitimacy in the Oxford Online Dictionary). (1) Conformity
to the law or to rules and; (2) Ability to be defended with logic or justification;
validity.
Both the etymology and the two English definitions of the word, revolve
around two aspects of legitimacy. On the one side, legitimacy is related to
a quality, more specifically, it is related to the quality of being “legal” or
“lawful”. This means that products of Democracies must be measurable
with specific metrics derived by laws that establish legislative systems of
Democratic countries. On the other side, the above definitions also refers
to the process of “making lawful” or “justify” the products of Democracy
even “before” they become products. In other words, this means that also
complex decision-making processes, that eventually result in a Democratic
products, must be measured and evaluated in some way.
The following five questions, may address more clearly the need to con-
sider legitimacy both when considering Democratic decision-making pro-
cedures, and when considering products of Democracies. Also, the five
questions clarify differences between quantitative and qualitative analysis
of Democratic products, to the extent they are conceived in relation to the
effectiveness and in relation to the efficiency of outcomes.
1. Is the Government system recognized as a true Democracy by the Cit-
izens?
2. Are the Institutions that administrate the Democratic process recog-
nized as Authorities by Citizens?
3. Is the Democratic decision-making process agreed by Citizens taking
part, directly or indirectly, in it?
4. How many outcomes does the model produce?
5. Do generated outcomes enhance the Society and the Democratic pro-
cess itself?
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The first three questions are needed to analyze the legitimacy of Democra-
cies. The last two questions are intended to analyze the outcomes of Democ-
racies and their effectiveness and efficiency. A very first assessment of legiti-
macy of specific Democracies may be achieved by taking into account all the
above questions together.
To understand the motivations that underlay the first question, we must
go back to Aristotle and to the three kind of possible Government that he
enumerated in his work “Politics” [9]. He stated that:
“The true forms of government ... are those in which the one, or
the few, or the many govern, with a view to the common interest.”
More specifically, he identified three of such true forms of Government:
Monarchy, Oligarchy and Democracy8. In Monarchies, the ruler is just one
person, typically a king or a queen. In Oligarchies, Government is designated
to restricted elites of few persons. In Democracies, the power is distributed
and divided among everyone. Against this background, by going back to the
first of the above questions, it is now clear that a Government system can be
legitimated as a Democracy only if Citizens have the clear perception that
the power is in their hands, and not in the hands of one or few people. No
matter if they are requested to elect someone to take part in the Democratic
decision-making process, or if they are requested to directly take part in it. A
Democracy is legitimated only if the People, as a whole, is the Government.
The analysis of legitimacy of Democracies by means of questions two
and three may be better understood by comparing models of Democracy to
games, like I already did in section 2.1.
Under a game perspective of Democracy, while the first of the above
questions is intended to legitimate “the game” as “an actual game”, questions
two and three are intended to legitimate the “arbitrator of the game”, and
the “rules of the game”. A Democracy can be legitimated only if judges of
8Although modern literature defines other true forms of Government, like the Polyarchy
by Robert Dahl [10], for the purposes of the explanation of the legitimacy of Democracy,
I will focus only on the three Aristotelian forms.
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Democratic decision-making processes are the Citizens themselves or they
are elected and recognized by the People. Not less important, Citizens must
agree on a set of shared rules that drive the decision-making process and
these rules must stand for the whole “gaming period”. Neither judges, nor
Citizens, are allowed to change the rules during the game. Rules may be
changed only by means of a separated “gaming phase”, and so by entering
in another Democratic decision-making process.
The effectiveness and the efficiency of Democratic decision-making pro-
cesses can be analyzed by replying to questions four and five above. Not
only Democratic processes must be legitimated but their outcomes must be
effective and efficient and so they must be evaluated both quantitatively and
qualitatively. In a nutshell, the effectiveness and the efficiency of a model
of Democracy are instrumental measurements of implemented policies and
their quality.
Although they may seem independent concepts, legitimacy, effectiveness
and efficiency of outcomes sometimes may overlap. On the one hand, Citizens
may think that good results may be generated only by good procedures. So
if outcomes are effective and efficient, Citizens may legitimate both outcomes
and procedures. On the other hand, Citizens may think that if procedures
are legitimated, they must undoubtedly produce legitimated effective and
efficient outcomes.
Under a philosophical perspective of legitimacy of Democracies, outcomes
and procedures are clearly separated concepts, and, in order to investigate
the legitimacy of Democracies, they can be analyzed individually or together.
Next sections are intended to explain different conceptions for the analysis
of legitimacy of Democracies.
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No agreement exists between scholars of Legitimacy of Democracies on
whether it is appropriate to legitimate Democracies only in function of their
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outcomes, or in function of their decision-making procedures, or in function
of the former and the latter simultaneously. Indeed, studies on Legitimacy
of Democracies expose two different conceptions, the monistic one, and the
non-monistic one [11].
Monistic views of legitimacy rely only on one parameter. Either they give
an instrumental evaluation of outcomes of the Democratic decision-making
process, or they legitimate the Democratic decision-making process by taking
into account only its procedural features. Non-monistic views legitimate
Democracies by referring both to their effectiveness, and so to their outcomes,
and to the Democratic decision-making procedural features.
Next sections, mainly based on the work by Fabienne Peter [12], aim
to briefly summarize three main streams of conceptions of Legitimacy of
Democracy.
2.3.1 Substantial Legitimacy
Instrumental evaluation of outcomes, also referenced in literature as sub-
stantial evaluation [13], lays its foundation on the idea that there are ideal
outcomes that a Democratic decision-making process must produce, and
these ideal outcomes may be summarized as “maximize rights fulfillment”
[14], and as “produce the best possible outcomes”. If a Democratic procedure
results in these outcomes, then it is legitimated.
Constraints and issues when legitimating Democracies by evaluating only
their outcomes are quite clear. Firstly, this approach may revolve in the
unlikable situation to also legitimate non-Democratic regimens and non-fair
decisions. For instance, the German Nazi regimen actually maximized the
rights fulfillment by granting rights only to the majority of the population,
and so to German and Aryan Citizens, that in 1933 were more than the
99.25% of the population9. Secondly, when trying to legitimate a Demo-
9Data of the census of June 16, 1933, according to the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum in the article “GERMANY: JEWISH POPULATION IN 1933 ”
(https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005276).
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cratic regimen, a pure instrumental evaluation of outcomes must primarily
define what are the most desirable outcomes. For instance, by being inspired
by well-known researches about Democracies effectiveness and so by evalu-
ating the effectiveness in function of economic development [2], now-a-days,
it is quite difficult to understand if results of Democratic decision-making
processes should foster models of sharing economy, or models of economy
based on the property.
Positions in favor of legitimizing Democracy only by produced outcomes,
are supported by the Condorcet jury theorem. It states that if there are
two possible outcomes, a right one and wrong one, and a participant in the
decision-making process is more likely to choose the right one, then the ma-
jority of participants will choose the correct outcome. Moreover, the theorem
states that the more the participants to the decision-making process, as in
the case of Democracies based on aggregation of votes, the more outcomes
are likely to be fair.
While instrumentalists try to legitimate Democracies by evaluating their
outcomes, other scholars claim that Democracies must be legitimated by
evaluating their decision-making procedures.
2.3.2 Procedural Legitimacy
The idea laying the ground to legitimate Democracies by considering only
Democratic decision-making processes is that, if Democratic procedures are
recognized fair de iure (by the Law) on the basis of rules recognized moral
de facto (by the Society), then the outcomes must be recognized fair de
facto (by the majority of the People), and de jure (by Political Systems
of Countries). For instance, in those Democracies in which decisions are
taken by means of ballots and aggregation of preferences, Democracy may
be legitimated when dispositions on ballots: (1) expose clear norms that
regulate procedures to acquire preferences of Citizens and; (2) expose clear
norms that regulate procedures to aggregate preferences and; (3) expose clear
norms and algorithms to compute the will of the majorities [15].
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On one side, since the procedure is actually an outcome of other Demo-
cratic processes agreed by Citizens, the procedural theory may seem the most
fair way to evaluate the legitimacy of Democracies 10. On the other side, if
a Democracy is legitimated by considering only its procedures, there may
be situations in which procedures themselves contribute to illegitimate the
same Democracy [17, p. 237]. An instance, already exposed in section 2.3.1,
is the Germany in 1933, when a chancellor was elected by means of free elec-
tions, and his first measure was to issue the “Decree of the Reich President
for the Protection of People and State”11, used as a legal basis to suppress
the opponents of the same chancellor, so to actually modify the Democratic
decision-making procedure.
Against theories of Democratic legitimacy by evaluation of the outcomes,
or by legitimacy of the decision-making procedure, other theories propose to
legitimate Democracies by taking into account multiple parameters.
2.3.3 Substantial and Procedural Legitimacy
Non-monistic conceptions try to assess if a Democracy is legitimated or
not by looking both at the properties of decision-making processes, and the
outcomes that they produce. This conception is referenced in literature as
“rational proceduralist”, because of the idea that, in order to be legitimated,
Democratic procedures must produce “rational outcomes”12.
The struggle against procedural legitimacy of Democracy is that, even if
10This is true only by taking it as a premise that there is an egalitarian possibility for
each Citizen to prefer a specific Democratic procedure rather than another one, and that
the People is enabled to use the procedure preferred by the majority, as stated by famous
scholars Bobbio and Kelsen [16, p. 167].
11The decree was also called “Reichstag Fire Decree”, because it gave to Nazis the
legal consensus to put the Reichstag building on fire. For more information read the
dedicated page of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum at the following URL:
https://www.ushmm.org/learn/timeline-of-events/1933-1938/reichstag-fire-decree.
12Further explanations and discussions on rational outcomes will be held later. For now
just consider rational outcomes as those ones that are effective and efficient for Citizens.
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Democratic procedures are established to be fair, morally and in accordance
to law, they could produce non-legitimated or irrational outcomes. Exam-
ples of non-legitimated outcomes are the ones exposed in section 2.3.1 and
section 2.3.2. Irrational outcomes are those ones that may be effective but
not efficient, and so outcomes of very low quality.
Advocates of perfect rational proceduralist conceptions, chiefly scholars
of Deliberative Democracy like Habermas and Cohen, state that, assuming
that it is possible to outline ideal standards for the outcomes of Democratic
procedures, these outcomes can then be achieved by involving Citizens in
properly constrained decision-making processes. According to Habermas,
(Deliberative) decision-making processes are legitimated because the opinion-
formation is discursive and Citizens expect the result of these discursive
procedures to have a impartial quality. So if the decision-making process
is shaped correctly, it will result in decisions that everyone has reasons to
accept. For Habermas only deliberative decision-making procedures are able
to create this environment [18].
This contributed to create different branches of rational procedural legiti-
macy of Democracies. On one hand, there are supporters of “perfect rational
proceduralism”, like Habermas, stating that only a procedure may lead to
rational outcomes. On the other hand, there are supporters of “imperfect
rational proceduralism”, arguing that it is not possible to both have an in-
fallible single decision-making process, and reach perfect outcomes. So in
their opinion, decision-making procedures must be multiple, and each one of
them must be aimed to achieve the best approximation of perfect rational
outcomes.
In previous sections of this dissertation, and in this latter one, I have
exposed a definition of Democracy and the main-stream conceptions about
the legitimacy of Democracies. It is now clear that Democracies may be
conceived as actual Democracies only to the extent that they may be le-
gitimated and so, only if they are built around specified decision-making
procedures that result in effective and efficient outcomes.
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Legitimacy, procedures and outcomes are the basic concepts that un-
derlay Democracies. Before explaining different models and applications of
Democracies, we need to understand which atomic components eventually
give rise, pieced together, to Democratic systems. Next section is aimed to
discuss components of Democracies exposed by modern literature scholars.
2.4 Components of Democracies
Classical theories of legitimacy of Democracies attempt to legitimate
Democracies by analyzing two parameters: outcomes and procedures. This
leads to a paramount discussion that needs to be addressed.
Consider for a moment computer software. Like Democracies, they are
built around a series of procedures that computers run in order to produce
outputs. When designing a software, there is another important parameter
that must be taken into account, the inputs. Software can produce right
outputs only if inputs are compliant to specific and proper formats defined
by the software designer. Inputs and procedures are strictly related, meaning
that procedures are written in order to deal only with the kind of data that
software are intended to process. Also, although software can run without
producing any outputs (even if this is a not desirable situation), they can
definitely not run without receiving any inputs.
By exporting the latter assertion to the Democratic context, classical
conceptions of legitimacy clearly have a certain lack when considering legiti-
macy of inputs. As a matter of fact, either they completely ignore inputs, or
they assume that inputs are parts of Democratic decision-making procedures
themselves.
Scholars of new Democracies models argue that inputs must doubtless
be taken in consideration. Inputs and procedures of Democracies must be
considered as separated concepts and both must be legitimated [19]. By
following this conception, inputs are related to the Citizens requests to Gov-
ernments, and outputs to Governmental decisions. A more participatory
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view of input-output legitimacy is the one by Scharpf, addressing inputs to
the participation of Citizens in Democratic decision-making procedures, and
outputs to the efficacy of laws and rules to Democratically solve Societal
issues [20].
However, when addressing legitimacy of Democracies by means of input
and output, procedures are set aside. Democratic decision-making processes
are important to Democracies but, if inputs and outputs are legitimated,
they can be constructed as black boxes that, given specific inputs, produce
specific outputs. After having highlighted the perks of such a legitimization of
Democracies, scholars added a third dimension to input-output frameworks
of legitimacy. More precisely, they introduced the “throughput” dimension
[21], that can be defined as “a performance criterion centered on what goes
inside the black box of the political system” [22].
In a nutshell, throughput is related to decision-making procedures, and
legitimacy of procedures is addressed by analyzing their efficiency to produce
outcomes. Also, and more important, legitimacy of throughput is concerned
about accountability. Not only it must be possible to evaluate the amount
of work made by Governmental Agencies, but also Citizens must be able to
trace back the outcomes.
The input-throughput-output framework is largely used in literature to
study legitimacy in various contexts [23] [24, p. 235] [25]. Even if the frame-
work was firstly and mainly intended and used to address the legitimacy of
the Democracy model of the European Union, other studies argue that it
can also be used also to legitimate Representative Democracies, by evaluat-
ing, for instance, the quality of the representation (inputs), the transparency
of processes to set the order of the day (throughput), and, of course, the
accountability of decisions (outputs) [26] [27].
On one hand, due to its flexibility, the three-dimensional legitimacy frame-
work is surely the most appropriate one to be applied to both classical
forms of Democracies, like Representative Democracies, and modern hybrid
Democracy models, like Participatory Democracies or the Democracy model
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of the European Union. On the other hand, the input-throughput-output
framework does not consider yet the legitimacy of important components of
Democracies.
As stated before in this section, Democracies may be seen as composed by
black boxes, in which decision-making procedures are handled, with entering
and exiting pipes. To put it in a graphical way, Democracies are like the box
drown in figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Democracies as boxes
While three-dimensional frameworks address legitimacy of inputs, proce-
dures, and outputs, they do not consider the way how inputs enter Democ-
racies and outputs exit Democracies. To put it simply, Citizens, and In-
stitutions are took aside from an eventual legitimization. Also, there is no
distinction between throughput (the black box), and procedures (the actual
decision-making processes).
To understand why Citizens matter and why they must be decoupled
from inputs, let’s examine “The Waldo Movement”, the episode three of the
second season of the famous anthology television series “Black Mirror” 13
[28]. In the episode, a television company creates a political movement to
increase its sharing rating during the electoral campaign. The political move-
13Black Mirror is a anthology television series created by Charlie Brooker. It was
first broadcast in UK on channel 4 in 2011. From the very first episode it be-
came a cult series criticized by media and experts of new technologies because of
they way the series highlights problems of addiction to new devices and social me-
dia. For a complete description of Black Mirror see the article of its author on
The Guardian online (https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/dec/01/charlie-
brooker-dark-side-gadget-addiction-black-mirror).
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ment revolved around a blue puppet, named Waldo, nominated to legislative
elections of UK, and struggled politically against other “human” candidates.
Not only Waldo was a puppet, but it also did not have political arguments
and used to muzzle its opponents only by means of swear and curse words.
Eventually, even after the master of Waldo tried to back down and to warn
Citizens to not vote for his puppet, Waldo won the elections, and the Waldo
Movement was exported world-wide and won the elections globally14.
The question is: was Waldo legitimated to participate to the elections and
so, was Waldo a legitimated input in the UK Democratic system? It is not a
goal of this section to critically answer the question, but this example clearly
shows the need for legitimating both inputs of Democracies and Citizens
involved in Democracies.
If inputs only must be legitimated, then there is only the necessity to
understand if the arguments used by Waldo are compliant to Democratic
processes or not. But the problem is also why, and how Waldo entered the
Democratic processes. Firstly, it must be addressed if puppets are Citizens.
Secondly, it must be checked if Waldo actually had Democratic intentions or
if his speeches were driven by mere economic targets pursued by the television
network. Thirdly, if Waldo is considered a Citizen then the way to access
Democracy must not discriminate him because he is a puppet.
To summarize, legitimacy of Democracy must be evaluated by means
of both the inputs, and ways the inputs access Democracy processes. Le-
gitimacy of inputs is related to aspects of Citizens Democratic initiatives.
14The Waldo Movement must not be acknowledged not giving to much weight to it. The
current diffuse support to Populism in Italy, in Europe and in Americas, widely studied
in literature [29] [30] [31], in some situations actually started by political figures acting
very similarly to Waldo. For instance, in Italy, the “V-DAY” laid the foundation to the
creation of the Movimento 5 Stelle that currently is one of the largest party of Italy [32],
and that is also defined by Carty a “Franchising Party” [33]. V-DAY is an abbreviation
of “Vaffanculo-Day”, that literally can be translated to “Fuck-Them-All-Day”, a political
initiative that took place on September 8, 2007, in several squares of Italian and European
cities.
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Legitimacy of Citizens is related to aspects of creation of inputs and their
allowance to enter Democratic processes.
To understand why outputs and Institutions must be both legitimated,
let’s consider the case of the consultative referendum of the city of Bologna,
in Italy, hold on May 26, 2013. The referendum asked Bologna Citizens if
the city would continue to economically support, with public funds, private
nursery schools as well as public ones. Citizens were asked to choose between
“A” (use public funds only for public schools), and “B” (use public funds
also for private schools). Eventually the “A” won but, on July 29, 2013, the
town council decided to ignore the outcome of the referendum, and so, the
Major and his council decided to publicly found also private schools.
As in the Waldo case, it is not a goal of this research to establish whether
this was a right decision, but this is a good example to understand why
both outcomes of Democracies, and Institutions of Democracies must be le-
gitimated. The problem is “what are” the outcomes, and “what happen” to
the outcomes of Democratic decisions. Surely, outcomes must be reintro-
duced in Democratic processes, otherwise the effort spent by Democracies
to produce them is useless. But, even if outcomes are blocked, Institutions
must be legitimated to do that by means of law15, or by means of Demo-
cratic decisions that were previously agreed. To summarize, if only outputs
must be legitimated, then Democracies are legitimated if they produce some-
thing (quantitative evaluation). If both Institutions and outcomes must be
legitimated, then Democracies are legitimated if they produce outcomes that
Institutions can actually, or must actually, process to fulfill Democratic wills
of Citizens (quantitative and qualitative evaluation).
The last separation of components of Democracies that must be addressed
is related to the “throughput” of Democracies. Classical conceptions of legit-
imacy, and three-dimensional conceptions of legitimacy, do not make a clear
15That is exactly what did not happen for the case of Bologna. Indeed the Italian
Constitution states that “Entities and private persons have the right to establish schools
and institutions of education, at no cost to the State.” [34, Art. 33].
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distinction between the decision-making procedures used to achieve demo-
cratic outcomes, and discussions among Citizens and Institutions that are
performed to achieve them. In other words, while addressing a Democratic
need, the focus is only on the procedures to fulfill it. By using again the
games metaphor, this means that the focus is on checking if the rules of the
game are legitimated while deciding, but no attentions are put on legitimacy
of interactions among players while deciding. This may create despicable sit-
uations where actors involved in Democracies change the needs of Societies,
while a need is being Democratically addressed.
An example may come in help to better understand the need of con-
sidering legitimacy of discussions and legitimacy of decision-making proce-
dures. On November 30, 2010, the Italian Chamber of Deputies discussed
the “Gelmini’s reform”, a bill aimed to a substantial reform of the Italian
University system. The reform was justified by the necessity of adapting the
Italian University system to the European Union requirements. Even if it did
not serve to its purpose, as demonstrated by recent literature [35], the reform
was eventually enforced. However, the point is not to address the efficacy and
the efficiency of the reform, but to understand what happened in the mean-
while. In the same day of the discussion of the bill in the Italian Chamber of
Deputies, students paralyzed the whole Italy16. Students blocked railways,
roads and Institutions in the majority of Academic Italian cities, including
Rome, Palermo, Bologna, Genoa, Milan, Turin, Brescia, Venice, Florence,
Pisa, L‘Aquila, Naples, Bari and Catania. There were violent clashes among
students and police, and among anarchic students and students belonging to
extreme-right movements, and the ones belonging to extreme-left movements.
As a consequence, the attention of media moved from what was going on in
the Democratic Institution, to what was happening outside the Parliament.
If we consider everything that happened that day as the throughput of
16The protest was so big that even international media focused on it. See,
for instance, the following news: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-protest-
idUSTRE6AT4IF20101130
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Italian Democracy, because protests are part of Democracies, then the reform
and the process of enforcing it is legitimated. But, just for the sake of
this explanation, if we assume that protests could be instrumental ones,
organized to move the attention from the Chamber of Deputies to the outside,
then the reform is not legitimated, because discussions among Citizens and
Institutions about the issue, on that day, were not legitimated.
Table 2.1: Components of Democracies
Component Description
Citizens Create Democratic needs
Inputs Democratic needs that access Democracies
Discussions Communications among Citizens and Infrastructures
Decision-Making
Procedures
Democratic decision-making processes
Outputs Outcomes of Democratic decision-making processes
Institutions Where outcomes flown to
To conclude, I argue that legitimacy of Democracies must be addressed by
means of a six-dimensional framework. Table 2.1 shows the components be-
longing to the framework. After being created by Society (Citizens), and so
after being agreed as moral needs, Societal needs (Inputs) enter Democracies
as unshaped ideas. By means of proper communications (Discussions) among
Citizens and Institutions, inputs are deconstructed into interesting choices
that Citizens can discuss, agree or vote (Decision-Making Procedures). After
having agreed on the most proper needs and choices, needs are shaped into
normative, democratic, or societal tools, like acts, new Democratic tools, or
infrastructures (Outputs). According to their nature, outputs are driven to
the proper place to be handled (Institutions). For example, they go to Par-
liaments if they are bills, or they are flown again into Democratic procedures
if they create other needs. Figure 2.3 shows a graphical depiction of such a
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kind of Democratic process.
Figure 2.3: A graphical depiction of components and their relations in Democratic
processes
2.5 From Components of Democracies toward
Models of Democracies
In this chapter, I have exposed a definition of Democracies, I have enu-
merated conceptions about legitimacy of Democracies and eventually I have
proposed a six-dimensional framework of components that must be consid-
ered to address the legitimacy of Democracies. The framework is compli-
ant both to direct models of Democracies, and to representative models of
Democracies.
The focus now moves on how to use and to connect components of Democ-
racies to achieve Democracies aimed to be as much legitimated as possible.
On one hand, there are models of Representative Democracies, basing their
legitimacy on Citizens, discussions, decision-making procedures, and Institu-
tions. On the other hand, there are Not-Representative Democracies, propos-
ing models that aim to create Democracies legitimated in relation to all the
components of the framework that I have proposed.
In the next chapter, by discussing literature on various models of Democ-
racies, I expose the roles of components in different models of Democracies.
Eventually I will focus on Deliberative Democracies and Deliberative Sys-
tems, that are the main topic of my research.
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Chapter 3
Models of Democracies
The aim of this chapter is to expose different models of Democracies and
to highlight the degree of Citizens’ participation and involvement in each of
them. In the section 3.1, I will describe Representative Democracies, giving
a few hints on the motivations of their current crisis. In section 3.2, I will ex-
pose Direct Democracies and Participatory Democracies, showing examples
of their implementations, with particular regard to Participatory Budgeting
practices. In section 3.3, I will expose how Participatory Budgeting practices
have flown into more complex, and more generic, Participatory Democracies
practices. Eventually, in section 3.4, I will show ways to discriminate among
different models of Democracies by means of the degree of participation that
Citizens have in them.
3.1 Representative Democracies
Representative Democracy is a Democracy model that laid its foundations
in the American, English, and French revolutions of the eighteenth century
[36, p. 1]. Representative Democracies are kinds of Governments where
Citizens elect their representatives, usually by means of secret ballots, to
discuss their Democratic needs in Institutions.
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According to James Madison1, Representative Democracies are superior
political systems aimed to: “refine and enlarge the public views by passing
them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may
best discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of
justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations”
[39, p. 82]. Madison was strongly convinced that a Government based on
representatives would be more able to manage the public good, rather than
a Government enacted directly by Citizens [39].
Even if Representative Democracy is stated to be efficient in terms of
time and outcomes, because decisions are restricted to a limited set of people
deemed to be optimal to solve Democratic issues [40], since its early intro-
duction it has raised doubts among scholars of diverse fields of study, but
also among artists, politicians belonging to diverse parties, and religious be-
longing to diverse religions [41] [42] [43]. Although it is not a task of this
research to deeply explore Representative Democracies, and fully examine
their critics and supporters, it is important to highlight the main criticisms.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was among the earliest and strongest attackers
to Representative Democracies. In a nutshell, he stated that the English
Representative Democracy of the eighteenth century was nothing else than
a kind of slavery poorly masked as liberty [36, p. 1]. More specifically, in
his work “The Social Contract Or Principles of Political Right” he stated
that: “the moment a people allows itself to be represented, it is no longer
free: it no longer exists” [44]. It deserves to be highlighted that Rousseau
did not criticize the vote as a tool to express the will of Citizens, that he
retains necessary to govern large countries. However, he harshly contrasts the
concept of representation because, by combining ballots and representation,
Citizens use the vote to elect who must deliberate, rather than using it as an
1Madison was the fourth president of the United States of America. His ideals, and
proposals are deemed to be so innovative that Madison is considered the actual “Father of
the Constitution” [37]. His proposals are still present in the current American Constitution
as the “Bill of Rights”, and so, the first ten amendments to the American Constitution
[38].
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efficient deliberative tool.
The concept of voting and votes aggregation is central for the legitimacy
of Representative Democracies. Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard [45] argue
that in Representative Democracies only few people actually elect represen-
tatives because of the median voter theorem2. Taken alone, this may be a
beneficial situation. By definition, outcomes in the mean range should sat-
isfy, at least partially, the wills of the majority of the people. Issues arise
when votes aggregation is combined to the current world, mostly driven by
financial markets. While representation continues to be an ideal model of
Democracy to foster commerce and finance, as in the early time of Democ-
racies Emmanuel Joseph Sieye`s stated [47], the middle class may neglect to
consider necessities of economically marginalized individuals or groups [48,
p. 19]. As a matter of fact, this may flow into an oppression by the majority
that may act as a dictatorship [49] [50].
Dangers of Representative Democracies strictly based on the majority
rules, are increased by new technologies, television, and social medias, be-
cause they may shape political advertising in specific and unfair ways [51].
Human beings are demonstrated to be biased when choosing among pref-
erences3, as also demonstrated by research of Amos Tversky [52] and the
Nobel prized Daniel Kahneman [53]. As a matter of fact, this means that it
is not possible that people perform rational choices, especially when choices
are related to their economical interests, and when information they have
access to are built on the needs of commercials and politicians, rather than
Democratic thinking and Democratic deliberation. In other words, I argue
here that, people with economical, politic, and financial powers may group in
elites, and they may use their powers to control traditional and new medias,
2The mean voter theorem states that the preference of mean voters beats any other
alternative. However, this is true only in one-dimensional contexts of aggregation, and so
in ballots in which there is only one issue to vote [46].
3I will investigate deeply human beings’ biases related to preferences and deliberations
in section ??.
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and so to drive the vote of Citizens4.
The latter statement, plausible or not, leads to the creation of populist
groups. Populism, by definition, is the conception that world the population
is divided between “pure people”, and “corrupted people” [54], so the feeling
of the existence of corrupted elites of people driving Citizens’ opinion is a
factor for the current large and widely diffused support to populism, that is
undermining Representative Democracies on their roots.
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index states that, in 2016,
the 50.3% of the world population was Governed by means of full or flawed
(Representative) Democracies (Figure 3.1) [55, p. 3]. In the United States,
the percentage of Americans that trust in the ability of representatives to
govern is decreased from ~70% in 1958, to ~20% in 2015 (Figure 3.2) [55, p.
14]. According to the World Values Survey this attitude seems to be shared
all over the world in the last nineteen years [55, p. 18]. Although the seeds
of such a crisis of Representative Democracies are quite difficult to analyze
and deserve dedicated researches, it seems that the most agreed explanation
for the loss of truth in the Government is the financial crash of 2008-09, that
revolved in poverty and inequality among Citizens [55, pp. 19-20].
Not only inequality destabilizes the legitimacy of Representative Democ-
racies, but also undermines the legitimacy of new Democracies based on the
diversity of people, like the Democracy model of the European Union. On
one side, unequal power distribution and unequal power relations among Citi-
zens, are the causes of the current deprivation of legitimacy of Representative
Democracies, because there are no precise and explicit standards to check if
4As medias report, it seems that lately elections in various countries around the world
was driven by acting on medias and information. It is reported to be happened in
the latest Turkish elections (http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/02/turkey-
referendum-erdogan-tone-policing-backfires.html), in latest elections of various countries
of Latin America (https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-how-to-hack-an-election/),
and last but not least, in the latest Presidential election of the United States
of America (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/01/12/was-
the-2016-u-s-election-democratic-we-see-7-serious-shortfalls/?utm term=.4b3711acffd6).
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Figure 3.1: The diffusion of Democratic Governments around the world
Figure 3.2: The decreasing of trust in the Government of United States of America from
1958 to 2015
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this uneven distribution of power is fair [50]. On the other side, the demand
of a more clear distribution of powers may legitimate populist requests of a
division of powers based on ethnicity, on nativism, or on other parameters
that are not related to the Democratic capacity of individuals [56].
By taking into account the components of Democracies that I have under-
pinned in section 2.4, it is clear that legitimacy of Representative Democra-
cies revolves all around Citizens. Indeed, in these models of Democracy, Citi-
zens create inputs, so they point out needs and issues of Societies. Needs and
issues are then taken care by delegates of Citizens that were previously legit-
imated to solve problems. Representatives use transparent decision-making
procedures to solve issues, and produces outcomes. While representatives
are solving issues, Citizens are not enabled to participate in decision-making
process, but, after outcomes are produced, Citizens can interact with In-
stitutions to check if Representatives have produced effective and efficient
outcomes to fulfil their needs or solve their issues. When Citizens retain that
outcomes are not effective or efficient, or when they think they are not proper,
they can retire legitimacy of Representatives. This may happen both when
outcomes are actually poor, and when Citizens think so due to a mediated,
biased and manipulated communication among Citizens and Institutions. As
Judith Butler puts it, when people legitimate Government, they still preserve
the power to take back the legitimacy and the power. Also, an elected Gov-
ernment can be blocked and replaced by an assembly of people that holds
the power to legitimate the exercise of the Democracy [57].
While it is not a goal of this research to endorse or not Representative
Democracies, one of my research questions is to understand what are the
valid alternatives that may replace Representative Democracies in the cur-
rent complex globalized and interconnected world. For the purpose of my
research, after having accounted all of the above thoughts, I will assume that
Representative Democracies need a replacement, and in next sections, I will
move forward to describe new models of Democracies that may better replace
current Representative Democracies.
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3.2 Direct Democracies and Participatory
Democracies
Direct Democracies and Participatory Democracies are aimed to solve the
very issue of Representative Democracies and so, in these models of Democ-
racies, Institutions involve Citizens in Democratic decision-making processes,
rather than involving Citizens only in the election of representatives, or in
the selection of political personnel [58, p. 17]. Nowadays, I argue here, the
two models of Democracies usually overlap, both in dedicated literature, and
in informal speaking. For the sake of clarity, and for the sake of my research
purposes, in this section, I will firstly address a clear distinction between the
two kinds of Democracies, secondly I will define them, thirdly and lastly I
will expose examples of both models of Democracies.
Before moving forward and addressing the distinction between Direct
Democracies and Participatory Democracies, two clarifications related to
Participatory Democracies must be addressed. Firstly, there is a need to un-
derstand what is “participation” and what are “Participatory Democracies”.
Secondly, there is a need to understand if Participatory Democracies, can be
conceived as “Not-Representative Democracies” opposed to ”Representative
Democracies”, to the extent of the distinction of Not-Representative Democ-
racies and Representative Democracies that I have given in section 2.1, and
to the extent of the definition of Representative Democracies that I have
given in the previous section 3.1.
Participation, as Carole Pateman defined it, is the “Citizens’ participation
in making decisions about collective life” [59]. If applied to Democracies, par-
ticipation resolves in transforming them into “thick” Participatory Democra-
cies [60]. The concept of “thick” Democracies and “thin” Democracies is de-
rived from the distinction between Aggregative and Elitist (Representative)
Democracies and Participatory Democracies. In the former, the participa-
tion of Citizens is peripheral and restricted to vote. This means that Citizens
are not involved in everyday Democratic decision-making procedures and so,
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these kinds of Democracies are considered thin. In Participatory Democra-
cies, the participation of Citizens is considered fundamental to Democratic
decision-making processes. This means that Citizens always have a voice in
Democratic decision-making procedures and, so, these kinds of Democracies
are considered thick [61].
The above description of Participatory Democracies leads to the other
distinction that must be addressed between Direct Democracies and Par-
ticipatory Democracies. Both of them are thick Democracies, nevertheless
belong to the former those Democracies that use Democratic tools, regu-
lated by laws or constitutions (for instance, referenda, recalls, plebiscite, and
popular initiatives), to keep the Citizens active players even after they have
delegated their Democratic power to representatives [62, pp. 7]. Although
these tools are situational, when Citizens of Direct Democracies use them,
de-iure and de-facto, they may get rid of representatives, and they produce
Democratic outcomes by themselves.
The Participatory Democracy, while also belonging to Non-Representative
Democracies, is longer recognized as an “evolutionary goal of representative
democracy for higher and more effective citizen’s participation in govern-
ment decisions”5. This means that Direct Democracies are, at least some-
5Here I cite the article “Direct Democracy Vs. Participatory Democ-
racy” of Gerardo Martinez-Solanas in the democraciaparticipativa blog
(https://democraciaparticipativa.net). Very interestingly, the article exposes a doubt on
the Indian anti-corruption movement, leaded by Kisan Baburao Hazare [63]. Indeed,
one of the proposals of the movement is the “rejection” vote. When requested to
vote, Citizens can cast the rejection vote, and so they can expressly reject all the
candidates. If the number of rejections is higher than the sum of votes for all the
candidates, then the ballot is annulled. The members of the movement argue to foster the
Participatory Democracy, but also they reclaim a new kind of vote regulated by the law.
Because of this, to the author it is not clear if they have confused Direct Democracies
with Participatory Democracies. Also, I argue here, it is very interesting that the
leader classify the movement as an “anti-corruption” movement, that may address the
movement as a populist movement to the extent of the definition of populism that I
have given in section 3.1. The complete article is publicly available for reading at the
following address: https://democraciaparticipativa.net/economia-society/columnistas-
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times, models of Democracies where participation of Citizens has a normative
meaning, and Citizens are allowed by enacted laws to produce Democratic
outcomes. Whilst, Participatory Democracies must be intended in parallel to
Representative Democracies, with the only scope to serve to a better engage-
ment of Citizens in participating in Democratic decision-making procedures,
while still delegating final decisions to Institutions (or to representatives).
The firs of the following definitions is my own definition of Direct Democ-
racies. The second one is my own definition of Participatory Democracies,
built by matching all the above insights with the definition of Umberto Al-
legretti [64, p. 156] and the doubts by Luigi Bobbio about Participatory
Democracies [65, p. 1]:
Definition 6 (Direct Democracy). Direct Democracy is a model of Democ-
racy where Citizens are allowed, by enacted laws or by the Constitution, to
produce Democratic outcomes directly.
Definition 7 (Participatory Democracy). Participatory Democracy is a re-
lationship among Citizens and Institutions, that resolves in a direct engage-
ment of the former in monitoring the actions of the latter, without having
any formal and normative power on Democratic decision-making procedures.
The next sections are aimed to expose the very first example of Direct
Democracies, the ancient Athenian Democracy, and to expose instances of
Participatory Budgeting, both when they are classifiable as Direct Democ-
racies, and as Participatory Democracies.
3.2.1 The Ancient Athenian Democracy
The idea of enabling Citizens to govern themselves, thus the very first
experiment of direct Democracy, has long-standing roots in the ancient his-
tory. More specifically, Democracy was born in Athens in 507 B.C., when
invitados/4261-direct-democracy-vs-participatory-democracy.html.
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Cleisthenes proposed a reform, called ”Demokratia” [66], that laid the foun-
dations for modern Democracy, because of the way it redistributed the power
to the People as it was never done before[67, p. 225].
In the fourth century and fifth B.C., the population of Athens was stated
to be between ~30000 and ~60000 people [68, p. 215]. A large cut of the
People, around 13295 male Citizens, were involved in Democratic processes.
Around 13100 male Citizens were involved voluntarily, or by means of lots,
in the four most important Institutions of the Government [31, p. 57].
The assembly of the People, the Demos [69], was made up of ~6000
voluntary male Citizens that used to meet in forty Ecclesia (meetings of the
assembly) per year [70]. They had in charge to vote bills and decrees, and
to elect the minority part of the Athenian’s Democratic system that was not
selected by lots, such as some members of the Arkhai (the Civil Judiciary)
[71]. During the assembly, votes were cast in show of hands or by ballots
[72].
The forty annual Ecclesia were administrated by the Council of the Five
Hundreds, the Boule´ [69]. The Council was also responsible to draft new
bills and decrees, and to supervise the work of Magistrates. As suggested
by its name, the Boule´ counted five hundreds male members, chosen by lot
among Citizens that were at least thirty years old. The Council of Five
Hundreds also contained committees like, the Prytaneis (the executive) and
the Proderoi [69]. The president of the Council, the Epistates changed daily
and was elected by lot [73, p. 31]. He was the supreme ruler, and had the
duty of chairing and supervising the meetings of the Council for twenty four
hours [74].
The Heliaia, the Popular Tribunal, was not constituted by legal experts
[75], but made of ~6000 male Citizens chosen by lot on the day of the trial
[76, p. 70] among Citizens in their thirty or older. Parts of the Heliaia, were
the Nomothetai and the Juries. The Nomothetai had in charge to examine
and approve new laws, and to change existing laws. The Juries had the tasks
of judging criminal trials, civil trials, and the legality of decrees [76, p. 132].
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Only murderers of Athenians Citizens were judged externally of the Heliaia
and by legal experts. Homicide trials were managed in the Areopagos (the
Ancient Tribunal), that was made up of 150 Areopagites, Magistrates that
used to be members of the Arkhai and that had retired [77, pp. 41-46].
The last of the four fundamental Institutions of the Government was the
Civil Judiciary, the Arkhai. Around six hundreds Magistrates of the Arkhai
were elected by lot among male Citizens that were aged thirty or older [31,
p. 57]. Nine Citizens were also elected Arkhons, the chief Magistrates of
Athens, who had in charge to organize the Athenians celebrations and to
preside over the Heliaia [78, pp. 217-218].
Figure 3.3 shows in a simplified and schematic way the Athenians Demo-
cratic system and the flow of bills and decrees in the Athenians Democratic
process [31, p. 58].
The Athenians Democracy is perhaps, I argue here, the best example of
Direct Democracy, because of its wide involvement of Citizens. However, in
order to give every male Citizen the autonomy to participate in the Demo-
cratic decision-making, the Athenians Democracy relied strongly on three un-
derling conditions [79, p. 27]. First and worst condition, while the Athenian
males were engaged in time-consuming Democratic deliberation, they were
able to glean labour force from two kinds of slavery. Women were exploited
for addressing domestic services, and slaves were exploited for agriculture,
industry and mining. This also contributed to create the second condition
for the effectiveness of Athenians Direct Democratic because slaves, women
and immigrants were not enabled to participate to Democratic processes,
and the deliberation was restricted to a small amount of Citizens. The third
condition was the dimension of the ancient Athens, a city fitted in a few
square kilometers with a large agricultural hinterland.
In other words, the Athenians Democracy worked well because of its
restricted set of participants, and because of the dimensions of the land
that Democratic outcomes would affect, two conditions on which also some
modern models of Direct Democracy rely, as I expose in the next section.
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Figure 3.3: The Athenians Democracy System
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3.2.2 Participatory Budgeting in Brazil
Participatory Budgeting is an interesting instance of both Direct Democ-
racies and Participatory Democracies. One of the most studied examples of
Participatory Budgeting is the Participatory City Budgeting in Porto Alegre,
in Brazil [80] [81] [82]6. Participatory Balancing are Participatory policy-
making and decision-making processes held in forums, where Citizens can
discuss on how to allocate financial resources of their neighborhoods [83].
In 1988, after a long period of instability of the Brazilian Democratic Insti-
tutions, a coalition of left parties flew into the Worker’s Party (Partido dos
Trabalhadores). After having gained the control of the municipal government
of Porto Alegre, the party contributed to promulgate the new Constitution of
the Federal Presidential Representative Democratic Republic of Brazil, whose
articles 14 and 29, respectively, grant to the People the opportunity to ex-
ercise sovereignty by means of People’s initiative, and grant to the People’s
assembly to participate in organizational processes of Town Councils7. The
articles leaded also to a measure named the “Participatory Budgeting”.
Twice per year, each region meets in a regional Plenary Assembly to
discuss the budget of the region. Anyone can participate to the Assembly,
but the vote is restricted to residents Citizens of the region. During the
first meeting, held in March, representatives of the Region show and discuss
the budget from previous year. Right after, the assembly elects delegates
among the present Citizens. Delegates are then involved in weekly meet-
ings for the following three months to work on regions’ budgetary issues and
regions’ priorities for the following year, and so they discuss options to im-
prove regions’ financial stability, but also discuss new projects to improve
regions’ economy. After three months, the second Plenary Assembly is held,
6The Participatory City Budgeting in Porto Alegre, is usually cited in literature as an
implementation of Participatory Democracy, or it is cited as an implementation of Delib-
erative Democracy. According to my definitions 6 and 7, I will consider the Participatory
City Budgeting of Porto Alegre as an example of Direct Democracy.
7The English translation of the Brazilian constitution of 1988, is publicly accessible at
the following address: http://english.tse.jus.br/arquivos/federal-constitution.
56 3. Models of Democracies
Figure 3.4: The number of participants of Participatory Budgeting in five Cities of Brazil
and delegates present a set of possible proposals, voted together with the
selection of two delegates that will represent the region in the Participatory
Budget Council, working in the next five months on citywide budgets to fit
them into the one of the Region. The city-level council is composed by six-
teen members: two delegates from the Region, ten elected delegates of the
five thematic plenaries (two delegates for each of them), a delegate from the
union of the workers of the City, a delegate from the neighborhood associa-
tions, and two delegates from municipal Agencies. The city council meets at
least once per week to create a municipal budget compliant to the regional
one. On September 30th, councils of Cities submit the budget to mayors,
who can accept and promulgate it, or ask the Council to review it. If that
is the case, members of the council can accept to amend the budget, or they
can override the veto of the Major by voting and reaching a super-majoritan
consensus of two thirds of the members.
Nowadays, techniques of Participatory Budgeting are used all over Brazil-
ian regions and Cities with increasing participation rate by Citizens. Figure
3.4 shows the increasing number of participants of Participatory Budgeting
in five cities of Brazil from 1990 to 2003. Figure 3.5 shows the frequency of
participants of Participatory Budgets in Belo Horizonte and Betim [83].
On the heels of the good results in participation achieved by cities of
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Figure 3.5: The frequency of participation of Participatory Budgeting in Belo Horizonte
and Betim
Figure 3.6: The spread of Participatory Budgeting initiatives around the world at the
end of 2012
Brazil, Participatory Budgeting techniques have been adopted in various
country of the world. Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 show the number of par-
ticipatory initiatives around the world updated to 2012 [84].
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Figure 3.7: The number of Participatory Budgeting initiatives around the world at the
end of 2012
It is also very interesting to discuss, the Participatory Budgeting models
adopted by some European countries, due to their shifting from models of
Direct Democracies to models of Participatory Democracies. In the next
section, I will discuss some of them.
3.2.3 Participatory Budgeting in the European Union
The most interesting models of Participatory Budgeting in the European
Union, I argue here, are: the “Consultations on public Finance”, the so-called
“Proximity Participation”, the “Community Funds at local and city level”,
and the “Public/Private negotiations table”. All of them are models of Par-
ticipatory Democracy, either because the Town Council has the actual final
word on how to allocate finances, or because finances supplied to Citizens for
improving their Cities are not public funds, so funds are provided by private
businesses, and Citizens allocate them autonomously without any bounding
to local Institutions [85].
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France and Germany are the two European countries which mostly use
models of Proximity Participation and models of Consultation on Public Fi-
nances. Both models are consultative processes, where opinions of Citizens
are collected and listened by representatives, or by delegates of Towns Coun-
cils, and then Institutions may decide to implement or not ideas brought in
public consultations by Citizens [86]. The two models differ in their purposes,
and in their origins.
In models of Proximity Participation, mostly used in France, Citizens are
involved to discuss about non-financial issues, such as generic ideas on how
to improve their Cities. Proximity Participation models are derived from old
French models of public consultation based on neighbourhoods [87, p. 70]
[88], but they were partially modified by taking inspiration from the model
of Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre.
Consultation on Public Finances, mostly used in Germany, are intended
to make Citizens aware of the financial performances of their Cities. These
models were partially influenced by the Participatory Budgeting of Porto
Alegre, but they were actually imported in Germany from the New Zealand
city of Christchurch [87, p. 83].
Usually, in both models participants are informed by announcements
spread by medias, but in some experiments in both French and German
cities, participants were invited directly by Majors on the basis of a random
selection [86]. Both models involve Citizens in assemblies held twice per year.
In Proximity Participation models, while in assemblies, Citizens are supplied
with a list of proposals among which they can select their preferred ones. At
the end of assemblies, surveys by Citizens are collected and aggregated into
one or more proposals that are forwarded to Town Councils.
Community Funds and Public/Private Negotiating tables are mostly
adopted in Great Britain and Eastern Europe. The two models are similar to
the extent that Citizens are asked to propose ideas to allocate funds supplied
by themselves, or by private business or, in some cases, only partially supplied
by local public Institutions [85].
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For instance, in Public/Private Negotiating Tables, mostly used in East-
ern Europe, a part of the funds needed to implement a specific proposal, may
be supplied by business, or by Inter-Governmental Agencies like the United
Nations. By raising part of the needed funds, third party actors gain the right
to influence the final implementation of proposed projects. For example, in
Plock in Polonia, an oil company, the local Municipalities and the United
Nations funded together the developing program of the City for a total of
three-hundreds-thousands euros. Citizens were involved in discussing propos-
als by means of a Public/Private Negotiating Table, but after the assembly
they had no decision power on the advancements of the program [86].
In Community Funds models, mostly used in British cities, funds are
raised by Citizens and Business are excluded from the discussion on how to
handle them [87, p. 102]. Similarly to the Participatory Budgeting of Porto
Alegre, funds are mostly used to mitigate social disadvantages [83].
Practices of Participatory Budgeting, classifiable under the umbrella of
Participatory Democracies, are impressively increasing in European Union.
Figure 3.8 shows a graphical depiction of the increasing amount of Participa-
tory Budgeting from 2000 to 2005 around Europe [85]. The graph in Figure
3.9, shows the increasing number of Participatory Budgeting practices from
1991 to 2008 in Europe [86].
3.3 Beyond Participatory Budgeting
Nowadays, Participatory Democracies are not only related to collabora-
tive and participatory budgeting practices. There are a plethora of partic-
ipatory methodology and models used in various initiatives, and in diverse
contexts. When searching into their website the keywords “Participatory
Practices”, the National Coalition For Dialogue And Deliberation8, lists more
8The National Coalition For Dialogue And Deliberation is a network of more than
two-thousands experts and enthusiasts of participatory and deliberative practices. On
their website (http://ncdd.org/), they maintain an updated list of tools and practices
for participation, manuals, and other resources related to both face-to-face, and online
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Figure 3.8: The spread of Participatory Budgeting initiatives around the Europe from
2000 to 2005
Figure 3.9: The number of Participatory Budgeting initiatives in the Europe from 1991
to 2008
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than one-hundred-eighty methods and tools (Figure 3.10).
Figure 3.10: Participatory Methods and Tools listed by the National Coalition For
Dialogue And Deliberation
Models of Participatory Democracy to address diverse issues are used
by Municipalities, States, and other Organizations at various engagement
scales of Citizens. The Neighborhood governance councils in Chicago, the
Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership, the Habitat Conservation Plan-
ning under the Endangered Species Act, all of them are initiatives using one
or more methodologies of Participatory Democracy [80].
More and more, these initiatives are moving from mere consultative Par-
ticipatory Democracies processes to actual models of Direct Democracies.
This particularly happens, I argue here, when Participatory Democracies are
promoted and used by social and political movements, or when they claim
to do so.
For instance, Zapatistas movement of Mexico, and the Landless Movement
of Brazil, both of them are implementing Participatory Democracies in six
areas. In some of these areas, like the Councils for Good-Government for the
Zapatistas, or the Management of Land Resources for the Landless Movement
of Brazil, they can claim to use Participatory Democracies [89]. In other
areas, like the Military Management for both movements, they actually use
participation, deliberation, and facilitation.
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Direct Democracies practices.
A very peculiar study case is the Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy. On one
hand, they discuss proposals in their party without any boundary by Institu-
tions, and to this extent they practice a model of Participatory Democracy
[90] [91]. On the other hand, as I stated before in section 2.4, the Movi-
mento 5 Stelle is currently the third largest party in Italy. For this reason,
they have currently one-hundred-twenty-one representatives in the Parlia-
ment. This allows them to discuss in the Italian Parliament the proposals
that the party has previously agreed with participatory tools, and so, this
revolves in a hybrid form of Participatory-Representative-Democracy.
Movements similar the Movimento 5 Stelle, are spreading all over the
Europe and, unfortunately, most of them found their political activity on
populist (or worst) arguments. As a limited exemplifying set, and worth of
note, are the Indignados in Spain [92], the Podemos party in Spain, the Front
National in France [93], the Syriza movement in Greece [94].
Although one of the causes of the growth of these populist parties is
surely the financial crisis of 2008, as well as all the other motivations that I
have exposed in section 3.1, leading to a loss of confidence in Representative
Democracies, I propose here two additional explanations for the large and
increasing endorsement that these movements are achieving. The first expla-
nation, or the bad one, is related to how they use new and traditional medias
to spread information, in order to skilfully and despicably exploit human be-
ings’ biases, like elites do in Representative Democracies, as I have already
touched upon in section 3.1. One of my research questions is to understand
which human biases can, and should not, be exploited when participating or
deliberating. I will answer this research question in chapter 6. The second
explanation, or the good one, is that Citizens want to participate more and
more, mostly directly, in the Democratic decision-making processes.
As an evidence to support this conclusion, in Italy, in 2013 the Web site
dedicated to initiatives of public participation9 promoted a survey asking
9The Italian public Web site for participation (http://partecipa.gov.it), is an initiative
64 3. Models of Democracies
Citizens to specify the public participatory tools that they would prefer to
use to improve Democratic and Institutional decision-making processes. The
survey lasted from July 8th to October 8th, and a total of 306.259 Citizens
filled it in. The results showed that 17.7% of Citizens would like to have more
bills proposed by public initiatives, 16,3% of Citizens would like to have more
consultative referenda, and 15,3% of Citizens would like to have more online
consultations [95, p. 55].
After having acknowledged all the above, the point now moves to the fol-
lowing two issues. Firstly there is a need to understand how to discriminate
between “pseudo” participation of Citizens, and “full” participation of Citi-
zens. Secondly, there is a need to understand which models of Democracies
can actually implement these thick and full Participatory Democracies or
Direct Democracies in legitimate ways. The next section is aimed to reply
to the former of these two questions.
3.4 From Pseudo-Thin Democracies
Toward Full-Thick Democracies
As I have stated in the previous section, nowadays, parties or Institu-
tions claiming to use or to be strictly founded on practices of Participa-
tory Democracies, actually rely on hybrid Participatory-Direct-Democracies.
Even worst, for the sake of clarity, these hybrid models of Democracies are
still interconnected with models of Representative Democracies. For these
reasons, it is often quite difficult to understand what is the specific model of
Democracy that Citizens and Institutions are dealing with. A first consider-
ation can be made on the degree of involvement of Citizens.
In the famous paper “A Ladder of Citizen Participation” [96], Sherry
Arnstein enlightens how to evaluate the level of participation of Citizens.
She argues that there are three levels of participation and, more specifically,
of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers intended to support and to foster public
consultations among Citizens, Institutions and Public Administrations.
3.4 From Pseudo-Thin Democracies
Toward Full-Thick Democracies 65
seven steps to climb the ladder of the full participation, depicted in Figure
3.11.
The first level of participation, the level of Non-Participation, includes the
“Manipulation” and the “Therapy” rungs. When manipulated, by means of
biased information, Citizens are driven to mass actions. The next rung, the
therapy, means that Citizens are “exploited” and involved in fake consulta-
tions and decision-making processes, aimed to legitimate specific actions. I
claim that this is the level where populist movements (but also dictatorships)
operate.
The second level of participation, the level of the Tokenism, contains the
“Informing” rung, the “Consultation” rung, and the “Placation” rung. This
level, I argue here, is a middle one between populist movements, and Direct
Democracies and, so, this is the level where Participatory Democracies and
Representative Democracies operate. In the first rung, the informing rung,
Citizens are supplied with real information on public initiatives related to the
public good. In the second rung, the consultation rung, Citizens are taken
into consideration when discussing new proposals related to the public good.
In the third rung, the placation rung, representatives or Citizens are actively
involved in decision-making procedures.
The third level of participation, the level of the Citizen Control, is the
one related to Direct Democracies and Deliberative Democracies, in which
Citizens are actually involved in Democratic decision-making procedures, or
they actually govern themselves. This level contains the “Partnership” rung,
the “Delegated Power” rung, and the “Citizen Control” rung. When there
is a partnership, all Citizens are involved into Democratic decision-making
processes, and they decide on public good together with Institutions. When
in the second rung, Citizens are delegated by Institutions to act on particular
issues. In the last rung, Citizens have the complete control on Society, and
so they govern themselves.
By matching the ladder of participation with the work of Donald Moyni-
han [97], the three levels of the ladder can be also conceived as related to
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Figure 3.11: The ladder of Citizen Participation by Sherry Arnstein
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Table 3.1: From Non-Participatory Democracies to full Direct Democracies
Type Thick Thin Level
Full Deliberative Democracy Direct Democracy
Decisions
Institutions and Citizens take decisions
after having agreed by means of discussions
Institutions and selected
groups of Citizens take decisions
C
itize
n
C
o
n
tro
l
Discussions
Large groups of citizens are
engaged in discussions with Institutions
Selected groups of Citizens
have significant influence,
but many citizens are not
engaged in discussions
Partial Participatory Democracy Representative Democracy
Decisions
Institutions take decisions,
and citizens have limited influence
Institutions and elites take decisions,
and selected groups of Citizens
have limited influence
T
o
k
e
n
ism
Discussions
Large groups of Citizens
are engaged in limited
discussions with Institutions
Selected groups of Citizens
have limited influence, but most citizens
are not engaged in discussions
Pseudo
Populist
Representative-Participatory-Democracy
Populist Participatory Democracy
Decisions Institutions take decisions Institutions take decisions
in a non-transparent manner
N
o
n
-P
a
rticip
a
tio
n
Discussions
Discussions are symbolic
even if they involve large
groups of Citizens
Discussions are symbolic,
and they involve a small
amount of Citizens
Pseudo Democracies, Partial Democracies, and Full Democracies. As showed
in table 3.1, each one of the levels has a thin version and a thick version, and
each level has a discussions sub-level, and a decisions sub-level.
Pseudo-thin Democracies are populist Participatory Democracies, and
pseudo-thick Democracies are populist Representative-Participatory- Democ-
racies. These two model of Democracies do not allow any participation
of Citizens, or Citizens are merely deluded to participate. Representative
Democracies belong to partial-thin Democracies, and Participatory Democ-
racies belong to partial-thick Democracies. These two models of Democra-
cies, give to Citizens a small amount of token to participate in discussions
and in decisions.
In the last level, there are Direct Democracies that belong to full-thin
Democracies, and Deliberative Democracies, that belong to full-thick Democ-
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racies. The two models of Democracies, essentially differ in the amount of
Citizens involved in discussion and in decisions, but also they differ in the
amount of discussions and decisions that must be taken.
Deliberative Democracies and Deliberative Systems are the main research
areas of this work. The next chapters of this part are aimed to define De-
liberative Democracies, expose their features, and discuss the requirements
needed to implement them. Nowadays, studies on the relevance and the fea-
sibility of Deliberative Democracies are quite impressive, so long that even
the latest President of the United States of America, Barack Obama, has
focused his attention on them. I would like to conclude this chapter with one
of his statements [98, p. 92]:
“What the framework of our Constitution can do is organize the
way in which we argue about our future. All of its elaborate ma-
chinery - its separation of powers and checks and balances and
federalist principles and Bill of Right - are designed to force us
into a conversation, a “deliberative democracy” in which all cit-
izens are required to engage in a process of testing their ideas
against an external reality, persuading others of their point of
view, and building shifting alliances of consent.”
Barack Obama, 2006.
Chapter 4
Deliberative Democracies
In this chapter, I will discuss the literature on Deliberative Democracies in
order to extract features for their legitimated and effective implementations.
Firstly, in section 4.1, I will expose literature on the first two generations of
Deliberative Democracies, and in section 4.2 I will expose the main criticism
on them. Secondly, in section 4.3 and its subsections, I will expose thoughts
of scholars of the third generation of Deliberative Democracies, show methods
to evaluate the quality of deliberations, and describe some practical exam-
ples of methods for Deliberative Democracies. Thirdly and lastly, in section
4.4, I will analyze the literature on the fourth generation of Deliberative
Democracies, and I will characterize Deliberative Systems.
4.1 Theories of Deliberative Democracies
As a very first and unsophisticated statement, the Deliberative Democ-
racy is a kind of Democracy aimed to engage Citizens in genuine discussions
rather than in expressing their preferences by means of ballots. In other
words, the aggregation of Citizens’ discrete needs is made before voting and
before creating the choices for the ballot. By doing so, eventually, in an ideal
deliberative world, voting would become unnecessary.
An elegant definition in literature is the one by John Parkinson [99, p.
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1], who defined the Deliberative Democracy as:
Definition 8 (Deliberative Democracy by Parkinson). A way of thinking
about politics which emphasizes the give and take of public reasoning between
Citizens rather than the counting of votes or the authority of representatives.
Another definition also involving representatives, is the one by Amy Gut-
mann and Dennis Thompson [50]:
Definition 9 (Deliberative Democracy by Gutmann and Thompson). A
form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their represen-
tatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons
that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reach-
ing conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to
challenge in the future.
The two above definitions expose some fundamental traits of Deliberative
Democracies. More specifically, Deliberative Democracies involve a certain
kind of reasoning about justified arguments, eventually turning into conclu-
sion that can always be challenged and transformed.
Before stepping forward to a deep investigation of different theories of
Deliberative Democracies and other features of them, there is a key point
that must be addressed. Due to the maturity of studies on Deliberative
Democracies, sometimes also in famous modern literature [100] [101], the
distinction between Deliberative Democracy and deliberation is readily ad-
dressed. Although it is not a scope of this research to precisely highlight the
differences between the two concepts, and deeply explain what are the traits
of the deliberation1, it is important to understand that deliberation is a “di-
alogue that bridges differences among participants’ diverse ways of speaking
and knowing” [103], whereas Deliberative Democracy, I argue here, is a kind
of Democracy whose first and mandatory component is the deliberation.
1I suggest to readers that want to understand better the differences between the two
concepts, to take a look to the Ph.D. thesis by Thomas William Flynn [102], that is
expressly intended to provide a clear distinction between the two concepts.
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Even if the idea of a Democracy built around the concept of the “rule of
reason” may be traced back to the Aristotelian Politics [104], the idea of the
Deliberative Democracy in the modern era is accounted to Jurgen Habermas.
After having deeply argued that democratic principles and moral principles
are separated entities, also by discussing classical literature on Democracies,
he concluded that there is still a certain form of competition between gover-
nance oriented to moral rights and governance oriented to popular sovereignty
[105, p. 94].
Habermas proposed a possible solution to appease this competition. Be-
cause laws may only describe the Democratic principles, the proposal of laws
must be justified by means of moral principles, on which Citizens should
agree by deliberation and by being moved by “the force of the better ar-
gument” [106, p. 108]. According to Habermas, if communication relies
on precise features, more specifically if it is open, unobstructed, and inter-
subjective, then outcomes of the deliberation will be moral, impartial and
transcendental from particular preferences and interests of individuals [107].
To be compliant to the above features and to produce outcomes having
the above qualities, current institutions must facilitate the deliberation by
supplying common goods, like free and independent information, and public
education. Also, institutions must facilitate the exercise of democratic rights,
like the right to demonstrate2.
The most forecasting and fascinating vision of the Habermas’ idea of
deliberation was about the places where the deliberation should occur. He
stated that the deliberation must take place not only in Parliaments, but also
in every place that belongs to the public sphere, such as in schools and in
media, but also when queuing at the bus stop. In other words, deliberation
2Features and goals of the deliberation, and features of infrastructure described by
Habermas, are well-summarized in the article “What is a democracy?”, edited by Marthe
in the Blog of the “West London Philosophy School”. It is available for public reading
at the following address: https://westlondonphilosophyschool.com/2016/07/03/what-is-a-
democracy-04072016/.
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must be ubiquitous and continuous3.
The latter is both the foundation that laid the ground to the discipline of
the Deliberative Democracy in its first generation, and the first requirement
of Deliberative Democracies belonging to the fourth generation.
The classification of Deliberative Democracy into four generations, is not
conceived as an analytical division based on strict parameters like specific
period of times and specific authors. The four generations are related to pe-
culiar and constituent characteristics of models of Deliberative Democracies,
and so, authors and concepts of the Deliberative Democracy may overlap
among different generations [110].
The first generation revolves around the normative theorizing and the
legitimacy of the Deliberative Democracy [18] [105] [107] [111] [112] [113]
[114] [115]. The second generation improved theories of the first one by
adapting them to integrate new needs of pluralist and multicultural Societies
[50] [116] [117] [118] [119] [120] [121] [122] [123].
The key differences between the first generation and the second genera-
tion revolve around the consensus, and the communication modes allowed in
Deliberative Democracies [102]. While scholars of the first generation assert
that a consensus must always be achieved by means of deliberation, scholars
of the second generation assert that there are situations where a consensus
may not be reached (and sometimes is even not desired4), and in these cases
3Interestingly, Stefano Rodota` used the term “Continuous Democracy” to refer to ways
we interact with Representative Democracies by means of digital technologies and new
media. He stated that these technologies are actually new places of mediation where
Democratic discussions are exercised without the needing of representatives [108]. The
Continuous Democracy, must not be classified as a form of Direct Democracy; it is a
new way to approach current Representative Democracies [109]. For this reason, the
Deliberative Democracy, as interpreted by Habermas, may be understood also as a meta-
layer referring to, and compliant to, other models of Democracies. Indeed, as Habermas
clearly expressed, Deliberative Democracy is a complex organism. It must be interpreted
as composed by a “central nucleus” that opens its “peripheries” to productive deliberation
[110, p. 143].
4Dryzek and Mill give very interesting arguments in support of disagreement. They
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decisions must be made by means of the majority rule.
The third generation supplied practical and detailed specifications to de-
sign and implement deliberation into institutions, and supplied empirical
analysis of existing deliberative processes. The fourth generation, by means
of a wide-sight on the other three generations, exposed the concept of Delib-
erative Systems5, so it focuses more on interconnected Deliberative practices,
rather than single implementations of Deliberative Democracies.
In this section, I discuss the literature on the first and the second gen-
erations and, eventually, I pinpoint a set of ideal features for Deliberative
Democracies that are shared among scholars of the first two generations, or
that I claim to be strongly necessary for ideal implementation of Deliberative
Democracies.
On the heels of Habermas’ theories and the features he has exposed for
implementing Deliberative Democracy, other scholars proposed concepts and
features to enhance the legitimacy of Deliberative Democracies and give in-
sight on specific arguments that must be taken into account when imple-
menting Deliberative Democracies.
The very first controversy in the literature on Deliberative Democracy
revolves around who must be included in the deliberation. Some scholars
argue that there must be certain kinds of control on the inputs of Democratic
deliberations. Others, assert that Deliberative Democracy must be broadly
open, because of its pluralistic intrinsic nature derived by the conception of
deliberation by Habermas.
John Rawls is a supporter of the idea to limit participants that must
state that disagreement is fundamental in improving individuals’ competences because, by
disagreeing, people may better understand their own position [124].
5The term Deliberative Systems was coined by Jane Mansbridge in 1999 [125] [110,
p. 143]. It refers to a system that allows Citizens to be engaged in a “everyday talk”.
Even if the “talk” is not strictly addressed to Deliberative Democracy, several scholars
after Mansbridge have proposed theoretical conceptions and practical solution to shape the
everyday talk into a Democratic deliberation [126] [118] [127], and eventually, Deliberative
Systems have flown into the very first concept of the fourth generation of Deliberative
Democracies. I will expose more deeply Deliberative Systems in the section 4.4
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be involved in deliberative decision-making procedures [114]. According to
his conception, this kind of discrimination must be performed on a moral
basis. Like Habermas, Rawls thinks that the first goal of the Deliberative
Democracy is to “forswearing the whole truth” [128, p. xvii], but he stresses
the point that there must be a preliminary agreement on what is the concept
of truth. This can happen only if participants to deliberation share political
values and pursue moral values that are reasonably accepted by everyone.
Rawls’ conception is counterposed to (among the others) Cohen’s one.
Cohen argues that, to yearn for legitimated Deliberative Democracies, decision-
making procedures should be created on a basis of epistemic legitimacy of
the inputs. These inputs, by means of deliberations built on specific features,
eventually flow into outcomes whose substantial value can be compared with
ideal standards of outcomes [115]. In Cohen’s conception, a deliberative
decision-making procedure, contributes itself to create informed Citizens and
new and shared moral values, because Democratic deliberations are based on
cognitive processes that drive Citizens to form personal and fair judgments
about the common good [128, p. xvi]. Cohen also states that, if the de-
liberation is built to ensure freedom to participants, their equality and their
autonomy, and to ensure mechanisms to avoid participant coercion, then the
deliberation will produce non objectionable outcomes. Finally, to evaluate
the quality of outcomes, Cohen stated that there must be publicly acceptable,
solid and fair standards, shared among different cultures. As a matter of fact,
the latter assertion reveals the idea of Cohen of a Deliberative Democracy
intended as a cross-Society model of Democracy.
On the same train of thought is John S. Dryzek. He states that ideal De-
liberative Democracies must be transnational and non-anthropocentric [110,
p. 141], and deliberation must be authentic, inclusive and consequential [117,
p. 10]. From his perspective, deliberation is: (1) authentic when discussing
Citizens are not influenced and coerced when choosing among options; (2)
inclusive, if the ones that are affected by decisions also have the opportunity
to discuss; (3) and consequential, if participators involved in the deliber-
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ation can actually contribute to build democratic outcomes. Interestingly,
Dryzek argues that the inclusiveness and the restriction of deliberations to
“mini-publics” [117, chapter 8] are not mutually exclusive. The coexistence
of inclusion and the limitation of participants may be achieved together by
limiting the occurrences of deliberation, by limiting the discussion to whom-
soever may best discuss about a given issue, and by limiting participators to
a restricted set of representatives.
Representation is a key argument for Dryzek. In his conception, legit-
imacy and representation are strictly related. Similarly to Cohen’s con-
ception, Dryzek argues that Deliberative Democracies must have normative
value of legitimacy [116]. For this reason, Dryzek argues that deliberation can
not subsist without representation because representation is closely related
to normative fundamentals of legitimacy [116, p. 43].
Dryzek tries to address a certain kind of transition from Democracies
based on representatives to Democracies based on deliberations, while pre-
serving normative legitimacy values given by representation [117, chapter 3].
He proposes to establish the so-called “chamber of discourses” [117, p. 43],
an institution hosting representative of discourses, rather than representa-
tives of Citizens. The scholar argues that nowadays, also due to the diffusion
of technologies that rely on the internet, there are influencing people, who
as matter of fact represent discourses, and the chamber of discourse may be
both a valid formal and informal option to legitimate these “representative
of discourse” as democratic inputs.
Dryzek, I argue here, has also farseeing ideas about communications and
discourses in Deliberative Democracies. He sets forth that a discourse is “a
shared way of comprehending the world embedded in language. In this sense,
a discourse is a set of concepts, categories and ideas that will always feature
particular assumptions, judgments, contentions, dispositions, intentions and
capabilities” [117, p. 31]. Most importantly, also by endorsing theories of
other scholars [129], Dryzek is a staunch supporter of the idea that Democ-
racies must allow different modes of communication, rather than the only
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reasoning, for instance story-telling, and argues that this is particularly es-
sential to include non-human inputs into deliberation, and to deal with other
conceptions of Democracy [116, p. 140].
According to Dryzek, Iris Marion Young also strongly supports the idea
that ideal deliberation must allow different modes of communication to the
extent that inputs are always accountable [120, chapter 4]. In Young’s view,
there are at least three types of communication that must be taken into
account to promote inclusion and diversity [120, pp. 57-77].
The first one is the “greeting, or public acknowledgement”, a set of ges-
tures used in communication by means of which “people acknowledge one
another”. Greetings include interaction based on human language, but also
other types of communication like handshaking and hugs. The second one
is the “rhetoric”, that is “the way content is conveyed as distinct from the
assertive value of the content” and consists, of course, of human language
communications, but also of figurative speeches and nonverbal media. The
last one is the “narrative and situated knowledge”, that serves to “foster un-
derstanding among members of a polity with very different experience and
assumption about what is important” and, so, to “giving voice to the kinds
of experience which often go unheard in legal discussions and courtroom set-
tings”. This is particularly useful when there are participants in the discus-
sion not having a proper understanding of arguments, and is useful to achieve
respectful deliberations.
Also Michael Neblo supports the possibility to allow different modes of
communication [130], and points out another interesting argument. Other
scholars, like Young [119], O’Neill [131], Remer [132] and Triadafilopoulos
[133], question Habermas’ because he seems to not allow any room for other
forms of communication in Deliberative Democracies, rather than the strong
reasoning. Neblo exposes that, actually, Habermas also took in consideration
rhetoric and other kinds of communication like greeting, story-telling and
testimony. By interpreting his theories, Neblo claims that Habermas allows
for other forms of communication providing that their purpose is at least one
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of the following three: (1) they provide arguments that can not be exposed
with norms; (2) they serve to expose arguments to people that would not get
them if exposed in any other way; or (3) they foster the trust, the inclusion,
and the respect among participants to the discussion.
After having agreed that ideal Deliberative Democracy must be built on
pluralistic and inclusive deliberations, and that it must allow different modes
of communication, theorists of the first generation of Deliberative Democra-
cies move on the ways to reach consensus in such kinds of deliberations.
Clearly, pluralistic and inclusive deliberation based on various type of
communication, may resolve into disagreements rather than agreements. The
most interesting attempt to solve this issue, I argue here, is the one by
Dryzek, who delineated a certain kind of composed consensus. He expounded
the concept of “meta-consensus”, that should foster eventual agreements,
without affecting the required trait of openness of Deliberative Democracies
[117, p. 101].
The meta consensus is composed by the normative meta-consensus, the
epistemic meta-consensus, and the preference meta-consensus. The first one,
the normative meta-consensus is related to the legitimacy of discussed values
and, so, is an agreement on values that underlay a deliberation. The second
one, the epistemic meta-consensus, is related to the belief that specific actions
may revolve into specific outcomes, so is an agreement on impacts of outcomes
of deliberations. The last one, the preference meta-consensus, is related to
the set of options among which deciders are requested to choose and, so, is an
agreement on specific things, or actions, that must be performed to resolve
an issue [134, pp. 22 and 23].
Scholars of the first two generations of Deliberative Democracies also
focus on how to engage people in creating pluralistic discussions, and how
to give them the needed knowledge to discuss (or how to understand if they
already have it).
Deveaux states that not only the Deliberative Democracy is legitimated
only if it takes the pluralism of inputs to heart, but also that the delibera-
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tion itself feeds the pluralism by contributing to a “cultural reinvention of
traditions” [135]. Moreover, as also exposed by Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson [123], Deveaux thinks that the more inputs are limited in deliber-
ation by enforcing rules, the more powerful and influential groups will benefit
and they may drive the deliberation to achieve their objectionable desired
outcomes. Deveaux also focuses on deliberation procedures, that must be
transparent and aimed to the negotiation and the compromise. Necessary
conditions for this kind of deliberation are the non-domination, the politi-
cal equality of participants, and the revisability of outcomes. Mechanisms to
avoid domination are needed to prevent who has social and economic power
to coerce the others. Political equality must be intended as the equal op-
portunity to access the deliberation independently by political ideas. The
revisability is to enhance a dynamic opinion-changing of participants, aimed
to an eventual agreement. Indeed, deliberating people may feel more com-
fortable to express their opinions if they know that they are able to change
them at any time.
For what it concerns the knowledge of Citizens and their (democratic)
education, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson pointed out interesting
arguments. They argue that to create Democratic education, Deliberative
Democracies must be reciprocity-oriented [123] [50]. Reciprocity may be
claimed only if reasons of arguments of deliberation are publicly accessible,
moral, respectfully, and revisable.
The above analysis of literature on the first two generations of Deliber-
ative Democracies expose a first list of features of ideal implementation of
Deliberative Democracies. The next two sections are aimed to expose the
main critics on Deliberative Democracies, and the literature on the third gen-
eration and actual implementations of methods of Deliberative Democracies.
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4.2 Critics of Deliberative Democracies
Before moving to the analysis of the third generation of Deliberative
Democracies, critics of Deliberative Democracies theories surely deserve at-
tention. Indeed, on one hand, scholars of the third generation of Deliberative
Democracies expose implementations of Deliberative Democracies to show
the actual feasibility of it. On the other hand, and I argue here perhaps their
most considerable work, is a kind of reply to critics on first generation of
Deliberative Democracies.
Fishkin and Luskin greatly characterize the main critics on Deliberative
Democracies into the following three categories [136]: (1) the defeatists, who
argue that Deliberative Democracies are impossible, because Citizens do not
have the Democratic capacity to deliberate, and because it is not possible to
achieve a large participation of Citizens while assuring some legitimacy re-
quirements, especially the political equality [17] [137]; (2) the extenuationists,
who argue that Deliberative Democracies are not necessary, because Institu-
tions are able to approximate discrete needs of Citizens by giving them sets
of preferences [138], and this is the most legitimated, effective and efficient
way, to govern [139], and; (3) the alarmists, who argue that Deliberative
Democracies are dangerous. In their opinion, Deliberative Democracies are
actually implementable, but a system of Government based on the ability
of Citizens to change their opinion by means of reasoning, would result in a
worst Democracy, rather than in a better one. This because there are people
that by means of their skills, or economical and social power, may be advan-
taged in deliberation [140]. Alarmists are also concerned that opinions may
change not because participants rationally change their mind, but because
the initial set of arguments is not balanced, or it is biased in some way [141].
In other words, alarmist doubt that the reasoning or the deliberation based
on other modes of communication would resolve in a perfect consensus.
I argue that, with this research work, and with arguments that I have
exposed in the previous chapter 3, I have already demonstrated that critics
by extenuationists can be set apart. In the rest of this part, I will propose
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a reply to the doubts exposed by alarmist and defeatists of Deliberative
Democracies. The first critics that must be addressed are the ones related
to the possibility to achieve a consensus, the ones related to the political
equality of participants, and the ones related to the amount of Citizens who
must be involved in Deliberative Democracies decision-making processes.
On one hand, as I have exposed in previous section 4.1, theorists of the
first and second generation of Deliberative Democracies state very clearly
that Deliberative Democracies are legitimated only if they are both built
on legitimated procedures (procedural legitimacy), and designed to foster
the production of legitimated outcomes (substantial legitimacy), achieved
after a consensus among Citizens. On the other hand, critics of Deliberative
Democracies affirm that Deliberative Democracies is a kind of utopia, be-
cause legitimate procedures and legitimated outcomes can not coexist [120]
[142] [143] [140]. In a nutshell, this means that it is not possible to design de-
liberative legitimated decision-making procedures by fostering pluralistic and
diverse inputs, without jeopardizing the legitimacy of outputs of Deliberative
Democracy, achieved only if there is a perfect consensus [144].
To unravel this thorny issue, Dryzek and Niemeyer propose to connect
procedures and outcomes at the design level of Deliberative Democracies [145]
and, so, they theorized, implemented and experimented the meta-consensus,
that I have introduced in previous section 4.1, and I will better expose in the
following sections of this work.
According to Dryzek, I argue that meta-consensus, and the mechanisms
to allow participators to change their opinion while discussing, are key points
for the legitimacy and feasibility of Deliberative Democracies. Indeed, by al-
lowing discussing people to change their preferences, they can change their
position according to reasons that they encounter during deliberations, and
this can be conceived as a sort of composed and sequential consensus. By
implementing it there will still be, of course, situations in which perfect con-
sensus among participators is not reached, but education and democratic ca-
pacity of Citizens will be improved, because they will explore, and eventually
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accept, diverse normative and epistemic values6.
Other critics to Deliberative Democracies, but also to Participatory Democ-
racies and more generically to Direct Democracies, are the ones concerning
the political equality of participants. Critics of competitive Democracies, the
ones based on aggregation of votes, assert that the political equality in these
models of Democracy is denied, because the activity of Citizens is restricted
to choose among a set of alternatives, and this could create elites that, in
fact, control Democratic processes, as I have exposed in section 3.1. So,
on one hand, critics of competitive Democracies, especially the supporters
of Participatory Democracies and Deliberative Democracies, state that by
allowing Citizens to create policy and laws by themselves the issue of polit-
ical inequality would be solved. On the other hand, Critics of Deliberative
Democracies, such as Norman Barry [146], assert that this is an erroneous
thought because there are no evidences that a decentralization of power from
Institutions to Citizens, would prevent the forming of elites acting as con-
trollers or oppressors of political minorities [147] and, so, there would be not
political equality among participators.
Also Robert Dahl [148] and James Fishkin [149, chapter 2] highlighted on
issue of political equality, and introduced arguments on Democratic capacity.
On one side, Dahl states that by assuming a priori the politic equality of
participants, the more the participants in a decision-making processes, the
less the influence each participator has, and this would avoid the creation
of controlling elites. Flipping the coin, Fishkin states that political equality
can not be assumed a priori in a situation of large inclusion of participants.
This happens because, if decision-making processes involve a lot of participa-
tors, there would not be enough resources to supply participators the needed
information to participate, and in particular information shaped on their
Democratic capacity.
6I remand readers to section ??, were I give further motivations for considering the
meta-consensus as a composed consensus, and to part III of this research, were I explain
how to actually implement mechanisms to achieve such a kind of consensus.
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The latter Fishkin assertion resolves into the very critic to Participatory
Democracies, and in one of the most controversial arguments on the behalf
of Deliberative Democracies. Participatory Democracies, as Fishkin states
with his democratic reform trilemma, are biased at their hearts, because only
Citizens having enough Democratic capacity and enough time to spend in
participation would participate, and this undermines the legitimacy require-
ment of political equality in participation. To address this issue, a feasible
solution is to allow to participate only random sampling of Citizens and,
so, to allow the participation or the deliberation to mini-public, but this
jeopardizes the legitimacy requirement of the openness of deliberation.
By summarizing, critics on Deliberative Democracies, revolve around the
possibility to achieve a consensus, the amount of Citizens who must be in-
volved in the deliberation, and the political equality and the Democratic
capacity of Citizens involved in deliberations. Some of these controversies
are solved by theorist of the third generation of Deliberative Democracies,
by theorizing actual implementations of methods of deliberation, and by em-
pirical evidences in support of Deliberative Democracies, as I expose in the
next section.
4.3 Analysis and Examples of Deliberative
Democracies
Scholars of the first two generations of Deliberative Democracies neglect
to specify how to practically implement them [110, p. 142]. The third gen-
eration of Deliberative Democracies, focuses on practical ways to implement
methods to deliberate in the public sphere. Scholars of the third generation,
also expose empirical studies on methods to evaluate the quality of outcomes
of deliberations [150].
Dryzek, is claimed to be the first one to move from theories to practi-
cal solutions [151]. As I have already explained in section 4.1, by means
of the concept of meta-consensus, Dryzek exposes a more feasible and prac-
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tically implementable way to achieve consensus among diverse and plural-
istic Citizens. Also, in his works on the third generation of Deliberative
Democracies [116] [152] [153] [154] [155], Dryzek fosters the concept of mini-
public. In his opinion, a practical implementation, and a combination of
meta-consensus and mini-public are the most suitable ways to implement
Deliberative Democracies for the public sphere, and he points out that mini-
public is not conflicting with diversity and pluralism, to the extent that the
two features are moved from Citizens to discourses while deliberating [117].
Niemeyer and Dryzek do not focus only on ways to build consensus, but
also expose interesting ways to qualitatively evaluate deliberations. In the
same work on meta-consensus [145], they define and delineate the Q-index.
The Q-index is based on the Q-methodology by Brown [156], and used to
measure the “inter-subjective rationality” of individuals. It is performed by
asking individuals, before and after a deliberation about a topic, to sort the
same set of statements in a quasi-normal distribution from a “most agree”
to “most disagree” nine point scale. The Q-sort is then analyzed by means
of an inverted factor analysis (Centroid extraction and Varimax rotation).
Also belonging to the third generation, and preceding the one of Dryzek
and Niemeyer, the study of Marco Steenbergen et al. [157] on the Deliberative
Quality Index (DQI) exposes another methodology to evaluate empirically
the quality of deliberations. The DQI is intended to evaluate the quality of
deliberations based on the fact that each deliberation has specific traits, in
particular: (1)it must be “theoretically grounded” according to one or more
deliberation theories of the first two generations; (2) it must be designed to be
empirically observed ; (3) it must be “general”; and (4) it should be “reliable”.
The DQI is performed on units that are called “speeches”. Each speech is
analyzed according to seven parameters: (1) the participation, that is the
capacity of the speaker to participate; (2) the level of justification, related to
the completeness of justifications given by speakers for their assertions; (3)
the content of justification, measuring how much justifications are related to
the common-good ; (4) the respect, that is the level of respect speakers expose
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in their statements; (5) the respect toward demands of others ; (6) the respect
toward counterarguments, and; (7) the constructive-politics, an indicator on
how much the speeches are aimed to build a consensus.
James Fishkin and Robert Luskin, after having listed a set of required fea-
tures for Deliberative Democracy and designed a practical implementation of
Deliberative Democracies, the Deliberative Polling that I describe in section
4.3.1, expose another model for the evaluation of the quality of deliberations
[136]. Firstly, they argue that deliberative Institutions must grant the polit-
ical equality and an equal consideration to everyone. Secondly, they expose
mandatory features of inputs and Citizens of ideal Deliberative Democracies.
More specifically, they state that deliberations must be: (1) informed, so the
arguments must be related to appropriate evidences; (2) balanced, meaning
that for every exposed argument it also its counterpart must be exposed ;
(3) conscientious, meaning that participants must be “willing to participate”,
respectfully expose their arguments, and respectfully listen the others’ par-
ticipants ones; (4) substantive, meaning that arguments must be analyzed by
taking into account their content and not their proposers, and; (5) compre-
hensive, meaning that institutions in Deliberative Democracy must take into
account the largest possible set of arguments by Citizens.
Fishkin and Luskin highlight a series of interesting results to appease
various critics on Deliberative Democracies, derived by their experiments.
Firstly they found that, even if they involved a mini-public of high skilled
participants, arguments where quite representative of the whole population.
Secondly, they found that opinion and vote intentions often change after hav-
ing deliberated. Thirdly, they found that participants gain information after
having deliberated, and that the gain of information and the change of opinion
and vote intentions are related. Also, they found that the trend of acquiring
information and changing preferences and vote intentions is not related to the
actual location of participants. Fourthly they found that, by means of delib-
eration the policy intentions become more predictable, so policy-makers may
use outcomes of deliberations to propose more desirable proposals. Fifthly,
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in relation to the more information acquired by participators, they observed
an increase of single-peaks7 in Citizens choices, and this is essential to avoid
the possibility of Arrowian preferences8 that may undermine the legitimacy
of an eventual voting section in case of a consensus is not achieved. Sixthly,
they found that preferences do not always become polarized and homoge-
neous among discussing groups. This is important to avoid the domination
of arguments, and to avoid that popular arguments are advantaged in de-
liberation. Lastly, they found that balanced deliberation promotes balanced
learning, meaning that usually participators do not tend to learn only posi-
tions on their own side, but also they significantly consider also positions of
the other sides.
Fishkin, together with Bruce Ackerman, also contributed to the third gen-
eration of Deliberative Democracies by proposing a theoretical implementa-
tion of deliberation called “The Deliberation Day” [160], that I will describe
in section 4.3.2. With their model, the two scholars expose other arguments
against the “civic privatism”, characterizing Representative Democracies.
The scholars also further foster the need of a renewed Citizenship, whose
first purpose is to get rid of the “rational ignorance” among Citizens. In-
deed, Fishkin and Ackerman state that, as an effect of the rational ignorance
concept introduced by Antony Downs in 1957 [161], Citizens may feel that
their choices would not actually affect the result of a particular ballot or de-
liberation, if a big amount of participants is involved in them. For this reason,
7Single-peaked preferences are largely studied in Social Choice Theory. A group of in-
dividuals have single-peaked preferences among a set of alternatives, when each individual
has a preferred option, and the options different from the ideal one are evaluated as less
preferred [158].
8The Arrow Impossibility Theorem states that preferences of voters can not be ranked,
if the process of acquiring preferences is not designed to fulfill three criteria [159]: (1)
if a voter prefer an option to another, then the group of voters must prefer that option
to the other option; and (2) if the preference of a voter between two alternatives remain
unchanged, then the preference of the group among those two alternatives must remain
unchanged; and (3) no single voter have the power to choose a preference for the whole
group.
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Citizens may prefer to remain ignorant and, so, to not acquire any informa-
tion about the topic of the ballot, or about the topic of the deliberation,
because they may retain that the time needed to become informed on the
topic is not worth it. By theorizing and practicing Deliberative Pools, and
by theorizing The Deliberation Day, Fishkin and Ackerman demonstrated
that Citizens feel to have right incentives to acquire information about the
discussed topics, so their rational ignorance is marginalized.
Another important contribution to the analysis of implementation and
proposals of Deliberative Democracy, and so, an important contribution to
the third generation of Deliberative Democracies, is the work of Archon Fung
on required features for ideal mini-public [162]. He explores eight dimensions
that must be taken into account when designing mini-public. For the sake of
my research purposes, four of them are worth a deep description.
Firstly Fung states, as other scholars, that deliberative models must al-
low only mini-public to be involved into discussions. However, with his con-
tributions, he characterized mini-public into three types. The first one is
called “Educative Forum”: by being involved in this type of mini-public, Cit-
izens acquire information about topics and shape their opinion about them.
The second type of mini-public is the “Participatory Advisory Panel”, aimed
both to help Citizens to improve the quality of their opinion, and Institu-
tions to align public policies with preferences of Citizens. The third type
of mini-public is the “Participatory Problem-Solving Collaboration”, defined
by Fung as a “continuous and symbiotic relationship between the state and
public sphere aimed at solving particular collective problems”.
Secondly, Fung focuses on how to choose participants that must be in-
volved in deliberation. Here Fung feeds-up the critics against the possibility
to choose participants only on a voluntarism basis because, as stated before,
this methodology may jeopardize the balancing in political equality of par-
ticipants. Indeed, he states that in such a model of voluntarism-centered
recruitment, only professional and proper educated Citizens would take part
into the deliberation. Fung delineates three options to choose participants.
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The first one is to choose participants on a random basis in order to select
representatives of the demographic diversity of the population. The second
one is to act a recruitment among Citizens that, differently to the volun-
tarism, must ensure a balancing in political equality by forcing recruiters
to follow specific guidelines to choose participators. The third one is to in-
volve Citizens on a voluntarism basis, but giving incentives to participate to
Citizens with “low-statuses” and “low-incomes”.
Thirdly, the scholar focuses on what topics must be put into deliberations,
and he exposes that there are essentially two big categories of topics that can
be discussed. There are topics that require high skills and a proper education
to be understood and discussed, and topics that can be discussed in a more
generic way. The mini-public and the deliberation process must be shaped in
different ways according to the level of expertise required by the topics that
are going to be discussed.
Fourthly, and lastly, Fung exposes the need of mini-public and delib-
erations of being monitored. Both Institutions must monitor and back-off
deliberations, and the mini-public must monitor actions undertaken by In-
stitutions after the deliberations have taken place. In this way, mini-public
can contribute to the accountability of any initiative of public policy.
Summarizing, in this section I have analyzed the literature on the third
generation of Deliberative Democracies, exposing other features of Deliber-
ative Democracies and empirical founding on practical implementations of
methods of Deliberative Democracies. In the next sections, I will describe
some examples of methods of Deliberative Democracies.
4.3.1 Deliberative Polling
The Deliberative Polling was invented by James Fishkin, and revolves
around a very simple idea [163, p. 162] [162]. The idea is to poll a sample
of people on a specific questions after giving them the opportunity to speak,
and to questions experts about that issue.
The organizers of Deliberative Pools select, on a random basis, several
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hundreds of participators from all over a Country that is going to face an
electoral ballot. The organizers prepare a balanced set of materials on the
issue, reporting all the views of different candidates about the same issue.
Participators are separated in smaller groups and involved in intensive discus-
sions with the opportunity, if requested, to ask clarifications about the issue
to highly skilled personnel, or to politicians who have submitted a specific
proposal in the political campaign. At the end of several days of discus-
sion, participators are requested to fill-in a survey, that is then forwarded to
Institutions or political parties. Fishkin argues that, by aggregating the re-
ceived surveys, politicians and Institutions would have the view of the entire
country if all Citizens would be involved in a similar deliberative process.
The design of Deliberative Pools deals well with the issue of political
equality, and partially satisfies the requirements of having Citizens properly
informed to discussed issues. However, the methodology can not be con-
sidered an ideal one for Deliberative Democracies, firstly because it is not
continuous, and Citizens are only involved in a one-shoot deliberation, sec-
ondly because it does not give actual actual incentives to Citizens to became
deeply informed about the issue [162]. Indeed, even if Citizens have the
opportunity to question and discuss with experts, this can work only if dis-
cussed issues are generic, because in case of very technical issues Citizens
would not have enough time to acquire a proper understanding of discussed
issues. The other problem of Deliberative Pools is that they do not formally
connect Citizens, Institutions and politics, so they are not useful to increase
the accountability of policies, or their efficacy.
To fill some of the above gaps, Fishkin also proposed another theoretical
method of deliberation, that I expose in the next section.
4.3.2 The Deliberation Day
The Deliberation Day is a theoretical implementation of Deliberative
Democracy [160], proposed by Fishking and Ackerman, that can be prac-
tical implemented by Institutions at local level. The aim of the Deliberation
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Day is to supply the Citizens with more, and more precise, information about
political candidates of any election and about the proposals that candidates
foster in their political campaign. The deliberative process is held one week
before any national election, and registered voters are called together in a
neighbourhood meeting place.
The Deliberation Day is supposed to be implemented in the United States
of America, and is simultaneously held in different places through the whole
country. Two weeks before the event, participators are asked to think and
reply to the following question: “what are the two most important issue
presently confronting the nation?”. While deliberating, Citizens are firstly
divided in small groups of fifteen Citizens and, at a later time, in larger
groups of five-hundreds people, to discuss the central issues raised by the
campaign. Each participator gets 150$ for participating in the meeting and,
during the day of the meeting, any other work, except the most essential
ones is forbidden by law. The day of the event is divided into four segments
of deliberation.
In the first segment, participators arrive to the meeting place, and are
welcomed between 8 am. and 9 am. Citizens are divided in groups of fifteen
people, and they sit together to watch a live television show on the principal
national candidates. Each party competing in the election day prepares an
informative and commercial ad (infomercial) to drive the discussion. For the
creation of the infomercial, parties can use a fixed amount of words and time.
The first segment ends at 10:15 pm, and between 10:15 and 10:30 there is a
coffee break.
The second segment starts at 10:30. Groups have to elect a foreman by
majority of vote. The main task of groups, in the second segment, is to
prepare their contribution for the larger group of five-hundreds people that
will take place after lunch. During this discussion nobody is obliged to talk,
but whomever wants to talk has an allocated time slot of five minutes. When
someone starts to talk the foreman starts a timer and she or he stops the
timer when speakers finish their intervention. The foreman can not allow
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to talk Citizens who have already consumed their time slot. The final goal
of each participator, in the second segment, is to formulate a question for
candidates of the election. At the end of the session, the foreman collects all
the questions and Citizens are requested to vote each one of them by casting
a secret yes or no vote. The second segment finishes at 12:15, and Citizens
have one hour and forty-five minutes for lunch.
During lunch time, moderators get the list of all the questions submitted
by each small group. In a first step, all moderators together try to group
similar questions. In a second step, each moderator selects fifteen questions
that will serve as a basis for the afternoon discussion. Moderators are Citizens
already proven to be able and skilled at moderating, like local judges. They
are selected before the event, and their number is related to the amount of
participators, in order to assure that each large group of five-hundreds people
has a moderator.
The third section starts at 2 pm. At that time, moderators welcome
Citizens and representatives of the local party. Each question is submitted
to representatives, and each one of them has two minutes to reply. After
all the questions are submitted, each representative is granted with a five
minutes slot to summarize the reply to Citizens.
The fourth segment starts at 4 pm, and in this segment Citizens return
to their morning small groups. By following the same five minutes protocol
as in the morning session, but not casting votes in this section, participators
share their reactions to the answers received from representatives during large
group session. After the fourth section, the Deliberation Day ends.
While solving some of the problems of Deliberative Polls, the deliberation
day still receive some criticisms. Firstly, if the Deliberation Day must be
spread all over the United States of America, the reward of 150$ for Citizens,
may resolve in a very high expense for Institutions. Secondly, the monetary
incentive may encourage Citizens to take part to the event, even if they do not
have an actual purpose of participating in the deliberation activity. Thirdly
and most important, Fishkin and Ackerman assume that, by simply limiting
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the time to argue, and by involving moderators and foremen to assure that
speakers do not exceed their allocated time, the deliberation would be fair.
However, this can not be proven, because struggles among participators could
even happen, and reasoning could be overtaken by passion and by emotions.
4.3.3 21st Century Town Meeting
Carolyn Lukensmeyer proposes a methodology for Deliberative Democ-
racies called the “21st Century Town Meeting” [164]. Differently to Deliber-
ative Polls and the Deliberation Day, 21st Century Town Meetings rely on
new communication technologies.
Participants to the 21st Century Town Meetings are chosen in order to
demographically represent the population, and they are supplied with free
meals, transportation, and even translations in order to avoid issues related
to cultural differences. As the very first step of the event, Citizens reply to a
survey with a voting keyboard. Results are analyzed in real-time to measure
the demographics of participants and to compare it with the expected one.
Before deliberations start, participants are divided in smaller groups of
ten or twelve Citizens sitting over round tables. A facilitator and a scribe
are assigned to each group. Scribes have are charge of writing transcripts
of the group discussions. Facilitators are in charge of helping participators
to discuss in civil ways, and helping discussions in those situations in which
participators have similar arguments, viewpoints, and ideas, but expose them
differently. Each small group has to follow the same agenda for discussions,
and deliberations are made in parallel on each table. At the end of this
phase all tables are linked, and the deliberation is performed on a large
scale of thousands of people. The deliberation in this step is facilitated and
hosted by a single person, that typically is a well-known famous person,
or a person very skilled to manage large public, such as a local politician
or a television anchor woman/man. While discussing in the large group,
Citizens are supplied with a voting keyboard, and they are requested to vote
periodically on specific issues. All voting sessions are collected and processed
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instantly, and results are showed to participants in real-time.
By means of specific software, facilitators and scribes collect all discus-
sions and viewpoints that emerge from deliberating tables, and try to ag-
gregate them in order to summarize the main viewpoints and positions of
participators. Before the end of the 21st Century Town Meeting, organizers
create a report containing results and other information about the meeting.
The report is distributed to participators, to media, and to Institutional
decision-makers9.
21st Century Town Meetings have several benefits on Citizens and delib-
eration. Firstly, meetings contribute to create informed Citizens, by means
of material that is carefully created and balanced on the basis of the de-
mography of participants. Secondly, the results of deliberations, but also the
Citizens during events, are linked with Authorities and Institutional decision-
makers. By doing so, on one hand, Institutions can have an instant feedback
on policies needed or desired by Citizens. On the other hand, Citizens can
feel more connected with Institutions and, so, they can feel to actually have
a voice in Democratic decision-making processes. The latter may solve prob-
lems related to the rational ignorance of Citizens, and may contribute to
improve their Democratic capacities.
Thee problems with 21st Century Town Meetings, I argue here, are es-
sentially three. The first one is related to the amount of Citizens involved in
deliberations, the second one is related to facilitators, the third one is related
to the continuity of the event. Firstly, even if these meetings can involve up
to five-thousands Citizens, and even if Citizens are chosen on a demographic
basis, problems of political inequality may still arise, because checks on par-
ticipants are made only on their demographics, and there is no check on their
skills or political ideas. Secondly, organizers of meetings suppose that facili-
tators are super-partes, and so that they can drive discussions to convergent
9A more detailed description of 21st Century Town Meetings, is the
one by Archon Fung, that is publicly available at the following address:
http://participedia.net/en/methods/21st-century-town-meeting.
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and shared viewpoints, without affecting the diversity and the plurality of
deliberations. Also, they have in charge to collect all the viewpoints, and
all facilitators together have in charge to analyze and summarize all view-
points shared among tables. As a matter of fact, facilitators may be seen
as representatives, and this can flow into the same issues of Representative
Democracies.
Thirdly and lastly, like others methods of Deliberative Democracies that
I have exposed in the previous sections, 21st Century Town Meetings are
one-shoot events. Neither they foster Citizens to continue deliberating af-
ter meetings, nor these meetings are connected with other similar events.
Scholars of the fourth generation of Deliberative Democracies and, so, of
Deliberative Systems, try to address these issues. In the next section, I ex-
pose the main literature and main conceptions, on the fourth generation of
Deliberative Democracies.
4.4 From Deliberative Democracies Towards
Deliberative Systems
Nowadays, literature on the first three generations of Deliberative Democ-
racies is quite humongous. After what I have exposed in the previous sections
of this chapter, it is quite safe to assert that we have enough information
to extract features for ideal and legitimated Deliberative Democracies pro-
cesses, and these features can be used to design deliberative processes solidly
grounded on theoretical thesis.
However, as I have shown in section 4.3, practical examples and theo-
retical methods for Deliberative Democracies, still fail to implement certain
features, and neglect to consider certain humans-related and technologies-
related aspects that, if present while deliberating, may resolve in a loss of
legitimacy of deliberative methods or, even worse, drive the deliberation out
of its purposes. Also, I argue here, there is still a certain lack of clarity on
what are common shared features among all theories of Deliberative Democ-
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racies. One of my research questions, is to address these latter issues, and I
will expose further on this in the next chapters of this work. But literature
and scholars of the first three generations of Deliberative Democracies also
focus on stand-alone deliberative processes and, I argue here, as a point of
facts, this means that they set apart any consideration on how to implement
eventual ubiquitous and continuous Deliberative Democracies. The fourth
generation of Deliberative Democracies, while still very young as Stephen
Elstub asserts [151, p. 114], addresses a first analysis of required features to
achieve this kind of “wide” Deliberative Democracies. This section is aimed
to expose the main literature and conceptions on the fourth generation of
Deliberative Democracies.
To expose a definition of Deliberative Systems, there is firstly the need
to expose a clear and generic definition of Deliberative Democracies. After
having acknowledged concepts of the first three generations of Deliberative
Democracies, and by including them in definition 3 of Democracies that I
have given in section 2.1, I argue that the following one is a good definition
of Deliberative Democracies:
Definition 10 (Deliberative Democracy). A Deliberative Democracy is a
form of Government based on legitimated deliberative and Democratic decision-
making processes that are designed, enforced, maintained and participated
by mini-public of Citizens and by Institutions. In Deliberative Democra-
cies, mini-public of Citizens and Institutions are directly and equally engaged
in improving their Democratic capacities, and in creating legitimated inputs
for the deliberation. The purpose of the deliberation is to make interest-
ing choices that can produce legitimated, effective, efficient, and satisfying
outcomes, aimed to improve the community, and aimed to improve the delib-
eration itself.
When speaking of Deliberative Systems, the word “system” has a very
technical acceptation, close to the acceptation of the word “system” in soft-
ware contexts. So, as exposed by Jane Mansbridge et al. [127], a systems
is: “a set of distinguishable, differentiated, but to some degree interdependent
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parts, often with distributed functions and a division of labour, connected in
such a way as to form a complex whole. It requires both differentiation and
integration among the parts. It requires some functional division of labour,
so that some parts do work that others cannot do as well. And it requires
some relational interdependence, so that a change in one component will bring
about changes in some others”.
By merging the above definition of systems, and the definition 10 of De-
liberative Democracies, I propose the following definition of Deliberative Sys-
tems:
Definition 11 (Deliberative System). A Deliberative System is a form of
Government based on legitimated interdependent, interconnected and dis-
tributed deliberative decision-making processes that are designed, enforced,
maintained and participated by Citizens and by Institutions. In Deliberative
Systems, Citizens and Institutions are directly, equally, continuously, and
ubiquitously involved to improve their deliberative capacities, and they are
motivated to create legitimated inputs for the deliberation. The purpose of
the deliberation is to make interesting choices that can produce legitimated,
effective, efficient, and satisfying outcomes, aimed to improve the community,
and aimed to improve the Deliberative System itself.
The absence of the word mini-public, and the absence of the word Democ-
racy, in the above definition 11, surely deserve more in-depth explanations.
While scholars of the first generation of Deliberative Democracies, par-
ticularly Habermas, have strongly supported the conception that Delibera-
tive Democracies must be open to the largest possible group of participants,
scholars of the second and third generation of Deliberative Democracies, have
mostly supported the idea that deliberation must be restricted to random set
of Citizens or to Institutions and, so, to mini-public. In other words, there is
a distinction between micro and macro approaches of Deliberative Democra-
cies [165].
Micro approaches of Deliberative Democracy refer to face-to-face syn-
chronous deliberations regarding the public sphere and so the Institutions
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[105] [116] [151, p. 109] [165] [166], whilst macro approaches of Deliberative
Democracies, and so Deliberative Systems, refer to an Institutionalization of
asynchronous deliberations [151, p. 109] [165] [166] and, so, I argue here, to
deliberations that could be, if required or wanted, continuous and ubiquitous.
The shift from a micro approach to a macro one, also justifies the absence
of the word Democracy in the definition 11 of Deliberative Systems that I
propose. Indeed, Deliberative Systems may include elements that are not
governed by means of a Democratic approach, without imperiling the whole
Democratic legitimacy of the Deliberative System. For instance, Mansbridge
et al. [127] assert that there are three elements that must be allowed to enter
in Deliberative Systems: experts, medias, and protests.
Medias, as the scholars state, must be absolutely included in Deliberative
Systems, because they serve as connectors among Citizens and Institutions,
and allow Citizens and Institutions to communicate in asynchronous ways.
However, I claim, medias could rely on their internal model of governance
that could also not be Democratic, while still being compliant to Demo-
cratic Systems, to the extent that their specific Government system does not
jeopardize others required features of Deliberative Systems, like the political
equality of participants, or the respectfulness of participants. In the same
work, Mansbridge and her colleagues also highlight important considerations
about the involvement of experts in Deliberative Systems, and about risks of
including protests in them.
Protests must be allowed in Deliberative Systems because they are in-
trinsically part of Democracies. However, protests must be accepted to the
extent that protesters use persuasive arguments, rather than pressuring ones.
Mansbridge is a strong supporter of the importance of persuasion in deliber-
ations, that she retains fundamental to achieve an eventual consensus. Also
experts must be involved in Deliberative Systems, firstly because they are
necessary to improve the deliberative capacities of other Citizens, secondly
because they are necessary to address issues requiring high education to be
addressed, and thirdly because by deliberating with other not-expert Cit-
4.4 From Deliberative Democracies Towards Deliberative Systems 97
izens, skilled persons may better master their area of expertise. However,
inclusion of experts must resolve in a not-hierarchical structure, otherwise
there could arise situations of social domination. Mansbride and her col-
leagues also expose other features of ideal Deliberative Systems, more specif-
ically they state that Institutions must be not-dominant and not-bounding,
and they assert that Deliberative Systems must not allow to enter rooted par-
tisanship, because they can undermine the political equality on which ideal
Deliberative Systems must rely.
Even if there are still few studies on Deliberative Systems in literature,
as I have stated at the very start of this section, they expose interesting
features for the creation of both legitimated and effective methods of Delib-
erative Democracies, and legitimated and effective Deliberative Systems. By
merging these latter features with the ones derived by studies on the other
three generations of Deliberative Democracies, it is possible to delineate a
framework of features, grounded on solid theoretical arguments, to imple-
ment Deliberative Systems. In order to create this framework, in the next
chapter I summarize all the features exposed by the four generations of Delib-
erative Democracies, and I match all of them with their proper components
in Deliberative Systems.
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Chapter 5
Features of Deliberative
Systems
In this chapter, I will expose all the features that ideal and legitimated
Deliberative Systems must implement. Firstly, in section 5.1, I will list the
components of Deliberative Systems, and their relations. Secondly, I will list
all the features that each component of Deliberative Systems must imple-
ment, by showing their references in literature. Lastly, in section 5.8, I will
summarize all the features of Deliberative Systems in a schematic way.
5.1 Components of Deliberative Systems
The wide literature on the four generations of Deliberative Democra-
cies that I have exposed in previous chapter 4 is useful to delineate a list
of features needed by ideal and legitimated implementations of Deliberative
Democracies. However, before doing this, there is still something to be ad-
dressed. When theorizing on deliberation, and on Deliberative Democracies,
or when theorizing on Deliberative Systems, scholars expose ideal features
without clearly expressing to what these features are related. For example,
when speaking about diversity and pluralism, perhaps the two most shared
concepts of deliberation among all scholars, it is not clear if diversity and
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pluralism must be addressed at the Citizens level, or at the arguments or
discourses level.
Among others, my research work has two purposes. The first one is
to delineate the components of Deliberative Systems by extending the set
of components of Democracies I have defined in section 2.4. The second
one is to match each feature of ideal Deliberative Systems to its appropriate
component. To this extent, in section 2.4, I have explained that Democracies
are composed by: citizen, inputs, discussion, procedures, outputs, institutions.
I claim, that the components of ideal models of Deliberative Democracies are
slightly different. Indeed, they are: the Deliberation, the Citizens, the Inputs,
the Decision-Making Procedures, the Outputs, and the Institutions.
The shift from discussions to deliberations is justified by three arguments.
Firstly, and obviously, as I have stated in section 4.1, deliberation is the very
first feature of Deliberative Democracies. Secondly, as I have stated before
in sections 4.1 and 4.3, one of the purposes of discussions in Deliberative
Democracies is to reach a consensus, and the first requirement to reach a
consensus is to deliberate, rather than to discuss. The concept of delibera-
tion, unlike the concept of discussion, also inherently brings other features,
like education, learning and so on, as I have exposed in chapter 4. For this
reason, in Deliberative Democracies, discussions must always be intended as
deliberations. Thirdly and lastly, unlike Representative Democracies, Par-
ticipatory Democracies, and other models of Direct Democracies, in which
discussion is among Citizens and Institutions, in Deliberative Democracies
deliberation must surround every part of the model, at any time.
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Figure 5.1: Components of Deliberative Democracies
Figure 5.1 shows the components of Deliberative Democracies and their
relations. In models of Deliberative Democracies, the Deliberation is a kind of
“umbrella” component that must be present at any level, and used to handle
any of the other components of the model. In Deliberative Democracies
there are Citizens and Institutions, that are separated entities but are always
linked by means of Deliberation. Citizens and Institutions, together and at a
different level, control, check, and create Inputs, Decision-Making Procedures,
and Outputs, always be means of Deliberation. Diverse models and diverse
implementations of Deliberative Democracies can be connected together to
create Deliberative Systems. Figure 5.2 shows a depiction of Deliberative
Systems1.
1As I have stated in section 4.4, Deliberative Systems may accept also components
that are not designed as deliberative tools, or that are not designed according to models of
Deliberative Democracies. For my purpose researches, I will consider Deliberative Systems
formed only by models of Deliberative Democracies.
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Figure 5.2: A Deliberative System
In the next sections, I summarize all the features of Deliberative Democ-
racies, matching each of them with its proper component.
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5.2 Features of Deliberations
The following list exposes the features of deliberation in ideal and legit-
imated models of Deliberative Democracies. They are classified in terms of
“must-be” features, and “could-be” features. Must-be features are manda-
tory: if a model of Deliberative Democracy does not implement them, the
legitimacy may be affected. Could-be features are optional, but should be
implemented in any model of Deliberative Democracy to ease its entering
into Deliberative Systems.
D-MUST-1 - Accessible: the deliberation must be publicly accessible by
every Citizen, including Citizens having different physical abilities.
D-MUST-2 - Open: the deliberation must be open to everyone and to
everything. There must not be any restrictions on the amount of Cit-
izens, Institutions, or other things, such as technologies, that want to
enter the deliberation.
D-MUST-3 - Reliable: the deliberation must be reliable. Citizens must
always be able to rely on the deliberation to address societal needs, or
to solve societal issues.
D-MUST-4 - Traceable: the deliberation must be traceable. Every in-
teraction performed by actors involved in the deliberation must be
recorded.
D-MUST-5 - Transparent: the deliberation must be transparent. Every
mechanism, tool or technology, on which the deliberation relies, must
be verifiable by Citizens or Institutions.
D-MUST-6 - Unobstructed: the deliberation must be open to everyone
and to everything. There must be no barriers to enter the deliberation
both for human beings and technologies.
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D-COULD-1 - Asynchronous: the deliberation could be asynchronous.
However, asynchronous communication does not exclude synchronous
modes of communication.
D-COULD-2 - Continuous: the deliberation could be continuous. Even
if Citizens and Institutions can be involved in one-shoot events to de-
liberate, they must be allowed to continue deliberating whenever they
want they need.
D-COULD-3 - Distributed: the deliberation could be distributed over
diverse places and platforms.
D-COULD-4 - Interconnected: the deliberation could be interconnected
to other deliberations. Deliberations must allow to refer to, or to link
to, arguments exposed in other deliberations.
D-COULD-5 - Interdependent: the deliberation could be interdepen-
dent with other deliberations. Arguments of a deliberation can depend
on arguments exposed in other deliberations.
D-COULD-6 - Ubiquitous: the deliberation could be performed in any
place by means of proper technologies.
Table 5.1, lists in a schematic manner the mandatory and optional fea-
tures of deliberation. The table also reports a sample set of references in
literature for each feature. If the feature is not exposed by literature on
the four generations of Deliberative Democracies, the table reports the word
“author”, meaning that I have inserted the feature on the basis of personal
examinations.
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Table 5.1: The features of the deliberation
Name Code References In Literature
Accessible D-MUST-1 [50] [123]
Asynchronous D-COULD-1 [151] [165] [166]
Continuous D-COULD-2 [105] [108] [109] [162] Author
Distributed D-COULD-3 [127]
Interconnected D-COULD-4 [127]
Interdependent D-COULD-5 [127]
Open D-MUST-2 [106] [110] [117]
Reliable D-MUST-3 [157]
Traceable D-MUST-4 Author
Transparent D-MUST-5 [135]
Ubiquitous D-COULD-6 [105] [108] [109] [135] [162] Author
Unobstructed D-MUST-6 [106]
5.3 Features of Citizens
The following list, exposes the features of Citizens who access Deliberative
Democracies. They shall be intended as “must-be” features, meaning that
they are mandatory. If Citizens lack one or more of them, the legitimacy of
the model of Deliberative Democracy may be affected.
C-MUST-1 - Capable: Citizens accessing the deliberation must be Demo-
cratically capable, and they must have accepted a priori some basic
understanding of concepts of Democracies, like the freedom and the
right to speak.
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C-MUST-2 - Conscientious: Citizens must be conscientious of their
participation in deliberations, and they must be conscientious of pros
and cons of their actions when deliberating.
C-MUST-3 - Educated: Citizens must have the basic education to de-
liberate, like the necessary education to write and read, and the neces-
sary education to use any technology on which models of Deliberative
Democracies may rely on.
C-MUST-4 - Motivated: the motivations moving Citizens to deliber-
ate must not be different to deliberating in a Democratic way, and to
producing Democratic outcomes.
C-MUST-5 - Purposed: Citizens who deliberate must have specific pur-
poses to do it, and they must not deliberate just for effect.
C-MUST-6 - Respectful: Citizens must be respectful when deliberating.
For instance, Citizens must not use course, swear, racial and sexist
arguments when deliberating.
Table 5.2 lists in a schematic manner the features of Citizens accessing
Deliberative Democracies, and their related references in literature. If the
feature is not exposed by literature on the four generations of Deliberative
Democracies, the table reports the word “author”, meaning that I have in-
serted the feature on the basis of personal examinations.
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Table 5.2: Features of Citizens accessing Deliberative Democracies
Name Code References In Literature
Capable C-MUST-1 [50] [136] [145] [148] [149]
Conscientious C-MUST-2 [136]
Educated C-MUST-3 [50] [107] [127] [123] [145] [162]
Motivated C-MUST-4 Author
Purposed C-MUST-5 Author
Respectful C-MUST-6 [50] [120] [123] [136]
5.4 Features of Inputs
The following list, exposes the features of inputs that access Deliberative
Democracies. They shall be intended as “must-be” features, meaning that
they are mandatory. If Citizens lack in one or more of them, the legitimacy
of the model of Deliberative Democracy may be affected.
I-MUST-1 - Balanced: the inputs entering the deliberation must be
balanced. When an input enters the deliberation, also its counterpart
must enter the deliberation.
I-MUST-2 - Diverse: the inputs entering the deliberation must be diver-
sified as much as possible, in order to meet all the interests of Citizens
and Institutions that deliberate. Also, the deliberation must not foster
some inputs more than others, independently by their popularity or by
their degree of agreement.
I-MUST-3 - Informed: the inputs entering the deliberation must be
matched with a proper set of information, in order to make Citizens
and Institutions able to deliberate on them.
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I-MUST-4 - Interesting: the inputs entering the deliberation must be
interesting, in the sense of interesting choice in the games context, as
explained in section 2.1.
I-MUST-5 - Justified: the inputs entering the deliberation must be
matched with a proper set of justifications, in order to explain to Citi-
zens and Institutions their importance for the deliberation.
I-MUST-6 - Pluralistic: the inputs entering the deliberation must be as
pluralistic as possible, in order to meet the needs of different cultures
and traditions of Citizens involved into deliberations.
Table 5.3: Features of inputs accessing deliberations
Name Code References In Literature
Balanced I-MUST-1 [136] [141]
Diverse I-MUST-2
[18] [50] [102] [105] [107] [111]
[112] [113] [115] [114] [116] [117]
[118] [119] [120] [121] [122] [123]
Informed I-MUST-3 [107] [115] [136] [160] [162] [149] [162]
Interesting I-MUST-4 Author
Justified I-MUST-5 [50] [99] [106]
Pluralistic I-MUST-6
[18] [50] [102] [105] [107] [111]
[112] [113] [115] [114] [116] [117]
[118] [119] [120] [121] [122] [123]
Table 5.3 lists in a schematic manner the features of inputs accessing
Deliberative Democracies, and their related references in literature. If the
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feature is not exposed by literature on the four generations of Deliberative
Democracies, the table reports the word “author”, meaning that I have in-
serted the feature on the basis of personal examinations.
5.5 Features of Decision-Making Procedures
The following list exposes the features of decision-making procedures of
ideal and legitimated models of Deliberative Democracies. They are classified
into “must-allow”, “must-avoid”, “must-foster”, and “must-grant” features.
All of them are mandatory, independently to which of the four above class
they belong to. If a model of Deliberative Democracy does not implement
one of them, the legitimacy of the model may be affected.
DMP-ALLOW-1 - Mind Changing: the decision-making procedure
must allow Citizens to change their mind and opinion on issues. In
order to make it possible, the decision-making process must not in-
volve Citizens or Institutions in one-shoot voting sessions.
DMP-ALLOW-2 - Majority Rule: the decision-making procedure must
allow voting sessions based on the majority rule, but only if a consensus
is not reached after a specified period of time.
DMP-AVOID-1 - Social Domination: the decision-making procedure
must not rely its functioning on mechanisms that may create social
domination by individuals or groups of them. For instance, Citizens
with high skills because of their education must not be allowed to group
together in order to dominate deliberations by means of their ability
to discuss.
DMP-AVOID-2 - Hierarchies: the decision-making procedure must not
rely on any mechanism of hierarchies among Citizens and Institutions.
Citizens that have high deliberative capacities, high Democratic ca-
pacities, or highly skilled in some field, must be acknowledged of their
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capacity, but must not have more decision-making power than other
Citizens.
DMP-FOSTER-1 - Learning: the decision-making procedure must fos-
ter the learning of Citizens about deliberated issues, by providing them
information while they are involved in the procedures. Information
must be properly structured as teaching material.
DMP-FOSTER-2 - Mastering: the decision-making procedure must be
designed to foster Citizens to continuously improve their knowledge on
specific topics in order to master them.
DMP-FOSTER-3 - Persuasion: the decision-making procedure must be
designed to foster deliberative interactions among Citizens and Insti-
tutions aimed to be persuasive, rather than pressuring.
DMP-GRANT-1 - Anonymity: the decision-making procedure must
grant the anonymity of Citizens involved in deliberations.
DMP-GRANT-2 - Egalitarianism: the decision-making procedure must
grant the egalitarianism of Citizens involved in deliberations, and must
not give to any deliberation more relevance than the others.
Table 5.4 lists in a schematic manner the features of decision-making pro-
cedures in Deliberative Democracies and their related references in literature.
If the feature is not exposed by literature on the four generations of Deliber-
ative Democracies, the table reports the word “author”, meaning that I have
inserted the feature on the basis of personal examinations.
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Table 5.4: Features of decision-making procedures in deliberations
Name Code References In Literature
Mind Changing DMP-ALLOW-1 [135]
Majority Rule DMP-ALLOW-2 [124]
Social Domination DMP-AVOID-1 [127]
Hierarchies DMP-AVOID-2 [127]
Learning DMP-FOSTER-1
[50] [123] [107]
[127] [136] [145] [162]
Mastering DMP-FOSTER-2 [127] Author
Persuasion DMP-FOSTER-3 [127]
Anonymity DMP-GRANT-1 Author
Egalitarianism DMP-GRANT-2
[18] [50] [102] [105] [107] [111]
[112] [113] [115] [114] [116] [117]
[118] [119] [120] [121] [122] [123]
5.6 Features of Outputs
The following list exposes the features of outputs exiting Deliberative
Democracies. They are classified “must-be”, and “should-be” features. Must-
be features are mandatory: if a model of Deliberative Democracy does not
implement them, the legitimacy of the model may be affected. Should-be
features are optional, but should be implemented in any model of Deliberative
Democracy to improve the functioning of the model.
O-MUST-1 - Accountable: the outputs of deliberation must be ascrib-
able to one or more decision-making processes which have produced the
output, and in which Citizens and Institutions were involved in some
way.
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O-MUST-2 - Effective: the outputs of deliberation must serve to solve a
Democratic issue, or to meet a Democratic need of Citizens or Institu-
tions.
O-MUST-3 - Monitored: the outputs of deliberation must be monitored
in order to check if they are used to serve their purpose and, so, they
solve they societal need or the societal issue that the were intended to
solve.
O-MUST-4 - Revisable: Citizens and Institutions must be always able
to modify a specific output of deliberation in order to adapt it to solve
new incoming needs and incoming issues.
O-SHOULD-1 - Efficient: the outputs of deliberation should serve to
solve a Democratic issue in the best possible way, or to meet a Demo-
cratic need of Citizens or Institutions in the best possible way.
O-SHOULD-2 - Satisfying: the outputs of deliberation should be sat-
isfying, to the extent that all Citizens and Institutions must feel com-
fortable when using that output to handle societal needs.
Table 5.5 lists in a schematic manner the features of outputs produced
by Deliberative Democracies and their related references in literature. If
the feature is not exposed by literature on the four generations of Delibera-
tive Democracies the table reports the word “author”, meaning that I have
inserted the feature on the basis of personal examinations.
5.7 Features of Institutions 113
Table 5.5: Features of outputs created by deliberations
Name Code References In Literature
Accountable O-MUST-1 [120] [162]
Effective O-MUST-2 [115]
Monitored O-MUST-3 [162]
Revisable O-MUST-4 [50] [123]
Efficient O-SHOULD-1 Author
Satisfying O-SHOULD-2 Author
5.7 Features of Institutions
The following list exposes the features of Institutions involved in Delib-
erative Democracies. They are classified “must-avoid”, and “must-grant”
features. All of them are mandatory: if a model of Deliberative Democracy
does not implement them, the legitimacy of the model may be affected.
IN-AVOID-1 - Domination: Institutions must avoid any domination on
Citizens and on deliberation, and must have equal power as Citizens in
decision-making procedures.
IN-AVOID-2 - Rooted Partisanship: Institutions must avoid rooted
partisanship to enter the deliberation.
IN-AVOID-3 - Tightness: Institutions must avoid in any way to bound
the deliberation and the decision-making procedures. More specifically,
the latter means that Citizens must be allowed to deliberate even if
Institutions are not involved in deliberations.
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IN-GRANT-1 - Authority To Deliberations: Institutions must grant
authority to deliberations. For instance, a deliberation must have
the same authority that representatives may have in Representative
Democracies.
IN-GRANT-2 - Egalitarianism To Participants: Institutions must
grant equal consideration to each Citizen involved in deliberations.
IN-GRANT-3 - Freedom To Deliberate: Institutions must grant each
Citizen the freedom to deliberate.
IN-GRANT-4 - Incentives To Deliberate: Institutions must grant
incentives to deliberate. Incentives must not necessarily be intended as
monetary incentives.
IN-GRANT-5 - Political Equality: Institutions must grant the same
consideration to any political view of Citizens involved in deliberations.
Table 5.6 lists in a schematic manner the features of Institutions involved
in Deliberative Democracies and their related references in literature. If the
feature is not exposed by literature on the four generations of Deliberative
Democracies the table reports the word “author”, meaning that I have in-
serted the feature on the basis of personal examinations.
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Table 5.6: Features of Institutions involved in deliberations
Name Code References In Literature
Domination IN-AVOID-1 [135] [136] [127]
Rooted Partisanship IN-AVOID-2 [127]
Tightness IN-AVOID-3 [127]
Authority To Deliberations IN-GRANT-1 [117]
Egalitarianism To Participants IN-GRANT-2
[18] [50] [102] [105] [107] [111]
[112] [113] [115] [114] [116] [117]
[118] [119] [120] [121] [122] [123]
Freedom To Deliberate IN-GRANT-3 Author
Incentives To Deliberate IN-GRANT-4 [136] Author
Political Equality IN-GRANT-5
[18] [50] [102] [105] [107] [111]
[112] [113] [115] [114] [116] [117]
[118] [119] [120] [121] [122] [123]
5.8 Toward a Framework for Deliberative Sys-
tems
Table 5.7 lists all the features that ideal and legitimate Deliberative Sys-
tems must implement. Features are grouped by components and, as described
in the previous sections of this chapter, classified into must-be, could-be,
must-allow, must-avoid, must-foster, must-grant and should-be features.
In following chapter 6, I will expose the requirements to implement Online
Deliberative Systems including all the features exposed in this chapter.
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Chapter 6
Requirements of Online
Deliberative Systems
In this chapter I expose all the proper requirements to implement online
Deliberative Systems with all the legitimacy features exposed in previous
chapter 5. Firstly, in section 6.1, I expose the normative and technologi-
cal requirements for Institutions and deliberations involved in Deliberative
Systems. Secondly, in section 6.2, I expose the normative and technological
requirements needed for the legitimacy of outputs of online Deliberative Sys-
tems. Thirdly, in section 6.3, I cover the requirements needed for legitimated
decision-making procedures of online Deliberative Systems. Fourthly, in sec-
tions 6.4 and 6.5, I expose the requirements for the legitimacy of Citizens
and inputs accessing online Deliberative Systems. Eventually, in section 6.6,
I expose a framework of features and requirements for online Deliberative
Systems.
6.1 Institutions, Web Design, and Delibera-
tive Systems
Starting from the early years of the XXI century, scholars of Democracies
have exposed benefits and hopes of moving Democratic processes online [167]
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[168] [169], but also concerns about the possibility of implementing full online
Democracies [170] [171].
On one hand, scholars argue that the Internet and the web would improve
Democracy, by providing to Citizens an open, universal and unobstructed
access to the public sphere. Indeed, by leveraging on the architecture of the
Internet, and on its open standards and open protocols [172] [172] [173] [174],
Citizens could be supplied with a medium for asynchronous or synchronous
communications that is free, egalitarian, and not tighten by any central and
hierarchical authority [175]. All the previous benefits are strengthened by
the principle of net neutrality, that grants a nondiscriminatory and universal
access to the net [176].
On the other hand, the usage of the Internet and the Web as primary
platforms for delivering Democracy could arise issues that may threaten the
legitimacy of online Deliberative Systems. Scholars are mostly concerned
about the digital divide, that may lead to a digital inequality, to the extent
that Citizens do not have equal opportunities to access the Internet [177]
[175]. Other scholars are concerned about the security issues that may arise
in contexts of full online Democratic participation, and may flow into un-
trusted models of Democracies [178]. Last but not least, scholars of online
deliberation expose that the demographic equality of participators in delib-
erations, in some situations can be affected when moving the deliberation
from oﬄine contexts to online contexts [179].
I argue that, for a legitimate implementation of Deliberative Systems,
the previous issues must be addressed from two perspectives. The first one
is the regulatory and normative perspective, meaning that Institutions must
enact laws or regulations aimed to ensure to diverse Citizens the access to
the Internet and so, by inheritance, to allow all Citizens to access online De-
liberative Systems. The second one is the Web Design perspective, meaning
that online Deliberative Systems must be designed by means of proper web
technologies to be accessible and usable.
By enacting regulation and legislation to avoid the digital divide and to
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boost the usage of online Democracies, Institutions may assess a very first
legitimacy of online Deliberative Systems. For what concerns the digital
divide, Institutions of Democratic countries are already addressing the issues
by means of effective regulations.
In order to bridge the digital divide on a world-wide level the United
Nations, more specifically their Department of Human Rights, has proposed
in the resolution A/HRC/RES/32/13 1 to solve the issue from a human rights
perspective. The department has produced a report defining a complete
framework of regulations that Countries around the world should implement
to get rid of the digital divide on a regional level2.
The European Commission has enacted the Digital Agenda for Europe
[180]], whose regulatory proposals, as showed in figure 6.2 and in figure 6.1,
have considerably helped to solve the digital divide issue in Europe3. The
actions of the European Commission are mostly aimed to reduce the costs
related to accessing high-speed Internet, review the European telecommu-
nication regulations, and engage designers of tools for online Democracy to
adopt the international accessibility standards4.
A good example of how to bridge the digital divide on a Country level is
the Italian one. On June 22nd, 2012, the Italian Parliament has approved
an act titled “Compelling actions for the growth of the Country”5. The
act gave the birth to the “Agency for the Digital Italy” with the purpose,
1The resolution A/HRC/RES/32/13 is publicly available for reading at the following
address: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage e.aspx?si=A/HRC/RES/32/13.
2The report A/HRC/35/9 is publicly available for reading at the following address:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/A HRC 35 9 AEV.docx.
3The full report on the effects of the European Digital Agenda is publicly available
for reading at the following address: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
BRIE/ 2015/ 573884/ EPRS BRI(2015)573884 EN.pdf.
4The international accessibility standards are promoted by the World Wide Web Con-
sortium, in order to define standard and guidelines to implement web applications that
are internationally accessible (https://www.w3.org/TR/tr-technology-stds).
5The act number 83 of July 22nd, 2012 is publicly available for reading at the follow-
ing address: http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legge:2012-06-
22;83.
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Figure 6.1: The use of Internet in European Countries in 2005 and 2014, according to
the age of Citizens
Figure 6.2: The use of Internet in European Countries in 2005 and 2014
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among others, to drastically reduce the digital divide related to accessing the
Internet in the disadvantaged areas of the country [181]. After the approval
of act number 83 on July 22nd, 2012, the Italian Parliament enacted a series
of other acts aimed to regulate the scopes and the purposes of the Agency6.
The Agency promoted a series of actions and specific acts aimed to reduce
the digital divide [181]. ]. Very worth a note is also act number 33 on March
14th, 2013, , proposed by the Agency to reform the regulations related to
the publication and transparency of the information supplied by the public
administrations7 8. Another important proposal in Italy is Stefano Rodota`’s
one, who proposed to include an article 21-bis in the Italian Constitution,
in order to recognize the access to the Internet as an universal right9. By
approving the proposal, the digital divide in Italy would be addressed at a
Constitutional level and this, I argue here, would lend legitimacy to online
Deliberative Systems at national level, at least to the extent of legitimacy
features that could be jeopardized by issues related to the digital divide.
By summarizing all previous arguments the Internet infrastructure, with
its open and neutral standards and protocols in conjunction with proper reg-
ulations enacted by Institutions, ensures by default some of the legitimacy
features of online Deliberative Systems. More specifically, I argue that by
granting at Institutional level the access to the Internet, online Deliberative
Systems would have by inheritance and by default the following features: (1)
they are open; (2) they are reliable; (3) they are unobstructed ; (4) they are
asynchronous ; and (5) they are distributed. Institutions granting by means
6All the acts related to the functioning of the Agency for the Digital Italy are available
for public reading on the Web site of the Agency (http://www.agid.gov.it/agid/quadro-
normativo).
7More information about the act, and the link to the original act, are available on the
Web site of the Agency (http://trasparenza.agid.gov.it).
8I will expose the importance of public and open data for the legitimacy of Deliberative
Systems in the next section 6.2.
9The proposal is currently under discussion in the Italian Parliament. The last report
on the proposal is publicly available for reading on the Web site of the Italian Chamber
of Deputies (http://www.camera.it).
122 6. Requirements of Online Deliberative Systems
of regulations the previous list of characteristics are also automatically legiti-
mate by the following points of view: (1) avoid domination of the deliberation
by granting the right to access the Internet and, inherently, the access to de-
liberate; (2) avoid to bound online Deliberative Systems that, for the nature
of the Internet are free and neutral;(3) grant egalitarianism, political equality
and freedom participants by equally allowing them to access the Internet and
Deliberative Systems.
The second perspective, from which the requirements to implement legiti-
macy features of Deliberative Systems must be analyzed, is the technological
one. Because Deliberative Systems must be hosted by the Web10, there is
the need to define what are the proper methodologies to design usable and
accessible Web applications.
For what concerns accessibility, firstly, there is a need to strictly follow
the international accessibility standards that I have already introduced pre-
viously in this section. Secondly, it is possible to follow well-known and
well-studied design practices, like the inclusive design, the responsive design,
and the material design. . The Inclusive design is a methodology to design
Web applications by starting from the sensor, motor and cognitive capabil-
ities of individuals [182] [183]. ]. As showed in figure 6.3, extracted from
the Inclusive Designed Toolkit of the University of Cambridge [184], if the
disability of individuals is evaluated by means of the latter three-dimensional
framework, there is a large amount of population that may have difficulties
to use not properly designed web applications. By following the inclusive
design principles, Deliberative Systems should satisfy the legitimacy feature
of a widest possible accessibility.
In order to implement ubiquitous and continuous Deliberative Systems, it
10Sometimes, also in literature that is not strictly related to Computer Science, the
term Internet and term Web overlap. However, there is a clear distinction between them.
The Internet, is the infrastructure on which diverse services are hosted, on of them is the
Web, that is a service that supplies connected and univocally identified resources. More
information on the differences between the Internet and the Web are available on the Web
site of the World Wide Web Consortium (https://www.w3.org/Help/#webinternet).
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Figure 6.3: The pyramid of diversity of population capabilities. Courtesy of the Univer-
sity of Cambridge (http://www.inclusivedesigntoolkit.com/whatis/whatis.html).
is possible to use techniques of Responsive Design. The responsive design is a
design methodology allowing web designers to create web applications that,
by relying on common web standards like HTML5 11 and CSS3 12, are able to
detect the resolution capabilities of digital devices and to adapt themselves
to small or large screens [186]]. As showed in figure 6.4, a research by com-
Score comScore13 on the use of mobile and desktop devices for accessing the
Internet [187]] has found that in 2014 mobile devices have overcome desktop
11HTML5 is the last version of the Hyper Text Markup Language, developed by the
World Wide Consortium and aimed to supply a “full programming environment for cross-
platform applications with access to device capabilities; video and animations; graphics;
style, typography, and other tools for digital publishing; extensive network capabilities ”
[185].
12CSS3 is the latest version of the Cascading Style Sheets language that is used for
describing the presentation aspects of Web pages and of web applications. More infor-
mation about the CSS3 language are available on the Web site of the World Wide Web
Consortium (https://www.w3.org/standards/webdesign/htmlcss).
13The comScore is a company that provides independent data and analysis on the use
of internet devices (https://www.comscore.com/).
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Figure 6.4: Percentage of time spent online with mobile devices in nine countries in the
world. Courtesy of SmartInsights (http://www.smartinsights.com)
devices in terms of number of users, and the time spent online with mobile
devices is higher than the time spent online by means of desktop devices
(figure 6.5)). As a matter of fact this means that, by following best practices
of responsive design, it is possible to design Deliberative Systems allowing
ubiquitous and continuous deliberations, deliberations, to the extent that
online deliberations could be accessed by all the Citizens with all types of
devices.
The Material Design defines a set of standards, guidelines and a language
to design software aimed to rich user experiences. It was created by Google
in 201414. While Inclusive Design is necessary for the accessibility of Delib-
erative Systems and Responsive Design is necessary for the implementation
of ubiquitous Deliberative Systems, Material Design is necessary to imple-
ment Online Deliberative Systems usable on every device. As I have exposed
in 2.1 and in definition 2, usability is an ISO standard to assess the effi-
14The guidelines, the standard and other information about the Material Design can be
found on the Web site of Material Design (https://material.io/guidelines/).
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Figure 6.5: The number of desktop and mobile users around the world from 2007 until
2015. Courtesy of SmartInsights (http://www.smartinsights.com)
cacy and efficiency of software, and to grant users satisfactory experiences
when using software. On one hand, the usability of Deliberative Systems
strengthens their legitimacy from the accessibility, continuity and ubiquity
perspectives. On the other hand, usability is the very first requirement to
implement engaging Deliberative Systems.
Institutional regulations to grant access to internet, and the use of proper
design methodologies to implement some of the required legitimacy features
of Deliberative Systems, are not enough to implement Deliberative Systems
with all the needed features to be legitimated. The other perspective that
must be analyzed is the one related to the data used or produced by Delib-
erative Systems. In next section 6.2, I expose the requirements for data.
6.2 Data, Documents and Deliberative Sys-
tems
By ensuringCitizens the access to the Internet and to Deliberative Sys-
tems, as I have stated in previous section 6.1, online Deliberative Systems
gain by inheritance some of the needed features for their legitimacy. How-
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ever, there is something still missing: more specifically, even if Deliberative
Systems are implemented online, deliberations could still be not not trans-
parent, not traceable, and not interoperable, meaning that they are not inter-
connected, and not interdependent15.
Interoperability is a term used in Information Technology to “define an
ideal way for computers and other electronic devices to relate to each other”16.
In software for electronic Government, or in software for participation and
deliberation, the term refers to the property of software to communicate in
three directions [188, p. 370]. The first one is the bottom-up communication.
For instance, in the European Community it refers to the ways the software
of single Countries communicate with the central software of the Community.
The second one is horizontal communication, and in the European Commu-
nity may refer to the way software of various Countries communicate among
themselves. The third one is top-down communication, that in the Euro-
pean Community refers to the ways the central software of the Community
communicate with software of the single Countries.
In the context of electronic Government and in Deliberative Systems, in-
teroperability must be granted among both software and data and documents
produced by deliberations [188, p. 371]]. This can be achieved by using Open
Source software17, by using standard technologies and software, by giving the
15For the purpose of my research, I will refer to the interoperability as a umbrella term
to define systems that are also interconnected and interdependent. The concept of the in-
terconnection, refers to the ability of Deliberative Systems to connect and to communicate
with other Deliberative Systems. The concept of the interdependence, refers to the ability
of Deliberative Systems to work independently or in conjunction with other software. I
claim that they need the same requirements of the interoperability to be enabled. For this
reason, and for simplicity of reading, in this section I expose the requirements to enable
the interoperability of Deliberative Systems.
16A more detailed explanation of the term can be found on the Web site of
the Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium (http://www.ncoic.org/what-is-
interoperability).
17Open source software is software that is available in source code form and that is often
developed in a public collaborative manner [189].
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freedom to choose the technologies that may best fit the deliberative needs,
and by publishing and documenting the software used for deliberations, and
the data that deliberations produce.
The latter, and so the need of Deliberative Systems to rely on open data,
and their ability to produce open data, is a mandatory requirement for the
legitimacy of online Deliberative Systems. In online Deliberative Systems,
the concept of open data refers to data which is available online without
any restrictions on its usage or distribution [190]. As stated by the United
Nations E-Government Survey of 2016, by publishing open data local Gov-
ernments can improve the transparency of their Democratic processes, and
ensure higher levels of accountability of their Democratic outcomes account-
ability of their Democratic outcomes [191, p. 3]. Moreover, a proper use of
open data may ensure the traceability of deliberations, and allow Citizens
and Institutions to monitor the outcomes of deliberations.
As for the strategies to reduce the Digital Divide, that I have exposed in
previous section 6.1, open data should be fostered from two perspectives too.
The first one is the normative and regulatory perspective, the second one is
the technological perspective.
For what it concerns the law and regulations, as stated by the United
Nations [191, p. 17], at national and local level Institutions should enact
regulations aimed to the following: (1) ensure Citizens the right to access the
information; (2) regulate data sharing and decide what data must be openly
provided; (3) adopt their own policy for data; (4) promote standards for
data aimed to improve the effectiveness of their sharing; (5) develop the data
analysis capabilities of public employers; (6) transform the nation statistical
agency into providers of data; (7) encourage developers and suppliers of data
to use different, and linked, sets of data. As showed in figure 6.6, the United
Nations E-Government Survey of 2016 shows that o105 Nations, out of the
193 belonging to the United Nations, have adopted to some extent this kind
of regulations [191, p. 37].
Also the European Community has adopted legislation to foster the use
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Figure 6.6: Number of Countries that have enacted legislation related to Governmental
open data in 2016
of Open Data. More specifically, the European Community has enacted the
Public Sector Information Directive (Directive 2003/98/EC ) [192, p. 7]18,
that has the main purposes to ensure equal treatments to all re-users of data
supplied by public administrations, and engage Public Administrations to
supply raw data in diverse formats [193]. In 2014, Directive 2003/98/EC
was amended by Directive 2013/37/EU 19, that introduces general principles
to engage the Countries belonging to the European Community to produce
data that is already structured to be supplied as open data [192, p. 7]and, so,
18The full text of the directive 2003/98/EC is available on
the Eur-Lex web site of the European Community (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:345:0090:0096:en:PDF). The
Eur-Lex is a good example of portal aimed to share open data. It supplies all the
legislation of the European Community in ways that are accessible both by human beings
and by computers.
19The full text of the Directive 2013/37/EU is available for public access on the Eur-lex
Web site (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32013L0037).
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Figure 6.7: European Community Countries that supply portals to share their open data
avoid the publication of raw data and encourage the publication of structured
data. As stated by the European Commission, these directives have flown
into a harmonization of the national regulations of Public Sector Information
[192, p. 20]. Figure 6.7 shows the European Community Countries that have
implemented portals to share their open data since 2009 [192, p. 43].
In 2005, Italy has adopted the Digital Administration Code, Legislative
Decree n. 82/2005 20. One of the purposes of the Code is to enable the
Agency for Digital Italy, that I have already introduced previously, to imple-
ment regulations and guidelines to enhance the use of Governmental Open
Data. The Agency has produced a full set of guidelines [194] to help the
Italian Regions to produce data compliant to the European Interoperability
Framework 21 [195]. Figures 6.8 and 6.9 show, respectively, the number of
open data sets supplied by the Italian Regions in 2016, and their impact on
the regional Gross Domestic Product.
20The full text of the Digital Administration Code is available on the Web site
of the Agency for the Digital Italy (http://archivio.digitpa.gov.it/amministrazione-
digitale/CAD-testo-vigente).
21The European Interoperability Framework defines a set of technologies, of strate-
gies, and of standards, that European Public Administration must use in order
to improve the interoperability among the Countries of the European Community.
The framework is publicly available on the Web site of the European Community
(https://ec.europa.eu/isa2/eif en).
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Figure 6.8: Number of open data sets supplied by Italian Regions on January 2016. Re-
gions with darken columns are both producers of open data and aggregators of other public
data sets. Courtesy of LinxLab (http://www.lynxlab.com/it/content/gli-open-data-delle-
regioni-italiane).
Figure 6.9: The impact of open data sets on the regional Gross Domestic Product on Jan-
uary 2016. Region with darken columns are both producers of open data and aggregators
of other public data sets. Courtesy of LinxLab (http://www.lynxlab.com/it/content/gli-
open-data-delle-regioni-italiane).
The guidelines of the Agency for Digital Italy are not only aimed to fos-
ter the production of open data. Most importantly, they are also aimed to
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improve the semantic interoperability by helping the Italian Public Admin-
istrations to produce Linked Open Data. The use of Linked Open Data is a
fundamental requirement to implement some of the needed features for the
legitimacy of online Deliberative Systems. By analyzing the concepts related
to Linked Open Data, it is possible to address the requirements of data and
documents related to Deliberative Systems from a technological perspective.
The Linked Open Data is a project of the World Wide Web Consortium,
which aims at extending the Web by publishing free and open data sets
created by means of the Extensible Markup Language, and linking data stored
in different places by means of the Resource Description Framework [196].
So, the very first concepts behind the Linked Open Data are the Extensible
Markup Language, and the Resource Description Framework.
The Extensible Markup Language (hereinafter XML), is a flexible de-
scriptive markup language defining a set of rules to produce human-readable
and machine-readable resources [197, p. 23]]. The XML is the most suitable
technology for the markup of both legal resources [198] and resources related
to Deliberative Systems [199] [200]. Indeed, the XML is a meta-language that
allows for the creation of specific dialects to properly markup documents of
specific contexts [197, p. 28].
AkomaNtoso is a XML dialect, and an OASIS standard22, for the markup
of legislative resources and other resources not belonging to the legislative
context [201] [202]. ]. Due to its design, particularly aimed to flexibility [197,
pp. 41-45], AkomaNtoso is currently used by a large set of both Govern-
mental and Inter-Governmental Institutions, and also for not Governmental
initiatives23. For the aim of this research, it is particularly worth of note
22The OASIS is an online authority for the standardization of technologies
(https://www.oasis-open.org). Because of the OASIS naming convention for standards,
AkomaNtoso is also known with the LegalDocumentML and LegalDocML names. The full
specifications of the language are available on the Web site of OASIS (https://www.oasis-
open.org/committees/tc home.php?wg abbrev=legaldocml).
23A full list of Institutions that are using AkomaNtoso, and of other initiatives related to
AkomaNtoso, is available on the Web site of AkomaNtoso (http://www.akomantoso.org/).
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that AkomaNtoso is already used to markup the legal resources and delib-
erative processes of the FAO24. Another initiative related to AkomaNtoso,
worth of notice for the purposes of this research, is the markup of William
Shakespeare’s “The Tempest” by means of AkomaNtoso25. The latter shows
that AkomaNtoso can be easily used to also markup speeches that do not
revolve only on strict rhetoric or political language since, as I have stated
in chapter 4, theorists of Deliberative Democracies claim that, in order to
be legitimated, deliberations must allow diverse language modes. For all the
previous reasons, XML dialects for the markup of legal resources are an im-
portant requirement for the legitimacy of online Deliberative Systems, and
AkomaNtoso could be a valid choice among these dialects.
Another requirement of Linked Open Data is to give a unique name to
each resource that must be supplied on the Web, and could be linked to other
resources. For this reason, also for the data and documents produced by on-
line Deliberative Systems and online deliberations, there is a need to find a
proper naming convention. Although the Web already supplies mechanisms
to univocally identify online resources, such as the Universal Resource Iden-
tifiers (hereinafter URI)2626 , there is a need to understand how to create
proper URIs that can identify deliberations. AkomaNtoso may come in help
of online Deliberative Systems also for what concerns the URIs for specific
24The FAO is the Food And Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
(http://www.fao.org/home/en/). More information about how AkomaNtoso is used
for the markup of deliberative processes of the FAO, is available on the Web site
of the FAO (http://aims.fao.org/activity/blog/introduction-xml-schema-“akoma-ntoso”-
structure-workflow-fao-normative-and-governing).
25The opera marked up with AkomaNtoso is publicly available on the Web site of SayIt
(http://shakespeare.sayit.mysociety.org/the-tempest.an). SayIt is a online software devel-
oped by MySociety (https://www.mysociety.org), that is aimed to facilitate the creation
of transcripts in order to supply them on the Web (http://sayit.mysociety.org).
26The URI is a technology that is used to give unique names to resources stored on
the Web, and that is used to enable interactions among resources over the Web. More
information about URIs can be found on the Web site of the World Wide Consortium
(https://www.w3.org/wiki/URI).
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deliberations. Indeed, by following the AkomaNtoso naming convention27,
resources marked up with AkomaNtoso may be identified by means of the
Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records [203] (hereinafter FRBR),
a conceptual model to assign hierarchical names to resources and navigate
their versions [197, p. 69].
The Resource Description Framework (hereinafter RDF)) is the last tech-
nology that must be used to implement Linked Open Data. Indeed, while
the XML is useful to structure legal documents and discussions in online
Deliberative Systems, it does not supply mechanism to give meaning to re-
sources and, most important, does not supply any mechanism to highlight
how resources are connected among themselves. RDF is a data model that,
by means of triples of the form subject-predicate-object, allows producer
of linked open data to give meaning to both resources and the connections
among them [204].
All the regulations and technologies previously exposed in this section
are mandatory requirements for the implementation of Deliberative Systems
whose deliberations aim to be interconnected, interdependent, transparent
and traceable. But regulations and technologies to implement Linked Open
Data in Deliberative Systems automatically also flow into the implementa-
tion of required features of the outcomes of Deliberative Systems. Indeed,
as I have stated in section 5.6, the outcomes of deliberations must be ac-
countable, effective, monitored, and revisable, and they should be efficient
and satisfying for Citizens.The accountability, revisability and monitorabil-
ity of the outcomes are automatically activated by using Linked Open Data
and by enacting proper regulations. The efficacy and efficiency of outcomes
may be automatically computed by algorithms that take advantage of the
property of Linked Data of being computer readable. For instance it is pos-
sible to automatically compute the complexity of a legislation and the effects
27More information about the AkomaNtoso naming convention may be found in the
specification of the AkomaNtoso standard, that are available on the Web site of OASIS
(http://docs.oasis-open.org/legaldocml/akn-nc/v1.0/akn-nc-v1.0.html).
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that amendments on laws may have on it [205]. It is also possible to com-
pare outcomes of deliberations with regulations enacted by Countries for the
normative and technical analysis of laws28. Lastly, I argue here, it is possi-
ble to create algorithms to compare outcomes of deliberations with Linked
Open Data created by other Public Administrations, for example by statis-
tical offices of Countries, in order to check if the quality of life of Citizens is
improved after specific outcomes are created, and this could be used to evalu-
ate the satisfaction of Citizens governing themselves by means of Deliberative
Systems.
However the satisfaction of Citizens must also be granted during the
whole process of deliberations and during decision-making procedures. In
this section and in previous section 6.1, I have exposed the regulations and
technologies needed to implement features for the legitimacy of deliberations,
Institutions and outcomes of Deliberative Systems. In the next section I
expose the ways decision-making procedures of Deliberative Systems must
be shaped.
6.3 Deliberative Interaction, Deliberative Con-
sensus and Deliberative Systems
In the previous sections 6.1 and 6.2, I have exposed regulations and tech-
nologies required to implement the legitimacy features of deliberations, Insti-
tutions and outcomes of Deliberative Systems. However, these requirements
are not enough to implement fully legitimated online Deliberative Systems,
because they neither give any hint on how to ensure that Citizens and inputs
have the proper features to enter deliberations, nor on how to implement le-
gitimated decision-making procedures aimed to help Citizens to choose ideal
outcomes among different options they have. In this section, I expose the
28An example of regulation to analyze the normative and the technical quality of laws is
the Italian one, that can be found on the Web site of the Italian Presidency of the Council
of Ministers (http://presidenza.governo.it/DAGL/uff studi/ATN.html).
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requirements to implement ideal and legitimated decision-making procedures
in online Deliberative Systems.
As stated by the theories of Deliberative Democracy that I have largely
exposed in chapter 4, the final aim of deliberations and their decision making
procedures, should be a consensus among Citizens. However, in some situa-
tions, the consensus could not be achieved, or is not desirable because there
could be different options that may satisfy different Citizens. To match both
these eventualities, decision-making procedures of Deliberative Systems must
supply to Citizens the opportunity to both change their mind if they reach
an agreement on shared solutions, and simply vote their preferred options
in those situations in which a shared solution can not be found. Decision-
making procedures must always aim to the former situation, rather than the
latter one, by fostering Citizens to persuade other Citizens, learn about issues
and motivations of other Citizens, and master mechanisms of deliberations
and decision-making procedures to improve deliberative capabilities.
I argue that all the previous features of decision-making procedures can be
enabled together by introducing the concepts of Deliberative Interaction, and
the concept of Deliberative Consensus. Both concepts are based on personal
examinations derived by theories of Democracies that I have exposed in the
previous chapters of this work.
Deliberative Interaction must be intended as a composite interaction in-
cluding different modes of communication that may also rely on not-humans
languages, to the extent that they are persuasive, and useful to learn and
master deliberative capacities. This means that Citizens can interact by
means of human language and rhetoric, or share stories, or use narratives,
or share videos, music and comics, or simply push buttons of online Deliber-
ative Systems to interact with other Citizens. In other words, Deliberative
Interaction can be defined as follows:
Definition 12 (Deliberative Interaction). Deliberative Interaction is an in-
clusive kind of interaction that allows participants of deliberations to argue
by means of any mode of communication that they may prefer. When de-
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liberations are performed by means of software, Deliberative Interaction also
includes interactions among participators and the software, both if these in-
teractions are performed by Citizens to accomplish their individual tasks and
are performed with the final purpose to communicate with other Citizens. De-
liberative Interaction is always based on persuasion, and its main purposes
are the learning and mastering of deliberative capacities.
Deliberative Systems that allow Deliberative Interaction should by default
be able to avoid social domination and hierarchies, and ensureegalitarianism
among Citizens and their anonymityanonymity. This can only be achieved if
Deliberative Interaction is used together with Deliberative Consensus, that
I expose later in this section, and if Deliberative Systems are designed to
enhance motivations of human-beings and avoid biases of human-beings that
I explore later in this chapter.
Deliberative Consensus is a kind of consensus based on the meta-consensus
theorized by Dryzek meta-consensus theorized by Dryzek [117, p. 101],], that
I have defined in section 4.1, and on the concept of interesting choices by Sid
Meier, that I have exposed in the section 2.1. In order to nurture Deliberative
Consensus among Citizens, decision-making procedures of Deliberative Sys-
tems must supply Citizens facilitation to share their values and their beliefs.
After all values and beliefs of Citizens are collected by means of Deliber-
ative Interactions, decision-making procedures must engage Citizens in the
creation of a set of interesting options to satisfy all their values and beliefs.
If the necessity of an option is not shared among all Citizens involved in the
decision-making procedure, it must involve Citizens in ballots based on the
majority rule, while continuing to engage them in Deliberative Interactions
to allow them to change their mind about votes they have cast. Deliberative
Consensus is defined as follows:
Definition 13 (Deliberative Consensus). Deliberative Consensus is a form of
full or partial consensus on values and beliefs among Citizens. It is reached
when participators in a decision-making process support, at least partially,
values and belief of other participants, or after ballots based on the majority
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rule aimed to choose among interesting options, allowing Citizens to change
their preference in any moment.
Similarly to games, in the context of Deliberative Consensus options are
interesting if: (1) involve some kind of trade-off; (2) allow Citizens to express
their personal values or beliefs; (3) are relative to specific decision-making
procedures; (4) affect Deliberative System, Citizens and decision-making pro-
cedures for a period of time; and (5) are informed.
In this section I have exposed my personal definition of Deliberative Inter-
action and Deliberative Consensus, and I have argued that they are manda-
tory requirements to implement the legitimacy features of decision-making
procedures of Deliberative Systems. On one hand, I claim that these two con-
cepts can be simply implemented in online Deliberative Systems by using the
technologies and web design methodologies that I have exposed in sections
6.1 and 6.2. On the other hand, only proper design and proper technologies
are not enough to ensure legitimacy of Citizens and inputs that access de-
liberations. In the following sections 6.4 and 6.5, I expose how physiological
and cognitive characteristics of human beings can be exploited or controlled
to aim to legitimated deliberations.
6.4 Motivations of Human Beings and Delib-
erative Systems
In ideal and legitimated Deliberative Systems, Citizens must be contin-
uously engaged in deliberations and, so, Deliberative Systems must be de-
signed to keep Citizens active in deliberation and satisfied while deliberating.
Citizens satisfaction can be improved by providing incentives to increase their
motivations to deliberate.
As I have exposed in section 4.3 and its subsections, scholars of Delibera-
tive Democracies have theorized models of deliberations in which Citizens are
engaged to participate by means of monetary incentives supplied by institu-
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tions. However, critics of Deliberative Democracies have exposed that mon-
etary incentives may result in unaffordable expenses for Institutions [162].
Moreover studies on monetary incentives have found that, although money
can be a good incentive in the private sphere and improve the quantity of
outcomes when performing a job [206], it does not have any effects on the
quality of produced outcomes and, even worse, could be counterproductive
when related to Social activities [207].
In order to solve the above issues, one of the purposes of this research is
to find alternative incentives to monetary ones. This may be addressed by
exploring the human intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Extrinsic motiva-
tionsmotivations, to which also monetary ones belong, are related to behav-
ioral attitudes of human beings, and so to behaviorism theories [208]]. Very
briefly, behaviorism is a psychological theory claiming that human beings are
describable by simply observing their behavior and their response to specific
stimuli. Thus, a proper distribution of rewards should drive individuals to act
in specific ways. Intrinsic motivations are related to cognitivist theories [209],
stating that thoughts happen before the behavior, so a certain behavior is
the result of a specific thinking process, meaning that actions of individuals
are also driven by their personality and “forma mentis”. Rephrasing the
latter assertion, extrinsic motivations are related to the brain of individuals,
whilst intrinsic ones are related to the minds of individuals.
Literature on extrinsic motivations expose four neurotransmitters that
can be stimulated by means of rewards and physical incentives, in order
to keep individuals satisfied. They are: the Dopamine, the Oxytocin, the
Serotonin, and the Endorphin [210, p. 13] [211, pp. 176-182]. Figures 6.10,
6.11, 6.12, and 6.13 show, respectively, the chemical composition of these
four neurotransmitters.
The Dopamine is an appetitive reinforcement that is released when in-
dividuals perform actions supposed to result in one or more rewards [212].
Moreover, the Dopamine is strictly related to learning, to the extent that
brains of human beings create powerful relation between actions and re-
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Figure 6.10: The chemical composition of Dopamine. Courtesy of Wikepedia
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dopamine)
wards when Dopamine is released, resulting in positive effects on learning
capabilities for individuals predisposed to actions-rewards learning [213].
The Oxytocin is released by brains of human beings when they are in-
volved in social physical interactions [214] and in interactions with other
human beings mediated by technologies29, but also when human beings read
compelling narratives [215]. ]. Oxytocin has powerful anti-stress effects [214]
and is deemed to be effective to increase altruism [211, p. 178], generosity
[216] and trust in other humans [217].
The Serotonin is related to the way human beings act when they are
involved in decision-making procedures and to the mood of human beings
when receiving feedback or rewards [211, p. 180]. In other words, the more
the Serotonin, the more human beings react positively to negative feedback,
and vice-versa [218]. Also, Serotonin is involved in impulsivity, meaning that
individuals with low level of Serotonin tend to choose options that supply
instant rewards, rather than options that may resolve in delayed but more
29For more information about the release of Oxytocin when using social
webs read the article “The Top 10 Ways to Boost Good Feelings” by Paul
J. Zak. The article is public available for reading on the PsychologyTo-
day site (https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-moral-molecule/201311/the-top-
10-ways-boost-good-feelings).
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Figure 6.11: The chemical composition of Oxytocin. Courtesy of Wikepedia
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxytocin)
profitable rewards [219].
The Endorphin is an opiate similar to morphine, that brains of human
beings produce naturally [211, p. 181]. While low levels of Endorphin are
connected to addiction to gambling [220], balanced levels of Endorphin in-
crease the sense of power and control of human beings, and increase their
overall wellness [221, p. 47].
In methods of deliberations and in Deliberative Systems, the four neu-
rotransmitters must be controlled and exploited to implement some of the
features of ideal and legitimate Deliberative Democracies.
On one hand, methods of deliberation must be built to control the re-
lease of the four neurotransmitters in order to not jeopardize the legitimacy
of deliberations. As a matter of fact, as I have exposed before, Endorphin
and Dopamine may create states of addiction in Citizens and, for this rea-
son, they may perform irrational choices by being driven by the mere need of
achieving rewards. Oxytocin, in extreme situations, may shift Citizens from
a feeling of trust to a feeling of anger towards other Citizens[211, p. 178]. I
also argue here that in anonymous contexts, moved by high levels of Oxy-
tocine, Citizens may over-trust other Citizens that actually have malicious
purposes. For what concerns Serotonin, I claim that high levels of it may be
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Figure 6.12: The chemical composition of Serotonin. Courtesy of Wikepedia
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serotonin)
Figure 6.13: The chemical composition of Endorphin. Courtesy of Wikepedia
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Endorphins)
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dangerous to the extent that they may influence Citizens in underestimate
the consequences of negative feedback.
On the other hand, the four neurotransmitters can be exploited to drive
Citizens to deliberate in legitimated and ideal ways. Firstly, Dopamine may
be controlled to give Citizens motivations to enter deliberations and remain
engaged in them. Also, Dopamine may be useful to give Citizens incentives
to improve their Deliberative capacities and learn the required information
needed to deliberate on complex issues. Secondly, Oxytocin may be used
to improve the respectfulness of Citizens, their sense of community , and
to create trust. Thirdly, by increasing the level of Serotonin of Citizens,
it is possible to drive them to deliberate in order to reach a consensus on
best options for the community in the long run, rather than to impulsively
choose options that may have only short-term beneficial effects. Fourthly
and lastly, by implementing mechanism to foster the release of Endorphin
while Citizens are deliberating, it is possible to improve their sense of sat-
isfaction with outcomes of deliberations. In part III, I will expose practical
examples of strategies that can be used to increase the production of these
neurotransmitters, when designing online Deliberative Systems.
While extrinsic motivations are related to the functioning of brains of
human beings, intrinsic motivations are related to their personality and their
innate psychological needs, more specifically the needs of competence (or
mastery), autonomy and relatedness [222]. The mastery is the need of human
beings to learn activities and to master specific areas of expertise as much
as they can [223, p. 56]. The autonomy is the innate need of human beings
to feel in control of their life and to have the freedom to choose according to
their personality [223, p. 57]. The relatedness is the innate need of human
beings to interact with the others, create social connections, and to work
together with foresight purposes, like improving the community or improving
the world [223, p. 57]. According to literature on motivations, the purpose
may be seen as a different motivation than relatedness30. The purpose is
30The four-dimensional framework of intrinsic motivation was proposed by Andrzej Mar-
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related to the intrinsic need of human beings to contribute to the creation
of big or epic things that can improve the world or the community. For
example, people involved in the creation of wikipedia may feel to be driven
by the great purpose of creating the largest encyclopedia of the history of
human beings [211, p. 63].
As well as extrinsic motivations, intrinsic motivations of Citizens can be
fed-up in order to keep them active in Deliberative Systems. In part III of
this work, I will describe strategies and practical implementations for the
design of Online Deliberative Systems aimed to leverage on intrinsic moti-
vations of Citizens. However, when considering pluralistic and diverse sets
of Citizens involved in deliberations, motivations could be slightly different
among participators [224]. The relatedness, conceived as the need to be-
long to a community, is recognized in literature to be a powerful motivator,
but seems to not be a universal motivator for Citizens belonging to different
cultures [225] [226], and the same seems to happen with the intrinsic need
of mastering [222] [227]]. Last but not least, when designing Deliberative
Systems, the need of autonomy of Citizens surely deserves deep attention.
While scholars have found that the need of autonomy does not have any cor-
relation with negative individualism of human-beings [224]], other scholars
have found that, depending on cultures and traditions of Citizens, in some
situations the need of autonomy may lead to a lack of cohesion in commu-
nities [228]. Other scholars have also highlighted that autonomy could be a
“western motivation”, because in some eastern cultures Citizens feel better
when they are submitted to controlling authorities [229].
Previously in this section, I have stated that there is a distinction on
where intrinsic motivations and extrinsic motivations are processed by hu-
mans beings. I argued that intrinsic motivations are processed by the mind,
whilst extrinsic ones are processed by the brain. This means that, by using a
czewski. It is based on the Self-Determination theory, and it adds the “purpose” motivation
to the theory. Usually, the four-dimensional framework is referenced in literature as the
RAMP framework [211, pp. 59-63].
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rough analogy between human beings and computers, extrinsic motivations
are processed by the hardware of human beings, and intrinsic motivations
are processed by their software, resulting in a faster processing of the former
compared to the latter. However, as showed in figure 6.14, last century liter-
ature on the way human beings think also exposes that the mind of human
beings is divided into a “fast-system” and a “slow-system” for processing
information. Both of them could be biased when involved in deliberations
especially, I argue here, when decision-making procedures of Deliberative Sys-
tems are designed to foster intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of Citizens. In
the next section 6.5, I will expose the main biases that must be avoided to
implement legitimate Deliberative Systems, or could be exploited to improve
deliberations in Deliberative Systems.
Figure 6.14: The effects of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations on thoughts of human
beings. Adaption of the graphic posted on Pinterest (https://www.pinterest.com)
by NeuroPowergroup (http://www.neuropowergroup.com) and by MixResearch
(http://www.mixresearch.co.uk).
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6.5 Biases of Human Beings and Deliberative
Systems
Starting from the second half of the twentieth Century, scholars have
found that human beings do not act rationally [53]. When individuals are
involved in decision-making procedures, they usually leverage on heuristics,
and decide by using their past experiences. However, these heuristics usually
flow into bad decisions, because individuals tend to apply them in different
contexts from the ones in which heuristics were originally elaborated. In
online Deliberative Systems these errors, also known as “biases”, could be
avoided at design level of deliberations.
Scholars of Deliberative Democracies have largely exposed arguments on
the necessity to avoid some bias related to deliberation and mini-public in
order to achieve legitimated Deliberative Democracies. For instance, Fung
[162] [230] [231], French [232] and Navarro [233] have exposed issues related
to the Participation Bias, related to situations in which participators are not
representative of the community [234], because they do not carry plural and
diverse arguments or because they are not equally distributed in terms of
politic ideals. Other scholars, like Nyemeyer and Spash [235], have exposed
issues related to self-selection bias, that may arise in mini-public when par-
ticipants are locally selected, because of the risk to only involve Citizens that
are already used to public deliberations and, so, people that have the time
and the proper skills to participate [236].
However, scholars of Deliberative Democracies and Deliberative Systems
neglect to analyze biases that could affect decisions of individuals while they
are involved in deliberations in both oﬄine and in online contexts. I argue
that these biases must be analyzed to avoid those that could jeopardize the
legitimacy of Deliberative Systems, but also that some of these biases can be
wisely exploited to improve deliberative capacities of Citizens. Figure 6.15
shows the most common biases that can affect decisions.
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Figure 6.15: Twenty biases that can affect individuals involved in decision-making
processes, as reported by Samantha Lee and Shana Lebowitz on BusinessInsider
(http://www.businessinsider.com/cognitive-biases-that-affect-decisions-2015-8?IR=T)
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Deliberative Systems that aim to fair and legitimate deliberations should
implement checks on all the twenty biases exposed in figure 6.15. However,
for the purpose of my research, in this section I will deeply expose other
biases that are related to new online social media and, so, could also affect
Deliberative Systems. More specifically, the biases that I will analyze for the
purposes of my research are: the online firestorm effect, the rumours effect,
the filter bubble effect, the echo chamber effect, the authority bias, and the
Lucifer effect.
The online firestorm effect when a large amount of negative word-of-
mount messages or despicable behaviors against a person, or a group of
persons, are spread all around the web [237]. In oﬄine contexts, firestorm
effect is comparable to (negative) rumors, that are unproved beliefs or bad
assertions on a person, or a group of persons, scattered among people of a
community by means of word-of-mouth [238].
In Deliberative Democracies and in Deliberative Systems online firestorm
effect and rumours, if verified, may seriously jeopardize the legitimacy and
the functioning of deliberations. Firstly, the two effects may signify either
a lack of respectfulness of one or more participant in deliberations, or may
be related to an attempt of one person or a group of persons to benefit by
discrediting someone else, meaning that deliberations are not driven by moral
purposes. Secondly, if online firestorms or rumours happen, they may cause
exclusion from the discussion of the targeted person or group of persons,
and undermine the balancing, diversity, and pluralism of arguments. Also,
Citizens previously excluded from discussions because they were the target
of the two effects may encounter difficulties when trying to deliberate, and
this affects the required feature of deliberations of being unobstructed.
Pfeffer and Carley highlighted that online firestorm effects and rumours
are caused by seven factors [237]. I claim that four of them are strictly related
to deliberations and decision-making procedures. More specifically, they are
the filter bubble effect and the echo chamber, the binary choices, and the
cross-media dynamics.
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Decision-making procedures built on binary choices [239] are those in
which decisions are limited to just one action, that deciders may perform
or not. For instance, in some modern social media, decisions are limited
to like or not like particular topics, or share or not share them. In oﬄine
contexts, the same happens for instance when Citizens are requested to vote
for a referendum. If they participate to the ballot, usually they are asked to
choose between a yes or a no about a specific issue. This may flow into the
undesirable situation where deciders, biased by the speed of the information
flow [240], do not have the time to build a rational opinion on arguments31,
but choose to like or to share topics because people in their network or
community have created a topic, or have already liked or shared a topic, as
highlighted by studies on network clusters [241].
Binary choices are not necessarily incompatible with legitimated deliber-
ations in Deliberative Systems. Indeed, they can be used in order to avoid
digressions, and can be controlled to avoid irrational choices by participants.
This may be achieved by means of a wise implementation of mechanisms to
reach Deliberative Consensus and balance Deliberative Interaction.
Other dynamics that must be controlled for the sake of the legitimacy of
deliberations are cross-media dynamics, which can also be exploited to engage
more Citizens in deliberations. Cross-media dynamics are those situations
in which social medias initially expose an argument, and other traditional
medias give more resonance to the same argument by sharing it. This means
that greater online activity in Deliberative Systems may result in greater
31Although referenda may seem neutral to this issue, because they must be disclosed
a certain amount of time before the ballot (that depends by the legislative system of
countries), communication speed bias may still verify because institutions and tradi-
tional medias may start to spread information about referenda only when the country
approaches the date of the ballot. This can be particularly dangerous when referenda are
related to very complex issues, like the Constitutional referendum held in Italy on Decem-
ber 4, 2016 (https://constitution-unit.com/2016/10/13/all-you-need-to-know-about-the-
italian-constitutional-referendum/), or in those countries governed by mixed Direct and
Representative Democracies, like the Switzerland that had 180 referenda in the last twenty
years (https://inews.co.uk/explainers/iq/switzerland-held-9-referendums-already-2016).
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external or oﬄine actions [237] [242]]. On one side, these situations may
increase an eventual on-going online firestorm effect and, so, affect the le-
gitimacy of deliberation processes. On the other side, cross-media dynamics
must surely be exploited in order to create Deliberative Systems, built on
ubiquitous and continuous deliberations, and on more informed inputs.
The needed features for the legitimacy of deliberative decision-making
procedures to allow Citizens to deliberate anonymously, may also came in
help to avoid online firestorm effects, and all their related effects. Indeed,
anonymity can be used by Citizens to protect themselves from libels and, so,
malicious discussants should avoid to create rumours and online firestorm
effect because they are useless. Anonymity has other beneficial effects on
discussions, and is indeed proved to be effective in engaging people in “risky
discussions” that they would not engage in non-anonymous contexts, to help
the construction of individual identity, and to help individuals to create dif-
ferent identities according to different roles needed in specific situations [243].
]. All of these effects of anonymity are useful in Deliberative Systems because
they can result in more balanced, diverse, informed, and pluralistic inputs.
Anonymity is also useful to avoid the Authority Bias, related to the ten-
dency of individuals to trust more in arguments exposed by authoritative
or famous people and, so, to be more influenced by these arguments even
if they are not properly justified or properly informed [244]. ]. Moreover,
this can also feed-up the confirmation bias in individuals that is, as showed
in figure 6.15, the tendency to take in consideration only arguments that
confirm their preconceptions [245]. In Deliberative Systems, the authority
bias can be avoided by allowing Citizens to discuss in anonymous way and,
I argue here, this can also help Citizens to focus more on the contents of
deliberations, rather than the people involved in them, thus improving the
conscientiousness of Citizens involved in deliberations.
However, anonymity may contribute to create another dangerous effect
that may result in biased deliberations. Studies have exposed that people
become more aggressive and use incivility when they interact anonymously
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[246]]. This is also related to the Lucifer Effect exposed by Philip Zimbardo
[247], stating that people have both “good” and “evil” personalities and in
some situations bad personality may easily arise, which seems to happen
more readily in online and anonymous contexts [248] [243]. The Lucifer
Effect could seriously threaten the respectfulness of Citizens, that is required
for the legitimacy of deliberations.
The Filter Bubble effect [249] is related to how information, topics and
arguments are perceived as important by people involved in decision-making
procedures. People using online systems that try to predict their preferences
by means of algorithms, especially online recommendation systems, are po-
tentially exposed to effects of filter bubbles, because algorithms may propose
to individuals only items that are not diverse from their preferences [250].].
In deliberative decision-making procedures, this means that individuals may
be isolated in “bubbles”, containing only arguments and positions close to
their own ones. This can affect the legitimacy of deliberations because Citi-
zens could listen only to a small set of arguments that, moreover, are aligned
with their positions. However, in “sound contexts” the filter bubble effect
can improve quality of decisions because it lowers the cognitive effort that
Citizens must use to select the information needed to decide [251].
The Echo chamber effect is related to the tendency of individuals to
create and affiliate to groups sharing their position on specific arguments.
While the Filter Bubble effect is related to arguments and inputs involved
in deliberations, the Echo Chamber effect is related to individuals involved
in deliberations, but can result in the same issues as filter bubbles. Indeed
in Deliberative Systems, especially if they implement mechanisms of “recip-
rocated followers”, the echo chamber effect may contribute to create groups
of Citizens characterized by political homophily, that could avoid to listen
different positions from their ones [252].
All the biases that I have exposed in this section can be controlled in two
ways. The first one is to implement a technological and preventive control,
the second one is to design and implement Deliberative Systems that help
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Citizens to individuate unfair deliberations and disadvantage Citizens that
contributed to create these conditions of unfairness.
Technological checks can be made by implementing fair algorithms using
Linked Open Data, exposed in section 6.2, in order to find attempts by
individuals, or by groups of them, to create these effects. For instance,
the filtering bubble can be prevented by sorting and randomly presenting
to Citizens the arguments of deliberations. The firestorm effect and the
negative rumours can be prevented by “muting” for short periods of time
those Citizens that seem to be using only bad arguments against the same
Citizen in the latest period.
However, these technological controls can have effects on the trust that
Citizens have on online Deliberative Systems. Indeed, even if algorithms are
transparent and reliable, Citizens that are not properly educated to under-
stand them may challenge the fairness of algorithms themselves.
I argue that a proper web design, based on the mechanism to give in-
trinsic and extrinsic motivation to Citizens to deliberate, and to also give
them motivations to detect unfair behaviors, could be a more suitable option
to implement legitimated online Deliberative Systems. In the next section
6.6, I will summarize all the requirements to create Deliberative Systems im-
plementing all the features to be legitimated. In part III, I will expose the
proper strategies and web design to implement online Deliberative Systems
that rely and foster intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of Citizens.
6.6 A Framework for Online Deliberative Sys-
tems
In the previous sections of this chapter, I have exposed all the require-
ments to implement Deliberative Systems supporting all the legitimacy fea-
tures that I have listed in chapter 5. Table 6.1 shows a summary of all the
requirements matched with the components and features of ideal and legiti-
mated Deliberative Systems. The requirements are grouped in the following
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categories:
Regulations, Laws or Constitutions: this category includes all the reg-
ulations, laws or Constitutional articles that Institutions must enact
in order to implement one or more features of legitimated Deliberative
Systems.
Internet Technologies: this category includes all Internet technologies and
protocols that are useful to implement one or more features of legiti-
mated Deliberative Systems.
Web Technologies: this category includes all Web technologies and proto-
cols that are useful to implement one or more features of legitimated
Deliberative Systems.
Linked Open Data Technologies: this category includes all Linked Open
Data technologies that are useful to implement one or more features of
legitimated Deliberative Systems.
Design For Inclusiveness: this category includes all the strategies and de-
sign methodologies to implement one or more features of legitimated
Online Deliberative Systems related to inclusiveness.
Design For Responsiveness: this category includes all the strategies and
design methodologies to implement one or more features of legitimated
Online Deliberative Systems related to responsiveness.
Design For Usability: this category includes all the strategies and design
methodologies to implement one or more features of legitimated Online
Deliberative Systems related to usability.
Design For Deliberative Interaction: this category includes all the strate-
gies and design methodologies to implement legitimate online Deliber-
ative Systems that support Deliberative Interactions.
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Design For Deliberative Consensus: this category includes all the strate-
gies and design methodologies to implement legitimate online Deliber-
ative Systems that support Deliberative Consensus.
Design For Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: this category includes
all the strategies and design methodologies to implement legitimate on-
line Deliberative Systems aimed to nurture the intrinsic and extrinsic
motivations of Citizens involved in deliberations.
Design to Avoid/Exploit Biases: this category includes all the strate-
gies and design methodologies to implement legitimate online Deliber-
ative Systems whose deliberations are properly designed to avoid biases
that can jeopardize their legitimacy, or to exploit biases that can im-
prove deliberations.
Table 6.1 provides the answer to one of my research questions, the re-
quirements of ideal and legitimated Online Deliberative Systems. In the
next parts of this research, I will answer the other main research question of
this work, and expose the proper technologies, methodologies and strategies
to keep citizens active and continuously engaged in deliberations.
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Table 6.1: The requirements to implement legitimated online Deliberative Systems
R
e
g
u
la
t
io
n
s
,
L
a
w
s
o
r
C
o
n
s
t
it
u
t
io
n
s
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
T
e
c
h
n
o
lo
g
ie
s
W
e
b
T
e
c
h
n
o
lo
g
ie
s
L
in
k
e
d
O
p
e
n
D
a
t
a
T
e
c
h
n
o
lo
g
ie
s
D
e
s
ig
n
F
o
r
I
n
c
lu
s
iv
e
n
e
s
s
D
e
s
ig
n
F
o
r
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
iv
e
n
e
s
s
D
e
s
ig
n
F
o
r
U
s
a
b
il
it
y
D
e
s
ig
n
F
o
r
D
e
li
b
e
r
a
t
iv
e
I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
io
n
D
e
s
ig
n
F
o
r
D
e
li
b
e
r
a
t
iv
e
C
o
n
s
e
n
s
u
s
D
e
s
ig
n
F
o
r
I
n
t
r
in
s
ic
a
n
d
E
x
t
r
in
s
ic
M
o
t
iv
a
t
io
n
s
D
e
s
ig
n
T
o
A
v
o
id
/
E
x
p
lo
it
B
ia
s
e
s
DELIBERATIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
D-MUST-1 Must be accessible 3 3 3 3
D-MUST-2 Must be open 3 3 3 3 3 3
D-MUST-3 Must be reliable 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
D-MUST-4 Must be traceable 3 3
D-MUST-5 Must be transparent 3
D-MUST-6 Must be unobstructed 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
D-COULD-1 Could be asynchronous 3 3
D-COULD-2 Could be continuous 3 3 3 3 3
D-COULD-3 Could be distributed 3 3
D-COULD-4 Could be interconnected 3
D-COULD-5 Could be interdependent 3
D-COULD-6 Could be ubiquitous 3 3 3 3 3
CITIZENS
CODE DESCRIPTION
C-MUST-1 Must be capable 3 3 3 3 3
C-MUST-2 Must be conscientious 3 3 3 3
C-MUST-3 Must be educated 3 3 3 3 3
C-MUST-4 Must be motivated 3 3 3 3 3
C-MUST-5 Must be purposed 3 3 3 3
C-MUST-6 Must be respectful 3 3 3 3
INPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
I-MUST-1 Must be balanced 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
I-MUST-2 Must be diverse 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
I-MUST-3 Must be informed 3 3
I-MUST-4 Must be interesting 3 3 3
I-MUST-5 Must be justified 3 3
I-MUST-6 Must be pluralistic 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES
CODE DESCRIPTION
DMP-ALLOW-1
Must allow mind
changing
3 3
DMP-ALLOW-2
Must allow majority
rule
3 3
DMP-AVOID-1
Must avoid social
domination
3 3 3 3 3 3
DMP-AVOID-2 Must avoid hierarchies 3 3 3 3 3 3
DMP-FOSTER-1 Must foster learning 3 3 3 3 3 3
DMP-FOSTER-2 Must foster mastering 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
DMP-FOSTER-3 Must foster persuasion 3 3 3 3
DMP-GRANT-1 Must grant anonymity 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
DMP-GRANT-2 Must grant egalitarianism 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
OUTPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
O-MUST-1 Must be accountable 3 3
O-MUST-2 Must be effective 3 3 3 3 3
O-MUST-3 Must be monitored 3 3
O-MUST-4 Must be revisable 3 3
O-SHOULD-1 Should be efficient 3 3 3 3 3
O-SHOULD-2 Should be satisfying 3 3 3 3 3 3
INSTITUTIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
IN-AVOID-1 Must avoid domination 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
IN-AVOID-2
Must avoid rooted
partisanship
3 3
IN-AVOID-3 Must avoid tightness 3 3
IN-GRANT-1
Must grant authority
to deliberations
3
IN-GRANT-2
Must grant egalitarianism
to participants
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
IN-GRANT-3
Must grant freedom
to deliberate
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
IN-GRANT-4
Must grant incentives
to deliberate
3 3 3 3
IN-GRANT-5
Must grant political equality
to citizens
3 3 3
Part II
Analysis of Online
Participation and Deliberation
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Chapter 7
Tools for Online Participatory
Democracy and for Online
Deliberative Democracy
In this chapter, I describe the design and the functioning of a set of de-
liberation and participation tools that I have selected by following specific
criteria, that I describe in the following sections 7.1. Each one of the fol-
lowing sections 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8, is aimed to describe the
functionality and the design of a specific system, and to analyze the legit-
imacy requirements of Deliberative Systems that it implements, as I have
exposed in the section 5. Eventually, in the section 7.9, I expose a brief
summary of the analysis and I conclude by introducing the motivations on
the behalf of a new kind of Online Democracy Systems that I expose in the
part III of this work.
7.1 Selection of the Tools for the Analysis
One of the goals of my research is to analyze the most-known tools for
online participation and online deliberation, in order to understand if they
implement the requirements needed to be legitimated, exposed in section 6.
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Although my research work is focused on online Deliberative Systems, I
chose to also analyze tools for online participation and online deliberation for
two reasons. The first one is that, since theories and studies on Deliberative
Systems are still very young, at the moment of writing there are no imple-
mentations of tools specifically classified as online Deliberative Systems. This
is also true for tools for Deliberative Democracy that, at the moment of writ-
ing, are very scarce. The second reason for which I have also analyzed a set
of tools for online Participatory Democracy (or simply Online Democracy) is
that, since there is still a certain lack of knowledge on the differences between
Deliberative Democracies and Participatory Democracies, in some situations
the online tools for online Participatory Democracy or, more generically,
the tools for online Democracy, actually implement features of Deliberative
Democracy or Deliberative Systems.
Besides the two previous reasons, according to the goals of my research,
I have restricted my analysis on tools that have two specific characteristics.
Firstly, tools were selected among the ones classified as tools for online
participation and online deliberation, meaning that I have selected only tools
that can be used on the Web, regardless of the specific way to actual connect
to them. In other words, I have selected tools that can be accessed by means
of Web Browsers, or applications for mobile phones connected to the Internet,
whilst I have excluded from the analysis those tools that can be used in off-
line mode. This was necessary to be sure that the tools already implement
some of the requirements for their legitimacy. More specifically, online tools
deployed on the web already implement the requirements related to Internet
and Web technologies that I have exposed in section 6.6.
Secondly, I have preferred tools whose final aim is to foster Citizens to
discuss Bills or Laws, by supplying them mechanisms specifically intended
to cite Laws or Bills. This selection criterion has two main motivations.
The first one is that, due to my research interests on Legal Informatics and
technologies for law-making, I was interested in analyzing how online Partic-
ipatory Democracies and online Deliberative Democracies can be exploited
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to allow Citizens to discuss and to design Bills by their own. The second
one is that, as I have exposed in section 6.2, one of the requirements for the
legitimacy of online Deliberative Systems is that they must use Open Data
and rely on them. Since transparency and public availability of Laws and
Bills is the main requirement for the legitimacy of Representative Democ-
racies, Countries are more likely to expose their Legislation in Open Data
before any other type of document. The previous statement also means that
the selected tools already implement the requirements for legitimacy related
to Laws or Constitutions, as I have exposed in section 6.6. However, because
of the scarcity of tools specifically aimed to discuss laws or bills, I enlarged
the set of analyzed tools by including also other one supplying public access
in order to be examined, and in which it is possible to link Laws or Bills in
discussions.
In order to select the tools for the analysis, I started from the Participat-
eDB Web site1,, and the most-known search engines available on the web. In
all of them I performed researches by means of a combination of the follow-
ing words: Online Deliberative Democracy, Online Participatory Democracy,
Online Deliberative Systems, e-Participation, e-Deliberation, e-Democracy,
Tools, Mobile Application.
I ended up with 29 results partially meeting the requirements that I have
previously listed in this section. Starting by this set I have selected all the
tools that, at the moment of writing, satisfy the following criteria: (1) the tool
must be available online; (2) the tool must not be broken and its database
must not be empty; (3) the tool must supply a Web or a Mobile version; and
(4) the tool must grant public access, or at least it must grant access to a
demo. Table 7.1 shows the results of the research.
In the following sections of this chapter I will describe the software that
follows the requirements that I have described in previously in this section,
in order to check if they implements the requirements needed for their le-
1The aim of the ParticipateDB is to collect participation and deliberation methodolo-
gies and tools used around the world (http://www.participatedb.com).
160
7. Tools for Online Participatory Democracy and for Online
Deliberative Democracy
Table 7.1: A list of tools for Online Participatory Democracy and Online Deliberative
Democracy
Name of the tool Web Site
Broken,
not available or
empty
Web or Mobile
Version
Public Access or
Demo Available
Allows to Discuss on
Bills or Laws
Agora https://the-agora.squarespace.com NO YES YES NO
Airesis https://www.airesis.eu YES YES YES NO
CivicEvolution https://whatdowethink.com NO YES NO ?
Common Ground for Action http://findcommonground.org NO YES NO ?
Deebase http://deeba.se NO YES NO ?
Demagora https://plone.org/demagora YES ? ? ?
Deme http://deme.stanford.edu NO YES NO ?
DemocracyOS http://democracyos.org NO YES YES YES
discourse-machine http://www.binary-objects.de NO YES NO ?
dito https://www.ontopica.de NO YES NO ?
e-Deliberation http://www.e-deliberation.com YES ? ? ?
e-dialogos http://www.edialogos.gr YES ? ? ?
e-Liberate http://publicsphereproject.org NO ? NO ?
Gov2DemOSS http://www.gov2u.org NO ? NO ?
GovTrack https://www.govtrack.us NO YES YES YES
OnlineTownhalls http://www.onlinetownhalls.com YES ? ? ?
Open Assembly http://www.openassembly.org YES ? ? ?
OurSpace http://www.joinourspace.eu NO YES YES YES
Parelon http://www.parelon.it/ NO YES YES YES
Parmenides http://cgi.csc.liv.ac.uk YES ? NO ?
PerlNomic http://www.nomic.net YES ? ? ?
PICOLA (Delibera 2.0) http://virtualagora.org YES ? ? ?
PICOLA-lite http://caae.phil.cmu.edu NO YES NO NO
PrioritySpend http://www.priorityspend.org YES ? ? ?
Puzzled by Policy http://puzzledbypolicy.moonfruit.com YES ? ? ?
Unchat http://unchat.com YES ? ? ?
YourConsensus http://yourconsensus.org YES ? ? ?
Zilino http://beta.zilino.com NO YES NO NO
Wikilegis https://edemocracia.camara.leg.br NO YES YES YES
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gitimacy that I have listed in the section 6.6. As I have stated previously,
some of the requirements must be considered implemented by default. For
this reason, the following analysis is aimed to understand if the tools uses
Linked Open Data technologies, if they, if they are designed for inclusiveness,
responsiveness and usability, if they supplies mechanisms for Deliberative In-
teractions and Deliberative Consensus, and if the tools are designed to foster
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of Citizens and to avoid common biases
of human beings involved in decision-making processes.
7.2 Agora Townhall
Agora2 is a project created at Cambridge by the Agora Townhall Inc,
originally designed to share ideas inside company teams in order to find new
business projects. The project was then adjusted to host ideas of Citizens
about their Cities, and to discuss on them in participatory ways. The ver-
sion of Agora for managing this kind of civic participation is called Agora
Townhall3.
The Agora Townhall is public accessible by all Citizens regardless of their
geographical position. The system can be accessed with the credentials of
the most-common social web platforms (figure 7.1), that means that it is
not possible to access it in anonymous way. After users log-in, the system
shows to them a set of communities in which they can enter to share their
ideas. When users choose a community, they can see a summary of the people
subscribed to that community, they can browse the chat rooms open in that
community, or they can browse the ideas proposed in the chat rooms of the
community (figure 7.2).
2The Agora project is available at the following address: https://agora.co/.
3A public demo of the Agora Townhall is available at the following address: https://the-
agora.squarespace.com/#about.
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Figure 7.2: The home page of the Agora project
Figure 7.1: The log-in page of the Agora project
The design of Agora Townhall is partially compliant with the guidelines
for inclusiveness, responsiveness and usability that I have exposed in section
6.1. Indeed, although the design of the system relies on Material Design,
granting standards for inclusiveness, responsiveness and usability, the chat
rooms seems to be broken when displayed on small screens, causing serious
difficulties to read messages of other Citizens (figure 7.3).
The Agora project partially implements the requirements on linked open
data, as exposed in section 6.2.. Both chat rooms and ideas have their own
URI that can be used to link them in other software (figure 7.4). However, the
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Figure 7.3: The visualization of the Agora project on small screens
resources can only be accessed by means of browsers, meaning that resources
are not machine-readable, as requested by standards of linked open data.
Figure 7.5 shows the replies to a CURL query4 by the Agora system.
Deliberative Interactions in the Agora system are limited to chat messages
and to the creation of new ideas. Although it is possible to link every kind of
content in messages, such as videos and images, it is not possible to classify
them in order to deal with them in different ways according to their nature
(figure 7.6). As I have exposed in sections 6.2 and 6.3, this is necessary for
the requirements of both linked open data and properly designed Deliberative
Interactions.
The Agora system supplies a certain kind of composed consensus, but it
is not designed as a Deliberative Consensus, as I have exposed in section 6.3.
As showed in figure 7.6, when users create inputs for deliberations, they can
insert a generic description of the input, the information about the issues
that users want to solve, the pros and the cons of their ideas, the required
steps to implement the idea, a set of tags to classify the idea, and generic
comments on the idea. However, users can cast their vote on the whole idea
4CURL is a command line command used to transfer and sharing machine-readable
data among software applications. More information about the CURL command are
public accessible at the following address: https://curl.haxx.se.
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Figure 7.4: The reply to a CURL query by the Agora system
Figure 7.5: The response of a query to the Agora project
Figure 7.6: A comment with a link in the Agora project
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Figure 7.7: The creation of an input in the Agora project
and they are not able to cast votes on other sections of it, as showed in figure
7.8.
Figure 7.8 also shows the voting system of the Agora project, that is based
on emoticons. Users can express eleven different emotions on ideas and all
the votes that ideas receive are grouped by emotions. After having explored
all the Web pages related to the project, I did not find any statement on
how this kind of voting mechanism is used to understand the consensus that
ideas have reached among users.
The system does not implement any feature to nurture intrinsic and ex-
trinsic motivations of users in order to keep them active in deliberations.
Inputs are simply collected and presented to the users without any adjust-
ment to make them more interesting for deliberations. Finally, as showed
in figure 7.9, , Agora does not implement any feature to prevent the raising
of biases of Citizens involved in discussions. By default, ideas proposed by
Citizens are sorted by updating time, and users can choose to sort them in
six different ways. Among the other options, users can select to sort ideas by
trends and by reactions, but the Agora project does not specify how ideas are
classified as trends, and how the amount of reactions on ideas is computed.
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Figure 7.8: The voting system in the Agora project
As I have exposed in section 6.5, this can lead to the production of the fil-
ter bubble effect, the bandwagon effect and other common biases related to
decision-making procedures.
Table 7.2 and the following list expose a summary of the legitimacy fea-
tures implemented by Agora Townhall in relation to the requirements for
their implementation that I have exposed in chapter 6.
Linked Open Data Technologies : the system implements only mecha-
nisms to univocally identify chats and ideas and nether relies on, nor
produces, any data by means of Linked Open Data technologies. For
this reason, all the legitimacy features related to this requirement are
not implemented.
Inclusiveness, Responsiveness, and Usability : by relying on the Ma-
terial Design, the interface of the system can be considered by default,
at least partially, inclusive, responsive and usable. All the legitimacy
features related to these requirements must be considered implemented
by inheritance, with the exception of the accessibility of deliberations,
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Figure 7.9: The sorting of ideas in the Agora project
that must be considered not implemented because the chat session is
broken on small screens.
Deliberative Interaction and Deliberative Consensus : the system im-
plements mechanisms to allow Citizens to change their preferences, and
does not implement any mechanism to discriminate among different
users and, so, avoid hierarchies and grant egalitarianism to Citizens.
Although the chat does not allow a variety of communication modes,
it is structured as a free textual chat and, for this reason, can be used
to persuade users. However, the mechanisms to reach a consensus do
not grant the anonymity of Citizens, nor implement any mechanisms
to avoid social domination and foster the learning and mastering of de-
liberative capacities. Lastly, the system does not implement any mech-
anism of majority rule to select most voted options in the eventuality
that Citizens do not reach a Consensus.
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Nurture Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations : the system does not im-
plement any feature to nurture intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of
Citizens. For this reason, all the legitimacy features related to this
requirement are not implemented.
Avoid/Exploit Biases : the system does not implement any feature to
nurture intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of Citizens. For this reason,
all the legitimacy features related to this requirement are not imple-
mented.
7.3 Airesis
Airesis is an open-source Social Network for Online Democracy, Online
Participation, and Online Deliberation developed by a team of Italian de-
velopers5. Airesis supplies a browser version and a mobile app version, as
showed in the figure 7.10, and the browser version is developed by following
standards of responsivity (figure 7.11).
Figure 7.10: Browser and mobile version of Airesis
Users can sign-in in Airesis by creating a dedicated account or by using
accounts of the most-known Social Web, as showed in figure 7.12. When users
sign-in for the first time in Airesis, they are welcomed by an on-boarding
system6 that exposes the main features of the system and the main areas of
5More information about the Airesis project are available at the following address:
https://www.airesis.eu/.
6For more information about on-boarding systems read the chapter 8.1.
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Table 7.2: The legitimacy features implemented by Agora Townhall
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DELIBERATIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
D-MUST-1 Must be accessible 3 5 5 5
D-MUST-2 Must be open 3 3 3 3 3 3
D-MUST-3 Must be reliable 3 3 5 3 3 3 5
D-MUST-4 Must be traceable 3 5
D-MUST-5 Must be transparent 5
D-MUST-6 Must be unobstructed 3 3 3 3 3 3 5
D-COULD-1 Could be asynchronous 3 3
D-COULD-2 Could be continuous 3 3 3 3 3
D-COULD-3 Could be distributed 3 3
D-COULD-4 Could be interconnected 5
D-COULD-5 Could be interdependent 5
D-COULD-6 Could be ubiquitous 3 3 3 3 3
CITIZENS
CODE DESCRIPTION
C-MUST-1 Must be capable 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-2 Must be conscientious 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-3 Must be educated 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-4 Must be motivated 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-5 Must be purposed 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-6 Must be respectful 5 5 5 5
INPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
I-MUST-1 Must be balanced 3 3 5 3 3 3 5
I-MUST-2 Must be diverse 3 3 5 3 3 3 5
I-MUST-3 Must be informed 5 5
I-MUST-4 Must be interesting 5 5 5
I-MUST-5 Must be justified 5 5
I-MUST-6 Must be pluralistic 3 3 5 3 3 3 5
DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES
CODE DESCRIPTION
DMP-ALLOW-1
Must allow mind
changing
3 3
DMP-ALLOW-2
Must allow majority
rule
5 5
DMP-AVOID-1
Must avoid social
domination
3 3 5 5 5 5
DMP-AVOID-2 Must avoid hierarchies 3 3 3 3 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-1 Must foster learning 3 3 3 5 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-2 Must foster mastering 3 3 3 5 5 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-3 Must foster persuasion 5 5 5 5
DMP-GRANT-1 Must grant anonymity 3 3 3 5 5 5 5
DMP-GRANT-2 Must grant egalitarianism 3 3 3 3 3 5 5
OUTPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
O-MUST-1 Must be accountable 3 5
O-MUST-2 Must be effective 5 3 3 3 5
O-MUST-3 Must be monitored 3 5
O-MUST-4 Must be revisable 3 5
O-SHOULD-1 Should be efficient 5 3 3 3 5
O-SHOULD-2 Should be satisfying 5 3 3 3 5 5
INSTITUTIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
IN-AVOID-1 Must avoid domination 3 5 3 3 3 5 5 5 5
IN-AVOID-2
Must avoid rooted
partisanship
3 5
IN-AVOID-3 Must avoid tightness 3 5
IN-GRANT-1
Must grant authority
to deliberations
3
IN-GRANT-2
Must grant egalitarianism
to participants
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5
IN-GRANT-3
Must grant freedom
to deliberate
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5
IN-GRANT-4
Must grant incentives
to deliberate
3 5 5 5
IN-GRANT-5
Must grant political equality
to citizens
3 3 3
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Figure 7.11: A responsive page in Airesis
its start page (figure 7.13). At the moment of writing, the system is down
for maintenance, for this reason all of the following information are extracted
from the Web site of the Airesis project, and from video guides supplied by
the Airesis developers.
Airesis supplies two main spaces for the Deliberation, the common space
and the group space. The common space is divided into two areas (figure
7.14), the proposals section in which users can proposes their ideas and vote
the ones of other Citizens, and the calendar section in which users can see
the scheduling of public events, like weekly meetings and public elections.
In the group space (figure 7.15), users can access to the deliberation groups
to which they belong, and each one of them contains a dedicated blog, a
proposals section, and a calendar section.
In both the groups and the common space of Airesis it is possible to
create proposals or to support proposals made to other Citizens. Proposals
are composed by an issue to be solved, a goal to be reached and a generic text
describing the proposal, and can be supported by single persons or by groups
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Figure 7.12: The sign-in page of Airesis
Figure 7.13: The on-boarding system of Airesis
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Figure 7.14: The common space of Airesis
Figure 7.15: The groups space of Airesis
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Figure 7.16: Creation of proposals, ranks and comments in Airesis
(7.16). As showed in figure 7.16, proposals in Airesis have a rank and a score,
and after users have created the proposal their goal becomes to increase its
score and rank. In order to do so, Airesis supplies a ranked commenting
system: Citizens can comment proposals and rank the comments that other
Citizens have made on proposals. Authors of proposals must follow the
discussion, must select the most ranked comments and, if they agree with
them, they can modify their proposals according to received comments (figure
7.16).
When users create proposals they have to choose a quorum that the pro-
posal must receive in order to pass to the ballot phase. Users can choose
among four different types of quorum, the fast quorum, the long quorum,
the good score quorum, and the standard quorum7. Creators of deliberation
groups can chose a default quorum for proposals discussed in the group, and
create custom types of quorum (figure 7.17).
As I have previously stated in this section, proposals have a rank and
7More information about the differences among the four type of quorums are available
on the Web page of the Airesis project (https://www.airesis.eu/).
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Figure 7.17: A custom type of quorum in Airesis
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Figure 7.18: The history of the modifies of proposals in Airesis
a score (figure 7.16). The score is the amount of positive consensus that
proposals receive, the rank is the total amount of votes that proposals receive.
Users can evaluate proposals by giving their positive or negative consensus
to them, and evaluate comments by giving a positive, negative or neutral
consensus to them. Users are always allowed to change their preference on a
proposal or a comment and, if the authors modify their proposals, users can
access to the modification history in order to check them (figure 7.18).
In Airesis, deliberations on proposals can be made in anonymous way, so
the author of proposals or the administrator of deliberative groups can chose
to allow Citizen to comment proposals anonymously. However, when the
deliberation phases end, all comments are collected in reports and matched
in them with their author in a transparent and non-anonymous way.
When proposals reach the needed quorum, authors of them must create
a ballot event in the calendar, in which they must specify a period for the
voting of the proposal (figure 7.19). ). Although at the moment of writing
it is not possible to access ballots in order to describe them, the authors of
Airesis state on the project Web site that ballots are managed by means of
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Figure 7.19: A list of proposals that reached the voting phase in Airesis
Schulze evaluation8.
Table 7.7 and the following list expose a summary of the legitimacy fea-
tures implemented by the Airesis project in relation to the requirements for
their implementation that I have exposed in chapter 6.
Linked Open Data Technologies: the Web page of the project dedicated
to its features does not provide any statement on the availability of the
produced reports in any format compliant to the Linked Open Data
standards. Also, after having explored the system, due to its functional
issues at the moment of writing, I have not found any way to univocally
identify the proposals under discussion.
Responsiveness: the system design is responsive and a mobile application
is provided. For this reason all the features related to the requirement
of the responsive design are implemented.
Inclusiveness and Usability: although the system is responsive, it does
not use any framework that follows by default standards and guide-
8More information about the Schulze method are available at the following Web page:
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze method).
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lines of usability and inclusiveness. For this reason, all of the features
granted by these two requirements must be considered as not imple-
mented.
Deliberative Interaction and Deliberative Consensus : Although dif-
ferent communication modes are not enhanced, the deliberation is struc-
tured as a forum and, for this reason, there are no limitations on the
types of contents that users can introduce in deliberations.
Although different communication modes are not enhanced, the de-
liberation is structured as a forum and, for this reason, there are no
limitations on the types of contents that users can introduce in delib-
erations.
Airesis includes a small app tour at the first sign-in, and this can be
considered as an attempt to foster the learning of the platform. How-
ever, the system does not implement any mechanism to drive user to
master the system.
For what concerns the voting mechanisms, Airesis allows Citizens to
change their mind at any moment, and the final computation of ap-
proved proposals is made by means of different methods based on the
majority rule.
Nurture Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: with the exception of the
initial app tour provided to users to learn the system, Airesis does not
implement any feature to nurture intrinsic and extrinsic motivations
of Citizens. For this reason, all the legitimacy features related to this
requirement are not implemented.
Avoid/Exploit Biases: Airesis allows Citizens to discuss in a temporary
anonymous mode and, for this reason, avoids the authority bias effect
and the lucifer effect related to social domination that I have exposed
in section 6.5. The system does not implement any other features to
avoid or exploit other biases related to decision-making procedures.
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Table 7.3: The legitimacy features implemented by Airesis
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DELIBERATIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
D-MUST-1 Must be accessible 3 5 5 5
D-MUST-2 Must be open 3 3 3 5 3 5
D-MUST-3 Must be reliable 3 3 5 5 3 5 5
D-MUST-4 Must be traceable 3 5
D-MUST-5 Must be transparent 5
D-MUST-6 Must be unobstructed 3 3 3 5 3 5 5
D-COULD-1 Could be asynchronous 3 3
D-COULD-2 Could be continuous 3 3 5 3 5
D-COULD-3 Could be distributed 3 3
D-COULD-4 Could be interconnected 5
D-COULD-5 Could be interdependent 5
D-COULD-6 Could be ubiquitous 3 3 5 3 5
CITIZENS
CODE DESCRIPTION
C-MUST-1 Must be capable 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-2 Must be conscientious 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-3 Must be educated 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-4 Must be motivated 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-5 Must be purposed 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-6 Must be respectful 5 5 5 5
INPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
I-MUST-1 Must be balanced 3 3 5 5 3 5 5
I-MUST-2 Must be diverse 3 3 5 5 3 5 5
I-MUST-3 Must be informed 5 5
I-MUST-4 Must be interesting 5 5 5
I-MUST-5 Must be justified 5 5
I-MUST-6 Must be pluralistic 3 3 5 5 3 5 5
DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES
CODE DESCRIPTION
DMP-ALLOW-1
Must allow mind
changing
3 3
DMP-ALLOW-2
Must allow majority
rule
3 3
DMP-AVOID-1
Must avoid social
domination
3 3 5 5 5 5
DMP-AVOID-2 Must avoid hierarchies 3 3 3 3 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-1 Must foster learning 5 3 5 3 3 3
DMP-FOSTER-2 Must foster mastering 5 3 5 5 5 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-3 Must foster persuasion 3 3 5 5
DMP-GRANT-1 Must grant anonymity 3 3 3 3 3 5 3
DMP-GRANT-2 Must grant egalitarianism 3 3 3 3 3 5 5
OUTPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
O-MUST-1 Must be accountable 3 5
O-MUST-2 Must be effective 5 5 3 5 5
O-MUST-3 Must be monitored 3 5
O-MUST-4 Must be revisable 3 5
O-SHOULD-1 Should be efficient 5 5 3 5 5
O-SHOULD-2 Should be satisfying 5 5 3 5 5 5
INSTITUTIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
IN-AVOID-1 Must avoid domination 3 5 5 3 5 3 3 5 3
IN-AVOID-2
Must avoid rooted
partisanship
3 5
IN-AVOID-3 Must avoid tightness 3 5
IN-GRANT-1
Must grant authority
to deliberations
3
IN-GRANT-2
Must grant egalitarianism
to participants
3 3 3 5 3 5 3 3 5 3
IN-GRANT-3
Must grant freedom
to deliberate
3 3 3 5 3 5 3 3 5
IN-GRANT-4
Must grant incentives
to deliberate
3 5 5 5
IN-GRANT-5
Must grant political equality
to citizens
3 3 3
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7.4 DemocracyOS
DemocracyOS is a web and mobile open-source software for deliberating
and voting democratic proposals9. The software was developed by Democra-
ciaEnRed, a foundation aimed to produce software for improving Democratic
systems10. DemocracyOS is currently used by several institutions, like the
Open Knowledge Foundation of Brasil and the City of Paris11.
Figure 7.20: A screen-shoot of DemocracyOS in different devices. Courtesy of Democ-
racyOS
The DemocracyOS application is designed to properly work in browsers
and in the most-known mobile devices (figure 7.20), and relies on modern
web technologies like React, Node.JS and MongoDB12. The design follows
common standards of inclusiveness, responsiveness and usability, and adapts
to the screen by following directives similar to the ones proposed by the
Material Design. Figure 7.21 shows the home page of DemocracyOS in a
Web browser with small size.
9More information about DemocracyOS are available on DemocracyOS Web site
(http://democracyos.org/).
10More information about the DemocraciaEnRed foundation are available on the foun-
dation Web site (http://democraciaenred.org/en/).
11A full list of the Institution that are using DemocracyOS is available on the GitHub
page of the project (https://github.com/DemocracyOS/democracyos).
12For more information about the listed technologies read the chapter 10.
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Figure 7.21: A screen-shoot of the home page of DemocracyOS
Figure 7.22: A screen-shoot of an argument proposed in DemocracyOS
The access to the software is granted by providing an e-mail address and
the user first name and surname. Although it is possible to provide a fake
e-mail and a fake name, all the interactions made in the application and all
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Figure 7.23: The form for the creation of arguments in DemocracyOS
Figure 7.24: An argument in DemocracyOS
the arguments proposed for discussion are clearly addressed to their authors,
as showed in figures 7.21 and 7.22.
Users of the system can create arguments for deliberation called “Democ-
racies”, and it is possible to assign an URI, a title, a summary and a cover
image to the created Democracies (figure 7.23). When users complete the
creation of arguments, they enter the system and can be seen and discussed
by other users (figure 7.24).
Although users can assign a URI to their democracies, the arguments are
not accessible in machine-readable ways and, for this reason, the inputs of
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DemocracyOS can be used only by the system and not by other software.
An exception is the list of comments made by users on topics related to
democracies. Indeed, they can be downloaded in CSV format13 and thus
used as input for other software, but the download must be done manually
by users, meaning that software can not connect and download automatically
the comments on topics. .
As previously stated, users can create topics on Democracies by filling a
form in which they provide several information, as showed in figures 7.25,
7.26 and 7.27. The topics can be structured as generic discussions, voting
sessions or polling sessions. According to the typology of topic, users have
different ways to express their opinion. If topics are structured as polls, users
can vote by choosing among the options provided by the topic creator, as
showed in figures 7.28 and 7.29. If topics are structured as ballots, users
can choose to vote “Yea”, “Nay” or “Abstain”, as showed in figure 7.30. In
both the types of topics users are allowed to change their preference at any
moment, as showed in figures 7.31, and 7.28, and when the time allocated
to the voting sessions ends, the results are computed and all users can see
them (figure 7.28 and reffig:demOS-13)). Until topics are opened, users can
discuss by using a commenting system placed in the bottom of the topic’s
page. As showed in figure 7.33, users can send comments, reply to comments
of other users, and give a “plus one” or a “minus one” to comments of other
users.
13The Comma Separated Value is a textual file format for representing data contained
in database or in spreadsheets (http://edoceo.com/utilitas/csv-file-format).
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Figure 7.25: The creation of a topic in DemocracyOS - part 1
Figure 7.26: The creation of a topic in DemocracyOS - part 2
Figure 7.27: The creation of a topic in DemocracyOS - part 3
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Figure 7.28: A pool in DemocracyOS
Figure 7.29: The votes on a pool in DemocracyOS
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Figure 7.30: A ballot in DemocracyOS
Figure 7.31: The votes on a ballot in DemocracyOS
Figure 7.32: A closed ballot in DemocracyOS
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Figure 7.33: The commenting system in DemocracyOS
Table 7.4 and the following list expose a summary of the legitimacy fea-
tures implemented by DemocracyOS in relation to the requirements for their
implementation that I have exposed in chapter 6.
Linked Open Data Technologies: the system only implements mecha-
nisms to univocally identify arguments and topics. The system pro-
duces only CSV files of the comments that topics receive, but the files
can not be automatically downloaded by other software. For this rea-
son, all the legitimacy features related to this requirement are not im-
plemented.
Inclusiveness, Responsiveness, and Usability: by relying on guidelines
similar to the ones proposed by Material Design, the interface of the
system can be considered by default, at least partially, inclusive, re-
sponsive and usable. All the legitimacy features related to these re-
quirements must be considered implemented by inheritance.
Deliberative Interaction and Deliberative Consensus: the system im-
plements mechanisms to allow Citizens to change their preferences, and
does not implement any mechanism to discriminate among different
users, and so avoid hierarchies and grant egalitarianism to Citizens.
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The commenting system does not foster the use of other communica-
tion modes than simple text, but is structured as a free forum and,
so, can be used to persuade users. Although the comments do not
grant the anonymity of Citizens, votes and preferences can be cast in
anonymous way and, so, the system avoids social domination. However,
DemocracyOS does not supply any mechanism to foster the learning
and mastering of the system and of deliberative capacities of Citizens.
For what concerns the computation of the results of ballots, Democ-
racyOS implements the mechanisms based on the Combined Approval
Voting exposed in section 8.6 and, so, relies on a certain kind of ma-
jority rule.
Nurture Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: the system does not im-
plement any feature to nurture intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of
Citizens. For this reason, all the legitimacy features related to this
requirement are not implemented.
Avoid/Exploit Biases: the system does not implement any feature to avoid
or exploit biases related to decision-making procedures. For this reason,
all the legitimacy features related to this requirement are not imple-
mented.
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Table 7.4: The legitimacy features implemented by DemocracyOS
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DELIBERATIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
D-MUST-1 Must be accessible 3 3 3 3
D-MUST-2 Must be open 3 3 3 3 3 3
D-MUST-3 Must be reliable 3 3 5 3 3 3 5
D-MUST-4 Must be traceable 3 5
D-MUST-5 Must be transparent 5
D-MUST-6 Must be unobstructed 3 3 3 3 3 3 5
D-COULD-1 Could be asynchronous 3 3
D-COULD-2 Could be continuous 3 3 3 3 3
D-COULD-3 Could be distributed 3 3
D-COULD-4 Could be interconnected 5
D-COULD-5 Could be interdependent 5
D-COULD-6 Could be ubiquitous 3 3 3 3 3
CITIZENS
CODE DESCRIPTION
C-MUST-1 Must be capable 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-2 Must be conscientious 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-3 Must be educated 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-4 Must be motivated 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-5 Must be purposed 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-6 Must be respectful 5 5 5 5
INPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
I-MUST-1 Must be balanced 3 3 5 3 3 3 5
I-MUST-2 Must be diverse 3 3 5 3 3 3 5
I-MUST-3 Must be informed 5 5
I-MUST-4 Must be interesting 5 5 5
I-MUST-5 Must be justified 5 5
I-MUST-6 Must be pluralistic 3 3 5 3 3 3 5
DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES
CODE DESCRIPTION
DMP-ALLOW-1
Must allow mind
changing
3 3
DMP-ALLOW-2
Must allow majority
rule
3 3
DMP-AVOID-1
Must avoid social
domination
3 3 5 3 5 5
DMP-AVOID-2 Must avoid hierarchies 3 3 3 3 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-1 Must foster learning 3 3 3 5 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-2 Must foster mastering 3 3 3 5 5 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-3 Must foster persuasion 5 5 5 5
DMP-GRANT-1 Must grant anonymity 3 3 3 5 3 5 5
DMP-GRANT-2 Must grant egalitarianism 3 3 3 3 3 5 5
OUTPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
O-MUST-1 Must be accountable 3 5
O-MUST-2 Must be effective 5 3 3 3 5
O-MUST-3 Must be monitored 3 5
O-MUST-4 Must be revisable 3 5
O-SHOULD-1 Should be efficient 5 3 3 3 5
O-SHOULD-2 Should be satisfying 5 3 3 3 5 5
INSTITUTIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
IN-AVOID-1 Must avoid domination 3 5 3 3 3 5 3 5 5
IN-AVOID-2
Must avoid rooted
partisanship
3 5
IN-AVOID-3 Must avoid tightness 3 5
IN-GRANT-1
Must grant authority
to deliberations
3
IN-GRANT-2
Must grant egalitarianism
to participants
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5
IN-GRANT-3
Must grant freedom
to deliberate
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5
IN-GRANT-4
Must grant incentives
to deliberate
3 5 5 5
IN-GRANT-5
Must grant political equality
to citizens
3 3 3
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7.5 GovTrack
GovTrack is a project developed by Civic Impulse14, aimed to allow Cit-
izens to track their preferred bills for updates, and support or not them by
expressing their sentiment on bills by means of emoticons and by sharing the
bill status on the most-known social web 15.
Figure 7.34: The home page of GovTrack
GovTrack is designed to be responsive but does not rely on any standard
framework to enhance its usability and inclusiveness. The system can be
accessed by using social web accounts or by creating a dedicated account
(figure 7.35)). When users access GovTrack they can create “trackers” by
using the top menu bar (figure 7.36); these are tools to follow the legislative
procedures and the Democratic procedures of the United States.
14More information about Civic Impulse are available at the following address:
https://civicimpulse.com/
15More information about GovTrack are available on the project Web site
(https://www.govtrack.us/about).
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Figure 7.35: The log-in page of GovTrack
Figure 7.36: The menu bar of GovTrack
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Trackers can be created on the Members of Congress, Bills and Resolu-
tions, Voting Records and Committees, as showed in figure 7.37. Although
the resources that can be tracked are different the creation of trackers is
identical for each type or resource. When users enter a section, GovTrack
lists a set of resources that can be tracked; as an example, figure 7.38 shows
the list of the “hot bills”.
Figure 7.37: The resources that can be tracked in GovTrack
Figure 7.38: The list of hot bills in GovTrack
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Users can select Bills and see useful information about them, for instance
the date of introduction of the bill (figure 7.39), or they can see the complete
work-flow of Bills, with specific information for each step of its process to-
wards an eventual enactment (figure 7.40)). Another important information
that users can see, as showed in figure 7.40, is the probability that Bills have
of being enacted.
Figure 7.39: Generic information of Bills in GovTrack
Users of GovTrack have a very limited set of actions that they can per-
form. More specifically they can create trackers, share bills on social web
sites, call the congress, and express their feelings on the bill by using a set of
emoticons displayed on the top of the page (figure 7.39). When users create
new tracks, they can choose to receive daily or weekly updates about the
status of the bill they want to track, as showed in figure 7.41.
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Figure 7.40: The work-flow of Bills in GovTrack
Figure 7.41: The creation of a tracker in GovTrack
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By clicking on the “call congress” button, users can insert their address
and request to call the congress to support or oppose bills, as showed in figure
7.42, and the system supplies them useful information on how to contact the
Congress and the Senators related to bills they are tracking, as showed in
figure 7.43.
Figure 7.42: A call to Congress in GovTrack
GovTrack strongly relies on Linked Open Data. Every resource that
can be tracked in GovTrack, or data that GovTrack produces, is marked-
up in XML. For instance, as showed in figure 7.44, the bills are retrieved
from the U.S. Government Public Office16, and all the resources produced by
16The U.S. Government Public Office is the authority of the United States that has in
charge to publish and distributing all the documents related to Democratic procedures of
the U.S. (https://www.gpo.gov/about/).
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Figure 7.43: Instructions to call the Congress supplied by GovTrack
Figure 7.44: The link to the U.S. Government Public Office in GovTrack
GovTrack can be accessed by means of APIs exposed in the developers page
of the project17.
Table 7.5 and the following list expose a summary of the legitimacy fea-
tures implemented by GovTrack in relation to the requirements for their
implementation that I have exposed in chapter 6.
Linked Open Data Technologies: the system strongly relies on Linked
Open Data and produces Linked Open Data. For this reason, all the
legitimacy features related to this requirement are implemented.
17More information about the APIs exposed by GovTrak are available in the developers
documentation of GovTrack (https://www.govtrack.us/developers).
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Responsiveness: the design of the system is responsive and can be properly
accessed by mobile devices. For this reason all the features related to
the responsive design requirement are implemented.
Inclusiveness and Usability: although the system is responsive, it does
not use any framework that follows by default standards and guide-
lines of usability and inclusiveness. For this reason, all of the features
granted by these two requirements must be considered as not imple-
mented.
Deliberative Interaction and Deliberative Consensus: Deliberative In-
teractions are very limited in GovTrack and can not be performed in
anonymous ways. However, emoticons and resource sharing can be used
in a certain way to persuade other Citizens to support Bills. Emoticons
can also be considered as a form of Deliberative Consensus, indeed the
system allows Citizens to change their minds and feelings about re-
sources and, although the algorithms used are not transparent, to the
system computes the hot and most trending bills.
Nurture Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: GovTrack does not im-
plement any feature to nurture intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of
Citizens. For this reason, all the legitimacy features related to this
requirement are not implemented.
Avoid/Exploit Biases : GovTrack is not designed to avoid biases of human-
beings, neither to exploit the ones that can enhance the deliberation.
Indeed, resources are sorted by the support they receive among Citi-
zens and the probability of them of being enacted. As I have exposed
in section 6.5, this can cause several issues, preventing the system to
implement all the legitimacy features related to Deliberations, Citizens,
Inputs, Decision Making Procedures, Outputs and Institutions that I
have exposed in chapter 5.
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Table 7.5: The legitimacy features implemented by GovTrack
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DELIBERATIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
D-MUST-1 Must be accessible 3 5 3 5
D-MUST-2 Must be open 3 3 3 5 3 5
D-MUST-3 Must be reliable 3 3 3 5 3 5 5
D-MUST-4 Must be traceable 3 3
D-MUST-5 Must be transparent 3
D-MUST-6 Must be unobstructed 3 3 3 5 3 5 5
D-COULD-1 Could be asynchronous 3 3
D-COULD-2 Could be continuous 3 3 5 3 5
D-COULD-3 Could be distributed 3 3
D-COULD-4 Could be interconnected 3
D-COULD-5 Could be interdependent 3
D-COULD-6 Could be ubiquitous 3 3 5 3 5
CITIZENS
CODE DESCRIPTION
C-MUST-1 Must be capable 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-2 Must be conscientious 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-3 Must be educated 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-4 Must be motivated 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-5 Must be purposed 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-6 Must be respectful 5 5 5 5
INPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
I-MUST-1 Must be balanced 3 3 3 5 3 5 5
I-MUST-2 Must be diverse 3 3 3 5 3 5 5
I-MUST-3 Must be informed 3 5
I-MUST-4 Must be interesting 3 5 5
I-MUST-5 Must be justified 3 5
I-MUST-6 Must be pluralistic 3 3 3 5 3 5 5
DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES
CODE DESCRIPTION
DMP-ALLOW-1
Must allow mind
changing
3 3
DMP-ALLOW-2
Must allow majority
rule
5 5
DMP-AVOID-1
Must avoid social
domination
3 3 5 5 5 5
DMP-AVOID-2 Must avoid hierarchies 3 3 3 3 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-1 Must foster learning 5 3 5 5 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-2 Must foster mastering 5 3 5 5 5 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-3 Must foster persuasion 3 3 5 5
DMP-GRANT-1 Must grant anonymity 3 3 3 5 5 5 5
DMP-GRANT-2 Must grant egalitarianism 3 3 3 3 3 5 5
OUTPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
O-MUST-1 Must be accountable 3 3
O-MUST-2 Must be effective 3 5 3 5 5
O-MUST-3 Must be monitored 3 3
O-MUST-4 Must be revisable 3 3
O-SHOULD-1 Should be efficient 3 5 3 5 5
O-SHOULD-2 Should be satisfying 3 5 3 5 5 5
INSTITUTIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
IN-AVOID-1 Must avoid domination 3 3 5 3 5 3 3 5 5
IN-AVOID-2
Must avoid rooted
partisanship
3 3
IN-AVOID-3 Must avoid tightness 3 3
IN-GRANT-1
Must grant authority
to deliberations
3
IN-GRANT-2
Must grant egalitarianism
to participants
3 3 3 5 3 5 3 3 5 5
IN-GRANT-3
Must grant freedom
to deliberate
3 3 3 5 3 5 3 3 5
IN-GRANT-4
Must grant incentives
to deliberate
3 5 5 5
IN-GRANT-5
Must grant political equality
to citizens
3 3 3
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7.6 OurSpace
OurSpace is an open-source project co-funded by the European Commis-
sion under the ICT Policy Support Programme18, aimed to connect large
group of deliberations with young people. As the developer of the project
states, OurSpace is a participation platform designed for the engagement of
young people in decision-making procedures, at both national and European
Level19. As showed in figure 7.45, OurSpace can be used as a stand-alone
web platform, a Facebook app, an iGoogle Gadget or a mobile Android ap-
plication.
Figure 7.45: The design of OurSpace for different platforms. Courtesy of OurSpace
Although OurSpace is supplied in different version for different browsers,
its design is not responsive, and the software does not rely on any stan-
dard for inclusiveness and usability. This causes several issues related to its
accessibility and usage on devices with small-size screens.
Users can log-in OurSpace by creating an account or by using their Face-
book accounts, as showed in figure 7.46. In both cases, all their interactions
18More information about the ICT Policy Support Programme are available at the
following address: http://ec.europa.eu/cip/ict-psp/index en.htm
19More information about the goals of OurSpace are available on the project Web site
(http://ep-ourspace.eu/Home.aspx).
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with other users are not anonymous, with the exception of the voting phase.
Users in OurSpace can be of two typologies: normal users, who are Citizens
that want to participate in decision-making processes, and collaborators, who
are special users with permission to evaluate proposals, accept or reject them.
Figure 7.46: The log-in page of OurSpace
The main section of OurSpace lists the proposals that Citizens have made,
as showed in figure 7.47. The decision-making process is divided into four
phases: the first one in which users suggest topics, the second one in which
they propose solutions to topics, the third one in which they vote solutions,
and the fourth one in which the results of voting are computed and displayed
to users (figure 7.47).
In the proposals phase Citizens can create topics and collaborators can
choose to approve or reject them. As showed in figure 7.48, users can create
topics at national or European level, and assign to topics a thematic area, a
title and a description. Users can also choose to attach external files to the
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Figure 7.47: The main page of OurSpace
proposal in order to better argument their proposals. To move to the next
phase of deliberation, the proposal must receive six likes by other users, or
it must be pushed forward by a collaborator. Figure 7.49 shows the list of
proposals created by users and the ways in which they can be sorted. Citizens
can click on proposals to see more information about them, and to like or
dislike the proposal, as showed in figure 7.50. In all phases users can vote
items just once, meaning that they are not allowed to change their opinions
and votes.
In the second phase of the debate, Citizens can propose solutions to the
debated topics, and collaborators can moderate the discussions about pro-
posed solutions. Figures 7.51 and 7.52 show, respectively, the form for the
creation of a solution and the list of solutions that a proposal received.
The third and fourth phase are aimed, respectively, to vote proposals and
to elect winners of ballots, as showed in figure 7.53. The fourth phase is a
passive phase in which all users are simply enabled to read the results, whilst
in the third phase Citizens can vote solutions by giving their agreement
and disagreement. A very severe issue of OurSpace is that, in this phase,
collaborators decide when solutions have received a sufficient amount of votes,
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Figure 7.48: The creation of a topic in OurSpace
Figure 7.49: The creation of a topic in OurSpace
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Figure 7.50: Information about a proposal in OurSpace
Figure 7.51: The creation of a solution in OurSpace
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Figure 7.52: The solutions proposed for a topic in OurSpace
so when to close the ballot, as showed in figure 7.54. As a matter of fact,
this creates formal hierarchies in the system, and can contribute to create
mechanisms of social domination and non-egalitarianism among Citizens.
Figure 7.54: The admin button to close a ballot in OurSpace
An interesting feature of OurSpace is that it supplies a system of points
and levels for users, and introduces a leader-board in which users can check
who are the Citizens that are contributing more in deliberations (figures 7.55
and 7.56). For this reason, OurSpace introduces mechanisms of gamification
that can be used to nurture the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of Citizens
to participate in deliberations, as I expose in part III of this work. However,
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Figure 7.53: A ballot phase in OurSpace
the leader-board is structured as a classical one, as I expose in sections 8.5
and 8.6, and this can contribute to the raise of biases in Citizens involved in
decision-making procedures.
Eventually, for what concerns the data produced by the system, OurSpace
does not rely on any standard for Linked Open Data and the results produced
by deliberations are not downloadable neither manually by human-beings,
nor in automatic way by machines or other software. Table 7.6 and the
following list expose a summary of the legitimacy features implemented by
the OurSpace project in relation to the requirements for their implementation
that I have exposed in chapter 6.
Linked Open Data Technologies: the system does not rely on any stan-
dard for Linked Open Data and does not produce any data in Linked
Open Data form. For this reason, all the features related to this re-
quirement are not implemented.
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Figure 7.55: The points and levels of users in OurSpace
Figure 7.56: The leader-board in OurSpace
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Inclusiveness, Responsiveness and Usability: although the system can
be accessed by means of a mobile application, its design is not respon-
sive and does not rely on any standard for inclusiveness and usability.
For these reasons, all the features related to these requirements are not
implemented.
Deliberative Interaction and Deliberative Consensus: the deliberation
in OurSpace is structured as a free forum in which users can send their
messages, allowing Citizens to persuade other users with different com-
munication modes. However, the system allows Citizens to vote any
argument just once, and for this reason they can not change their opin-
ion about arguments. Also, discussions can not be made anonymously
and special users, called contributors, have a final word on ballots This
can create mechanisms of hierarchies and social domination that seri-
ously affect the legitimacy of deliberations.
Nurture Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: OurSpace introduces a
system of points and levels and a leader-board that can contribute
to foster Citizens to learn and master both the deliberation and the
system. However, although gamified components are introduced, their
gamification design is not properly structured as I expose in part III,
and for this reason it only partially contributes to the implementation
of the legitimacy features related to this aspect.
Avoid/Exploit Biases: OurSpace is not designed to avoid or exploit bi-
ases of Citizens involved in decision-making processes, and the classical
leader-board that it introduces can contribute to the raise of the au-
thority bias, the Lucifer effect, and the confirmation bias, that I have
exposed in section 6.5.
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Table 7.6: The legitimacy features implemented by OurSpace
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DELIBERATIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
D-MUST-1 Must be accessible 3 5 5 5
D-MUST-2 Must be open 3 3 3 5 5 5
D-MUST-3 Must be reliable 3 3 5 5 5 5 5
D-MUST-4 Must be traceable 3 5
D-MUST-5 Must be transparent 5
D-MUST-6 Must be unobstructed 3 3 3 5 5 5 5
D-COULD-1 Could be asynchronous 3 3
D-COULD-2 Could be continuous 3 3 5 5 5
D-COULD-3 Could be distributed 3 3
D-COULD-4 Could be interconnected 5
D-COULD-5 Could be interdependent 5
D-COULD-6 Could be ubiquitous 3 3 5 5 5
CITIZENS
CODE DESCRIPTION
C-MUST-1 Must be capable 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-2 Must be conscientious 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-3 Must be educated 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-4 Must be motivated 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-5 Must be purposed 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-6 Must be respectful 5 5 5 5
INPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
I-MUST-1 Must be balanced 3 3 5 5 5 5 5
I-MUST-2 Must be diverse 3 3 5 5 5 5 5
I-MUST-3 Must be informed 5 5
I-MUST-4 Must be interesting 5 5 5
I-MUST-5 Must be justified 5 5
I-MUST-6 Must be pluralistic 3 3 5 5 5 5 5
DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES
CODE DESCRIPTION
DMP-ALLOW-1
Must allow mind
changing
5 5
DMP-ALLOW-2
Must allow majority
rule
3 3
DMP-AVOID-1
Must avoid social
domination
3 3 5 5 5 5
DMP-AVOID-2 Must avoid hierarchies 5 5 5 5 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-1 Must foster learning 5 5 5 5 5 3
DMP-FOSTER-2 Must foster mastering 5 5 5 5 5 3 5
DMP-FOSTER-3 Must foster persuasion 3 3 5 5
DMP-GRANT-1 Must grant anonymity 3 3 3 5 5 5 5
DMP-GRANT-2 Must grant egalitarianism 3 3 3 5 5 5 5
OUTPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
O-MUST-1 Must be accountable 3 5
O-MUST-2 Must be effective 5 5 5 5 5
O-MUST-3 Must be monitored 3 5
O-MUST-4 Must be revisable 3 5
O-SHOULD-1 Should be efficient 5 5 5 5 5
O-SHOULD-2 Should be satisfying 5 5 5 5 5 5
INSTITUTIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
IN-AVOID-1 Must avoid domination 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
IN-AVOID-2
Must avoid rooted
partisanship
3 5
IN-AVOID-3 Must avoid tightness 3 5
IN-GRANT-1
Must grant authority
to deliberations
3
IN-GRANT-2
Must grant egalitarianism
to participants
3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
IN-GRANT-3
Must grant freedom
to deliberate
3 3 3 5 5 5 3 3 5
IN-GRANT-4
Must grant incentives
to deliberate
3 5 5 5
IN-GRANT-5
Must grant political equality
to citizens
3 3 3
208
7. Tools for Online Participatory Democracy and for Online
Deliberative Democracy
7.7 WikiLegis
WikiLegis is an open-source project developed by the Hacker Labora-
tory20 of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. The software can be used by
different Institutions and it is aimed to allow Citizens to deliberate on generic
issues, to propose bills or amendments, and to send questions to Deputies.
The software works in Web browsers and, although its design is responsive,
it does not relies on any standard framework for the usability and the in-
clusiveness. The figure 7.57 shows a screen-shoot of the main page of the
instance of WikiLegis dedicated to deliberations among Brazilian Citizens.
Figure 7.57: The main page of WikiLegis for the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies
Although the issues discussed in WikiLegis have their dedicated URI (fig-
ure 7.58)), and although it is possible to manually create and download a
report of events that happen during deliberations (figure 7.59), the project
documentation does not provide any hint on the data that it uses for delib-
erations, nor on how the data produced during deliberations is serialized.
20More information about the Hacker Laboratory of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies
are available at the following address: http://labhackercd.net/
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Figure 7.58: The URI of a document in WikiLegis
Figure 7.59: A report of a deliberation in WikiLegis
Users of WikiLegis can access the system by creating an account, and the
name they supply is showed in every discussion in which they are involved.
Users are allowed to edit their name and provide fake names. For this reason,
although users can be linked to their emails, they are allowed to discuss
anonymously. WikiLegis allows users to deliberate on three typologies of
resources, as showed in figure 7.60. Users can discuss and edit collaboratively
bills, discuss on generic issues, and participate to scheduled interviews to
Deputies and ask questions to them.
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Figure 7.60: The three sections of deliberation in WikiLegis
As showed in figure 7.61 in the section dedicated to discussions on bills
users can see a list of bills that are currently under discussion and a list
of discussions already closed. The resources under discussions are sorted
by date and users are not allowed to change the sorting. In this section
of the system, users can not create new items and, after having explored
the software and project documentation , it is not clear how bills enter the
deliberation, and who creates them. However, as showed in figure 7.62,
Citizens are allowed to give positive or negative votes to whole bills and to
partitions of bills, and they are allowed to change their opinion at any time.
Also, users can propose modification to partitions of bills and the insertion
of new partitions, as showed in figure 7.63. If they do so, their proposal
enters the deliberation and other Citizens can express their preference on it.
Users are also allowed to send comments on modification proposals by means
of commenting areas dedicated to each modification proposal (figure 7.63).
When the time allocated to the discussion of proposals ends, the report is
created and it can be then used by Institutions according to their needs
(figure 7.59).
In the section dedicated to generic discussion, users can see a list of topics
under deliberation and sort them in different ways, as showed in figure 7.64.
As opposed to the section dedicated to deliberations on bills, in this section
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Figure 7.61: The list of bills under discussion in WikiLegis
Figure 7.62: The vote of a bill in WikiLegis
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Figure 7.63: The creation of a modification proposal in WikiLegis
users can simply and freely create new topics by clicking on the button in
the top bar menu (figure 7.64)). If they do so, a form appears at the bottom
of the page, and they can fill it by inserting a title and a description of the
topic, and selecting a category for it (figure 7.65). As showed in figure 7.66,
the discussion of topics is structured as a generic form, in which users can
reply to comments of other users, and express their agreement on comments
by clicking on an heart icon situated under each message.
The last section of WikiLegis is an innovative section dedicated to stream
interactive interviews to politicians. As showed in figure 7.67, when users
access this section, they can see a list of scheduled interviews and choose to
participate in one or more of them. When users participate to an interview,
they can interactively send question to Deputies, and other Citizens can vote
the questions (figure 7.68). If Deputies reply to the question at any moment
during the interview, the question is marked as “replied” and the system
creates a link to the specific part of the video in which the reply is given.
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Figure 7.64: The list of topics discussed in WikiLegis
Figure 7.65: The creation of a topic in WikiLegis
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Figure 7.66: The discussion on topics in WikiLegis
Figure 7.67: The list of interviews in WikiLegis
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Figure 7.68: An interactive interview in WikiLegis
Table ?? and the following list expose a summary of the legitimacy fea-
tures implemented by the WikiLegis project in relation to the requirements
for their implementation that I have exposed in chapter 6.
Linked Open Data Technologies: the system does not rely on any stan-
dard for Linked Open Data and does not produce any data in Linked
Open Data form. For this reason, all the features related to this re-
quirement are not implemented.
Responsiveness: the design of the system is responsive and, for this rea-
son, all the features related to the responsive design requirement are
implemented.
Inclusiveness and Usability : although the system is responsive, Wiki-
Legis does not use any framework that follows by default standards
and guidelines of usability and inclusiveness. For this reason, all the
features granted by these two requirements must be considered as not
implemented.
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Deliberative Interaction and Deliberative Consensus : Although dif-
ferent communications modes are not enhanced, the deliberation is
structured as a free forum and, for this reason, there are no limitations
on the types of contents that users can introduce in deliberations.
WikiLegis allows users to use fake names when they are involved in
discussions and, for this reason, the system avoids the formation of
hierarchies, grants egalitarianism and anonymity to Citizens, and can
be considered as a system designed for fostering the persuasion.
The voting system of WikiLegis allows Citizens to express their prefer-
ence on all the issues under discussion and to change their preference
at any moment. When ballots end WikiLegis does not elect winners,
but arguments in the final report are sorted by the number of positive
consensus they receive; for this reason the voting system of WikiLegis
can be considered as based on the majority rule.
Nurture Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: WikiLegis does not im-
plement any feature to nurture intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of
Citizens. For this reason, all the legitimacy features related to this
requirement are not implemented.
Avoid/Exploit Biases : WikiLegis allows Citizens to discuss by using a
fake name and, for this reason, avoids the authority bias effect and the
Lucifer effect related to the social domination that I have exposed in
section 6.5. However, the system does not implement any feature to
avoid or exploit other biases related to decision-making procedures.
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Table 7.7: The legitimacy features implemented by WikiLegis
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DELIBERATIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
D-MUST-1 Must be accessible 3 5 3 5
D-MUST-2 Must be open 3 3 3 5 3 5
D-MUST-3 Must be reliable 3 3 5 5 3 5 5
D-MUST-4 Must be traceable 3 5
D-MUST-5 Must be transparent 5
D-MUST-6 Must be unobstructed 3 3 3 5 3 5 5
D-COULD-1 Could be asynchronous 3 3
D-COULD-2 Could be continuous 3 3 5 3 5
D-COULD-3 Could be distributed 3 3
D-COULD-4 Could be interconnected 5
D-COULD-5 Could be interdependent 5
D-COULD-6 Could be ubiquitous 3 3 5 3 5
CITIZENS
CODE DESCRIPTION
C-MUST-1 Must be capable 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-2 Must be conscientious 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-3 Must be educated 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-4 Must be motivated 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-5 Must be purposed 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-6 Must be respectful 5 5 5 5
INPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
I-MUST-1 Must be balanced 3 3 5 5 3 5 5
I-MUST-2 Must be diverse 3 3 5 5 3 5 5
I-MUST-3 Must be informed 5 5
I-MUST-4 Must be interesting 5 5 5
I-MUST-5 Must be justified 5 5
I-MUST-6 Must be pluralistic 3 3 5 5 3 5 5
DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES
CODE DESCRIPTION
DMP-ALLOW-1
Must allow mind
changing
3 3
DMP-ALLOW-2
Must allow majority
rule
3 3
DMP-AVOID-1
Must avoid social
domination
3 3 5 5 5 5
DMP-AVOID-2 Must avoid hierarchies 3 3 3 3 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-1 Must foster learning 5 3 5 5 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-2 Must foster mastering 5 3 5 5 5 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-3 Must foster persuasion 3 3 5 5
DMP-GRANT-1 Must grant anonymity 3 3 3 3 3 5 3
DMP-GRANT-2 Must grant egalitarianism 3 3 3 3 3 5 5
OUTPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
O-MUST-1 Must be accountable 3 5
O-MUST-2 Must be effective 5 5 3 5 5
O-MUST-3 Must be monitored 3 5
O-MUST-4 Must be revisable 3 5
O-SHOULD-1 Should be efficient 5 5 3 5 5
O-SHOULD-2 Should be satisfying 5 5 3 5 5 5
INSTITUTIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
IN-AVOID-1 Must avoid domination 3 5 5 3 5 3 3 5 3
IN-AVOID-2
Must avoid rooted
partisanship
3 5
IN-AVOID-3 Must avoid tightness 3 5
IN-GRANT-1
Must grant authority
to deliberations
3
IN-GRANT-2
Must grant egalitarianism
to participants
3 3 3 5 3 5 3 3 5 3
IN-GRANT-3
Must grant freedom
to deliberate
3 3 3 5 3 5 3 3 5
IN-GRANT-4
Must grant incentives
to deliberate
3 5 5 5
IN-GRANT-5
Must grant political equality
to citizens
3 3 3
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7.8 Parelon
Parelon is a software developed by an International Non-Profit Orga-
nization originally started by members of the Italian Movimento 5 Stelle
belonging to the Italian Lazio region21. Parelon is aimed to allow Citizens
to propose and discuss generic issues, bills and amendments in specific the-
matic fields or territorial areas. At the moment of writing, the open demo
supplied by Parelon’s developers is down for maintenance, for this reason the
following analysis is based on tutorials and documentations provided by the
developers.
In order to register to Parelon, users must fill-in a form in which they
must specify a set of data for their identification, like their first name and
surname, and their Italian Fiscal Code (figure 7.69)). After having filled the
form, users are requested to complete two further steps for their identification.
Firstly they must schedule a web-chat, during which they will be requested
to demonstrate their identity by showing their ID in the web-cam. After
the chat, users will receive a physical token by means of which they can
eventually access the system and start to deliberate. On one hand, this
complex access mechanisms does not affect the requirement of anonymity of
deliberating Citizens, because they are allowed to change the public name
that will be displayed during deliberations (figure 7.70). On the other hand,
the registration procedure of Parelon is bounded by Institutions of Countries,
because Citizens must provide an ID to enter, and this affects some of the
legitimacy features of the system.
Although Parelon does not provide a version for mobile devices, and al-
though there are no specifications related to its inclusiveness in the documen-
tation, the design of Parelon is responsive and, as stated by its developers,
Parelon is designed to follow standards of usability (figure 7.71).
For what concerns the Linked Open Data technologies, the system relies
and produces AkomaNtoso documents, that I have introduced in section 6.2,
21More information about the Parelon Organization and about the Parelon software are
available at the following address: https://www.parelon.com/.
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Figure 7.69: The registration page in Parelon. Courtesy of Parelon.it
Figure 7.70: The user profile page of Parelon. Courtesy of Parelon.it
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Figure 7.71: Features of Parelon and their usability. Courtesy of Parelon.it
Figure 7.72: The download of the Parelon database. Courtesy of Parelon.it
and they are edited by means of the LIME editor22. Users are also allowed
to download the whole Parelon database, as showed in figure 7.72.
Users in Parelon can deliberate in different assemblies, public and inter-
nal, as showed in figure 7.73. The first ones are aimed to discuss public issues
and are publicly accessible. The second ones are for group of deliberations
that may have internal issues to be discussed and solved.
In Parelon, the deliberation is dived into two macro areas, the first dedi-
cated to the proposal of topics or issues to discuss, the second to the proposal
22More information about the LIME editor [197] are available at the following address:
http://lime.cirsfid.unibo.it/.
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Figure 7.73: Public and internal assemblies in Parelon. Courtesy of Parelon.it
Figure 7.74: The creation of an issue in Parelon. Courtesy of Parelon.it
of solutions to the issues raised by Citizens. When users raise issues, they
must supply generic information and justifications of the issue, and a first
possible solution, as showed in figure 7.74. For both the proposal and the
solution users can supply several information, like the name, description, and
links to external resources related to the proposal. It is also possible to link
videos stored on YouTube in order to help Citizens to better understand the
issue. When users create topics, or when they propose solutions, they can
request the involvement of a technical commission, as depicted in figure 7.75.
Technical commissions are aimed to verify the feasibility of solutions pro-
posed by Citizens and other issues related to the legal feasibility of solutions.
After proposals have been created they enter the deliberation, and must
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Figure 7.75: The request of a technical commission in Parelon. Courtesy of Parelon.it
Figure 7.76: The steps of deliberations in Parelon. Courtesy of Parelon.it
pass through several phases before being closed or accepted, as showed in
figure 7.76. During these phases Citizens can deliberate about topics and
proposed solutions and perform other actions, like sharing the issue on social
webs (figure 7.76)) or propose other solutions to the issue (figure 7.77)).
Citizens can access solutions and give their support to them in order to push
them towards an eventual approval, as showed in figure 7.78, but they are
allowed to retire their approval if they change opinion.
After the generic deliberations about topics and solutions end, users are
allowed to discuss and vote amendments on bills proposed by solutions (figure
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Figure 7.77: The list of proposed solution for an issue in Parelon. Courtesy of Parelon.it
Figure 7.78: A supporter of a solution in Parelon. Courtesy of Parelon.it
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Figure 7.79: The vote of an amendment in Parelon. Courtesy of Parelon.it
7.79)). Citizens can discuss and vote individual amendments and, after the
time allocated for the discussion of amendments ends, by means of a mech-
anism based on the majority rule the system computes the amendment that
has won the ballot, as showed in figure 7.76. During all the deliberation and
voting phases users are allowed to communicate by means of a commenting
system structured as an open forum.
Table 7.8 and the following list expose a summary of the legitimacy fea-
tures implemented by Parelon in relation to the requirements for their im-
plementation that I have exposed in chapter 6.
Linked Open Data Technologies: as stated by the system documenta-
tion, Parelon relies on standards for Linked Open Data and produces
open and downloadable data. For this reason, all the features related
to this requirement are considered as implemented.
Inclusiveness: the system documentation does not provide any statement
relative to the inclusiveness of the design of the system. For this reason,
all the legitimacy features related to this requirement are considered
not implemented.
Responsiveness, and Usability: as stated by the system documentation,
Parelon is designed to be usable and responsive. All the legitimacy
features related to these requirements must be considered implemented
by inheritance.
Deliberative Interaction and Deliberative Consensus: the system im-
plements mechanisms to allow Citizens to change their preferences, does
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not implement any mechanism to discriminate among different users,
and grants egalitarianism to Citizens. However, the access is strictly
bounded by institutions and this creates issues with the legitimacy of
deliberations. Users can use fake names in deliberations and, so, the
system avoids social domination. For what concerns the computation
of the results of ballots, Parelon implements mechanisms based on the
majority rule.
Nurture Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: the system does not im-
plement any feature to nurture intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of
Citizens. For this reason, all the legitimacy features related to this
requirement are not implemented.
Avoid/Exploit Biases: the system does not implement any feature to avoid
or exploit biases related to decision-making procedures. For this reason,
all the legitimacy features related to this requirement are not imple-
mented.
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Table 7.8: The legitimacy features implemented by Parelon
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DELIBERATIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
D-MUST-1 Must be accessible 3 5 3 3
D-MUST-2 Must be open 3 3 3 5 3 3
D-MUST-3 Must be reliable 3 3 3 5 3 3 5
D-MUST-4 Must be traceable 3 3
D-MUST-5 Must be transparent 3
D-MUST-6 Must be unobstructed 3 3 3 5 3 3 5
D-COULD-1 Could be asynchronous 3 3
D-COULD-2 Could be continuous 3 3 5 3 3
D-COULD-3 Could be distributed 3 3
D-COULD-4 Could be interconnected 3
D-COULD-5 Could be interdependent 3
D-COULD-6 Could be ubiquitous 3 3 5 3 3
CITIZENS
CODE DESCRIPTION
C-MUST-1 Must be capable 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-2 Must be conscientious 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-3 Must be educated 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-4 Must be motivated 3 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-5 Must be purposed 5 5 5 5
C-MUST-6 Must be respectful 5 5 5 5
INPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
I-MUST-1 Must be balanced 3 3 3 5 3 3 5
I-MUST-2 Must be diverse 3 3 3 5 3 3 5
I-MUST-3 Must be informed 3 5
I-MUST-4 Must be interesting 3 5 5
I-MUST-5 Must be justified 3 5
I-MUST-6 Must be pluralistic 3 3 3 5 3 3 5
DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES
CODE DESCRIPTION
DMP-ALLOW-1
Must allow mind
changing
3 3
DMP-ALLOW-2
Must allow majority
rule
3 3
DMP-AVOID-1
Must avoid social
domination
3 3 3 3 5 5
DMP-AVOID-2 Must avoid hierarchies 3 3 3 3 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-1 Must foster learning 5 3 3 5 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-2 Must foster mastering 5 3 3 5 5 5 5
DMP-FOSTER-3 Must foster persuasion 5 5 5 5
DMP-GRANT-1 Must grant anonymity 3 3 3 3 5 5 5
DMP-GRANT-2 Must grant egalitarianism 3 3 3 3 3 5 5
OUTPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
O-MUST-1 Must be accountable 3 3
O-MUST-2 Must be effective 3 5 3 3 5
O-MUST-3 Must be monitored 3 3
O-MUST-4 Must be revisable 3 3
O-SHOULD-1 Should be efficient 3 5 3 3 5
O-SHOULD-2 Should be satisfying 3 5 3 3 5 5
INSTITUTIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
IN-AVOID-1 Must avoid domination 3 3 5 3 3 3 3 5 5
IN-AVOID-2
Must avoid rooted
partisanship
3 3
IN-AVOID-3 Must avoid tightness 3 3
IN-GRANT-1
Must grant authority
to deliberations
3
IN-GRANT-2
Must grant egalitarianism
to participants
3 3 3 5 3 3 3 3 5 5
IN-GRANT-3
Must grant freedom
to deliberate
3 3 3 5 3 3 3 3 5
IN-GRANT-4
Must grant incentives
to deliberate
3 5 5 5
IN-GRANT-5
Must grant political equality
to citizens
3 3 3
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7.9 Summary of the Analysis
In the previous sections of this chapter, I have found a set of tools that
meet specific characteristics enumerated in section 7,, and I have described
them in order to investigate if they follow the requirements needed to imple-
ment the legitimacy feature that I have exposed in section 5.
Seven tools were analyzed and their design and functionality was com-
pared with the requirements that I have exposed in section 6. Two of them,
DemocracyOS and Parelon, described respectively in sections 7.4 and 7.8,
rely on or produce Linked Open Data and, so, implement the legitimacy
features related to this requirement.
The design of two of the analyzed systems, Agora and DemocracyOS,
exposed respectively in sections 7.2 and 7.4follows the requirements of in-
clusiveness. All the systems, with the exception of OurSpace, described in
section 7.6, follow the requirements of responsiveness, and three systems,
Agora, DemocracyOS, and Parelon, follow the requirements of usability by
using standard usable frameworks or designs.
All the systems are designed to rely on some kind of Deliberative Inter-
action and Deliberative Consensus and, so, implement at least partially the
requirements related to Deliberative Interactions and Deliberative Consen-
sus.
Very critically, none of the analyzed systems is designed to avoid or exploit
biases of human beings involved in decision-making procedures, with the
exception of those system that allow to deliberate anonymously or by means
of fake names. However this single feature, if implemented alone, is negligible
in order to address an eventual implementation of legitimacy features related
to biased deliberations.
Most importantly, none of the systems is designed to nurture intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation of users, with the exception of OurSpace, that im-
plements points, levels and leader-boards. Although these game elements,
used alone, are not enough to properly motivate Citizens to deliberate and
to drive Citizens to reach a consensus, they are the most used components
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in a brand-new field of study of the Human Computer Interaction called
“Gamification”.
In the next part III of this work, I expose the concepts and the literature
on gamification, and I describe how gamification can be used to address my
research goals and so, to design Online Deliberative System aimed to moti-
vate Citizens to deliberate, and to design system that can, at least partially,
avoid or exploit the most common biases that can arise in deliberations.
Part III
Models of Deliberative
Democracy for Continuous
Civic Engagement
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Chapter 8
Games and Gamified Systems
The aim of this chapter is to expose the concepts of games and gamifi-
cation, and give a first hint on how to use gamificaiton in contexts of online
Democracies. Firstly, in section 8.1, I expose the relation between games and
gamification, and in section 8.2 the concepts at the heart of games and gam-
ification. Secondly, in sections 8.3 and 8.4, I expose how to use gamification
techniques to satisfy motivations of different typologies of individuals that
can be involved in gamified processes. Thirdly, by introducing a software
designed and implemented for my doctoral research, in sections 8.5 and 8.6I
explain how a small set of gamified components can be used to improve the
design of online ballots. Eventually, in section 8.7, I briefly introduce the use
of gamification in Online Deliberative Systems.
8.1 Games and Gamified Systems
In part II of this work, I have exposed the theories behind Delibera-
tive Democracies and Deliberative Systems, and I have addressed my first
research question, listing a set of features of legitimated Deliberative Sys-
tems and enumerating the guidelines and requirements to implement these
features. In a nutshell, I have found that legitimated online Deliberative
Systems can actually be implemented and that these systems, if properly
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implemented, can solve the issues related to Representative Democracies and
Participatory Democracies. More specifically, by involving Citizens in gen-
uine deliberations before voting, or throughout ballots, Deliberative Systems
can solve all the issues related to the aggregation of votes that I have exposed
in chapter 3 of this work.
Two of the concepts at the heart of online Deliberative Systems are the
Deliberative Interaction and the Deliberative Consensus that I have exposed
in section Deliberative Interaction and the Deliberative Consensus. By en-
gaging Citizens in Deliberative Interactions, they should eventually reach a
Deliberative Consensus and, so, agree at least on a shared set of normative
and epistemic values. In other words, after a sufficient amount of Deliber-
ative Interactions Citizens will share, or at least accept, diverse and plural
values and beliefs.
based on deliberations is a complex societal issue. It is not realistic to
think that this societal and disruptive change can be achieved by simply
supplying to Citizens ways to deliberate interactively, or by simply facilitat-
ing Citizens to reach a Deliberative Consensus. This societal change must
be achieved step-by-step. Firstly, Institutions must accept the need of this
change, and they must enact every action needed to move forward to Democ-
racies based on deliberations. Secondly, several “tools” that can be connected
to Deliberative Systems must be designed and implemented to allow Citizens
to exercise their Democratic and deliberative Rights. Last but definitely not
least, Institutions and Citizens must be educated to the Deliberative Capac-
ities needed to be engaged in this kind of “every-day” Democracies. And
education needs motivations.
By using a metaphor by Simon Sinek1 [253]], while Deliberative Systems,
1The what-how-why framework by Simon Sinek states that usually human beings start
by the “what they want” and then they focus on “how to reach things they want”. Firstly,
by doing so, it would be very difficult for individuals to reach their targets because they do
not have any deep motivation that move them, and so, they may surrender readily when
difficulties arise. Secondly, even if individuals reach their targets by starting by the what,
the lack of initial motivations could make them unsatisfied by their achievements. By
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Deliberative Interactions, the Deliberative Consensus, and Deliberative Ca-
pacities are the “what” and the “how” to implement the transition from
Democracies based on aggregation to Democracies based on deliberation,
there is still a certain lack on the “why” and, so, the motivations that would
stimulate Citizens and Institutions to be continuously engaged in delibera-
tions.
As I have exposed in section 6.4, the actions of human beings are always
moved by the need to satisfy their intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Games
are proved to be very effective to nurture intrinsic and extrinsic motivations
of individuals, and this seems to happen in every kind of game, for instance in
sports [254] [255] and in other contexts, for instance when using board-games
and computer-games in education [256] [257] [258].
The core research hypothesis of this work is to understand if games can be
used to supply to Citizens motivations for: (1) improving their engagement
in online Democracies and online Deliberative Systems; (2) improving their
Democratic Capacities and their ability to deliberate interactively; and (3)
reaching a Deliberative Consensus.
In order to address a reply to this hypothesis, I will focus on Computer-
Games and on Online-Games, and more specifically on Massive Multiplayer
Online Games that are defined as follows [259]:
Definition 14 (Massive Multiplayer Online Games by Constance Steinkuehler).
Massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs) are highly graphical 2- or 3-
D videogames played online, allowing individuals, through their self-created
digital characters or “avatars,” to interact not only with the gaming software
(the designed environment of the game and the computer-controlled charac-
ters within it) but with other players’ avatars as well. These virtual worlds
are persistent social and material worlds, loosely structured by open-ended
(fantasy) narratives, where players are largely free to do as they please – slay
ogres, siege castles, barter goods in town, or shake the fruit out of trees.
starting by “the why”, human beings should be more motivated to achieve their targets,
and so, they would reach their targets more easily and in more satisfying ways.
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Before moving to investigate the possibility to use games for addressing
the hypothesis of my research, it is sure worth of notice to provide some
statistic on Computer-Games, Online Games, and Massive Multiplayer On-
line Games. Belonging to these categories are, as a very exemplifying set,
Super Mario Bros, Angry Birds and World of Warcraft.
Super Mario Bros is a platform game2 game in which players are engaged
to drive the main characters of the game, the two Italian plumbers Mario and
Luigi, to find Princess Peach who was kidnapped by Bowser, the villain of the
game [260, pp. 271-277]. Figure 8.1 shows a screen-shoot of the famous first
world of Super Mario Bros. Super Mario is deemed to be the most famous
Computer-Game of the history and very worth of notice is the number of
sold units of the game (in any of its versions) around the world, which in
2016 was stated to be over three-hundred-millions3.
Angry Birds is a Reverse Tower Defense Video Game genre4 created in
2009 by Rovio Entertainment5, in which players impersonate coloured birds
that must save their eggs from the attack of green birds. Since its first release
in 2009, three-hundred-millions of copies of the game were downloaded and,
as showed in Figure 8.26, as of today Angry Birds has around two millions of
2Platform games are kinds of Video Games in which players are mostly engaged in
guiding characters to jump among suspended platforms. Super Mario Bros is deemed to
be the defining game of the genre (http://gaming.wikia.com/wiki/Platform video games).
3The full statistics on the sold units of Super Mario, grouped by its versions, are publicly
available on the Video Game Sales Wiki Web site (http://vgsales.wikia.com/wiki/Mario).
4In Tower Defense Video Games players must attempt to stop enemies before they
invade their area on the game space. In Reverse Tower Defense Video Games players must
attack towers built by their enemies on their areas of the game space. The first Reverse
Tower Defense game is deemed to be Bokosuka Wars, created by the Japanese company
ASCII in 1983 (http://gaming.wikia.com/wiki/Bokosuka Wars), whilst Angry Birds is an
adaption of Crush The Castle (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crush the Castle).
5Rovio Entertainment is a Finnish entertainment company that develops, publish and
distributes Video Games. It is mostly focused on the casual Video Games market for
mobile smart phones (http://www.rovio.com).
6The complete info-graphic and statistics about the playing rate of Angry Birds is
available on the Web site of Atym (https://aytm.com/blog/research-junction/angry-birds-
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Figure 8.1: A screen-shoot of the famous first world of Super Mario Bros. Extracted by
Vintage games: An insider look at the history of Grand Theft Auto, Super Mario, and the
most influential games of all time, p. 271
hours of daily playing, meaning around three-hundred-eighty years of playing
every day.
World of Warcraft is a Massive Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game7
[263], created by the Blizzard Entertainment8 and released in 2004. In 2011,
the Video Games scholar Jane McGonigal found that the total number of
hours played to World Of Warcraft until 2011 was around six millions years,
that is more than the time Human Beings have spent to evolve from humanoid
addiction/).
7Massive Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game are a combination if MMOGs, that I
have defined previously in the definition 14, and role playing games. MMORGs are widely
studied in literature due to their beneficial effects on learning [261], and of the interesting
social dynamics that arise in the world of the game [262].
8Blizzard Entertainment (http://www.blizzard.com/) is a Californian Video Games
developers and distributor that have developed some of the most famous strategy games
series in the history of Video Games, including the StarCraft series that is one of the best
Real Time Shooters Video Games ever [264, p. 47].
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Figure 8.2: The number of minutes played to Angry Birds every day. Courtesy of Aytm
(https://aytm.com/blog/research-junction/angry-birds-addiction/)
to humans9. Another interesting fact found by McGonigal is that in 2011, all
over the world, people have spent around three billion hours to play online
Video Games every week [221, chapter 2]], and the number of Video Games
players is increasing every year, with them not being a media used only
by teenagers anymore. As showed in figure 8.3, in 2017 the Entertainment
Software Association10 found that sixty-seven percent of all households own
a device to play Video Games, the average age of players is thirty-five years,
and fifty-three percent of them mostly play MMOGs [265, p. 4].
One of the research questions of this work is to understand if all the
time spent to play Video Games can in some way be exploited to improve
the Civic Engagement of Citizens. Although Video Games are proved to
be very effective to improve Civic Engagement of both teenagers and older
people, it seems that when players exit the Magic Circle of games they lose
their motivations to remain active in civic activities [266] [267] [268] [269]
9For more information take a loot to the interview to Jane McGonigal on Youtube
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IiE2czrG0MI).
10The Entertainment Software Association is an association of developers, publishers
and distributors of software for engagement (http://www.theesa.com).
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Figure 8.3: Facts about the Video Games market in 2017 extracted by the annual report
of the Entertainment Software Association
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[270] [271]. The same studies also expose that Citizens have difficulties to
apply what they have learned in the Game worlds to the real world and,
thus, although Video Games are very effective to teach complex activities,
the new skills acquired by players seem to not be spendable in the real world.
To try to address this issue, scholars of games have studied a special
category called Serious Games. Serious games are created for a main purpose
different from the mere entertainment, that usually is a teaching or training
one [272] [273] [274]]. Serious games are used for training in various and
diverse contexts. As a very limited set of examples, EVACuation is a Serious
Game used to improve skills of hospitals’ personnel in evacuation situations
[275], the Microsoft Flight Simulator is a Video Game also used as a Serious
Game to teach flight bases to inexperienced airline pilots [276], and FoldIt is
a Serious Game used to teach how to fold proteins [277].
Although Serious Games are more oriented to the real life, they still have
three issues. Firstly, they are still games, meaning that even if players are
not completely in the Magic Circle, they are on the border of it. For this
reason players could still have problem to apply what they learned in the
game to the real world. Secondly, they are oriented to training, meaning
that, when players finish to play, they must repeat into the real world what
they have done in the game. Lastly, and most important, Serious Games are
actually complete games, thus they must be designed from scratch and it is
not possible to create a game on an existing process.
In Democracies and in deliberations contexts, Games, Video Games and
Serious Games can surely be used for training purposes and can therefore
be effective, for instance, to tech Citizens how to deliberate. However, as I
have previously stated in this section, one of the purposes of this research
is to investigate the possibility to integrate Games into Online Deliberative
Systems, in order to create deliberations that are able to keep Citizens ac-
tive and drive them to reach a Deliberative Consensus. In other words, the
purpose of this research is to make deliberations engaging as games are, and
not to design games that simulate Deliberative Systems.
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Gamification may come in help to address this research question. Gami-
fication is, in the software context, a brand-new branch of the Human Com-
puter Interaction [278] introduced in literature by Sebastian Deterding et Al.
in 2011. It is defined as follows [279]:
Definition 15 (Gamification by Sebastian Deterding et Al.). The use of
game design elements in non-game contexts.
Although Gamification has several definitions in literature [280, p. XIV]
[223, pp. 25-28] [211, Chapter 1], for the purposes of this research I will refer
to the previous definition 15, due to its simplicity and flexibility. Indeed,
definition 15 exposes very clearly what Gamification is, where to use it and,
so, the application of game design techniques and the use of games elementsin
contexts that are external to games. And this perfectly matches with Online
Deliberative Systems.
Since its introduction in literature, gamification has found approvals and
criticisms by scholars. On one hand, scholars argue that gamification is effec-
tive for improving users experience, and that it can be used in every context.
A recent literature survey in 2015 exposes that, at that time, there were more
than seven-hundred literature entries involving gamification studies in a va-
riety of diverse contexts, like education, online communities and social net-
works, health and wellness, crowdsourcing, sustainability, orientation, com-
puter science and engineering, research, marketing, and computer-supported
cooperative work [281].
On the other hand critics of gamification, mostly scholars of Games and
Video Games, argue that it is an over-simplification of games that relies
only on points, badges and leader-boards, used in applications without any
competence on games, or without any effective Game Design [281] [282] [283]
[284] [285]]. Even worse, scholars argue that gamification is a mere attempt
of business companies to “exploit” their employers and their customers, by
giving them false incentives to work more than they have to do, or to buy
things that they do not need [286] [287].
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Although the criticisms on gamification are very reasonable, I argue that
gamification can be effective, especially when used in delicate contexts like
online Democracies and online Deliberative Systems. Indeed, since these
contexts are very complex, it is unthinkable to create gamified applications
that simply rely only on points, badges and leader-boards. Gamified tools for
Online Deliberative Systems must rely on solid game designs, also involving
rules already inherited by the Democratic traditions of Agencies or Institu-
tions that supply Deliberative Systems, thus giving to deliberative processes
solid games structures. Also, if the design of Online Deliberative Systems
is based on legitimacy features of Deliberative Systems, and they are imple-
mented to avoid issues related to biases of human beings, there can not be
situation of exploitation of people involved in deliberations.
In the next sections of this chapter I expose the main concepts behind
Gamification, and in the next chapter I expose how to use them to design a
Gamified Online Deliberative System.
8.2 Concepts of Gamification
The classical game design identifies three principal elements in games:
mechanics, dynamics and aesthetics [288]. Mechanics are the very basic
elements of games, conceivable as the main gear wheels of a clock. For
instance, the rules of the game, the numbers of players, the ways the players
interact among each other are all mechanics. The dynamics describe how the
game works when the mechanics are used by the players. Dynamics are not
written rules but they are deducted by the players starting by the rules. For
instance, trying to conquer Oceania when playing Risk 11, preferring to collect
swamps rather than mountains when playing Magic: The Gathering12, , or
11Risk is a strategy board game that involves players in diplomacy and conflicts
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk (game)).
12Magic: The Gathering is a card trading game that involves players to act
the part of magicians. In 2015, Magic was stated to be one of the most fa-
mous games of the history, and it was stated to have around twenty millions
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choosing to cast scissors rather than paper when playing rock-paper-scissors,
are all examples of dynamics. The aesthetics are the ways through which
games make sure that players have fun. Based on the mechanics used by the
game and the dynamics activated by that game, certain emotions are induced
into players, for instance challenge in American Board-Games, collection of
resources in European Board-Games13, and fantasy in Role Playing Games.
Figure 8.4 shows a depiction of mechanics, dynamics, and aesthetics. Games
designers must start the design of games by mechanics, whilst aesthetics are
the first incentives for players to start a game.
Figure 8.4: The MDA framework in game design
Starting from the MDA framework, scholars of gamification have theo-
rized a set of key concepts that must be took in consideration when designing
gamified systems. Kevin Werbach and Dan Hunter [223, p. 82]] proposed
the set of concepts exposed in the following figure 8.5.
of players (https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/10/magic-the-gathering-
pop-culture-hit-where-next?CMP=fb gu).
13American style board-games are mostly focused on conflicts among players whose
outcomes are defined by rolling dices. In European style board-games players are mostly
engaged in collecting resources and using them in the best way possible to win the match
[289] [290].
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Figure 8.5: The hierarchy of gamification concepts
Dynamics is the most abstract level in a gamified system. It is the start-
ing point of the design of gamified systems, and is related to the emotions
that the system must activate in users such as, for instance, constraints like
limitations or forced behavior, progression like sequential levels to improve
users skills, or social connections aimed to altruism or to a sense of belong-
ing. Mechanics is the process of gamified systems that keeps users active
on systems or drive users to specific behaviors. Each mechanics activates
one or more dynamics, for instance: challenges activate progression and so-
cial interaction, cooperation activates social interaction, and rewards activate
the curiosity and progression of users. Components in gamified systems are
the artefacts that can be used in order to create mechanics and to activate
dynamics. Like mechanics in the classical game design, components in gam-
ification are the very basic elements used to implement the gamified system.
Examples of components are: avatars, badges, points, leader-boards, and lev-
els. Figure 8.6, shows a complete list of dynamics, mechanics, components,
and their relations in gamified systems.
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In order to connect gamified systems concepts and players that may be
involved in them, Andrzej Marczewski theorized an expansion of the MDA
framework [211]]. In Marczewski’s view, there are seven concepts between
systems and users in gamified contexts as depicted in figure 8.7. Mechanics
are defined by designers and are the rules of gamified systems. Schedules
define how and when changes in the system happen, like the transition of
users to new levels. Dynamics are connections among users and mechanics,
and are defined by designers. Feedback is the way in which gamified systems
shows users their results or achievements. Tokens are the virtual items sup-
plied to users to show their achievements. In other words, while feedback
represents the “concept” of notifications that must be given to users, tokens
are the actual “implementation” of feedback. Interactions are physical con-
nections among users and gamified systems, like gestures to act on mobile
applications. Aesthetics are emotions that users feel when they interact with
gamified systems.
Figure 8.7: Concepts of gamification between systems and users
In gamified systems, in the same way as games, there are different kind
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of players that the system should satisfy by means of a wise implementation
of all the above concepts. In the next section, I expose the main types of
players.
8.3 Players and Motivations in Gamification
Scholars of traditional game design have identified four typologies of play-
ers [291]. The first type are the achievers, who spend most of their time by
collecting points and trophies. The second type are the explorers, who prefer
to explore the system and the world of the game. The third type are the
killers, who have fun when interfere with the experience of other users. The
fourth and last type are the socialisers, whose main purpose is to create links
with other players by interacting with them in various ways. As shown in
figure 8.8, to motivate Achievers games must supply them a variety of actions
to act on the world of the game, while Explorers are satisfied by allowing
them to interact with the world of the game. On the other side of the graph
in figure 8.8 there are Killers and Socialisers, who are motivated by supplying
them, respectively, mechanisms to act on other players and to interact with
other players.
Figure 8.8: Types of players in classical game design
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Although the four types of players exposed by Bartle are a good abstrac-
tion of the possible categories of players that good games must satisfy, the
literature on types of players in games is very wide. Juho Hamari and Janne
Tuunanen, in their work [292] provide a synthesis of them, summarized in
figure 8.9.
Figure 8.9: A synthesis of literature on types of players. Courtesy of Hamari and
Tuunanen (http://todigra.org)
When moving from games to gamification, the types of users must be
investigated from a different perspective. As I have stated in the previous
section 8.1, Gamified systems revolve all around giving users motivations to
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use systems that are not games, in order to keep them satisfied. To match
users, intrinsic motivations and extrinsic motivations of human beings, that
I have exposed in chapter 6, Marczewski exposes six types of players in
gamified contexts [211, pp. 67-80], as showed in figure 8.10. The six type of
players are: the achievers, the disruptors, the free spirits, the philanthropists,
the players, and the socializers.
Figure 8.10: The hexad of players and motivations by Andrzej Marczewski
In 2016, a group of scholars asked to one hundred and thirty-three grad-
uate and undergraduate students to fill a survey, in order to discover the
specific components of gamification that can be used to motivate each type
of players exposed by Marczewski [293]. The result was matched with the
Big Five Personality Traits framework [294], and the scholars found that
four of the six types of players, the achievers, free spirits, philanthropists
and socialisers, are mostly moved by intrinsic motivations, whilst disruptors
and players are mostly moved by extrinsic motivations (table 6.1 and figure
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8.11).
Figure 8.11: Gamified Components, mechanics and dynamics for each type of
player. Courtesy of the HCI Games Group (https://medium.com/@hcigamesgroup/the-
gamification-user-types-hexad-scale-a6d8727d201e)
By using the proper dynamics, mechanics and components, gamified sys-
tems can drive different types of individuals in improving their capacity
within the context for which the gamified system is developed, as I expose
in the next section 8.4.
8.4 Self Improvement and Gamified Systems
In the previous section 8.3, I have shown that there are a variety of compo-
nents, dynamics and mechanics that can be used to nurture the motivation
of different types of players, in order to keep them active in gamified sys-
tems. Although the range of concepts on which gamification relies is very
wide, there are two frameworks that must be used when starting the design
of gamified systems.
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Table 8.1: Gamified Components, mechanics and dynamics for each type of player
User Type Gamification Components, Mechanics and Dynamics
Philanthropist
Collection and Trading
Gifting
Knowledge Sharing
Administrative Roles
Socialiser
Guilds or Teams
Social Networks
Social Comparision
Social Competition
Social Discovery
Free Spirit
Exploratory Tasks
Nonlinear Gameplay
Easter Eggs
Unlockable Content
Learning
Anonymity
Anarchic Gameplay
Customization
Challenges
Creativity Tools
Achiever
Challenges
Certificates
Quests
Anonymity
Learning
Badges
Levels
Progression
Disruptor
Innovation Platforms
Voting Mechanisms
Development Tools
Creativity Tools
Social Competition
Anarchic Gameplay
Challenges
Player
Points
Rewards or prizes
Leaderboards
Badges
Virtual Economy
Levels
Progression
Collection
Trading
Social Comparision
Social Competition
Social Discovery
Anonymity
Challenges
Certificates
Quests
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Figure 8.12: The SAPS framework
The first framework is the Status, Access, Power and Stuffs framework
(SAPS) [280, p. 10]. All these aspects are related to the intrinsic motivations
of individuals. More specifically, the status is about relatedness, and it is the
position of individuals in relation to others. Human beings compare their
status with the status of other human beings in order to understand their
position in the Society, since specific statuses give access to specific positions
in the Society. According to their position, individuals can have the power
to control parts of the society, or to acquire stuffs. Eventually, human beings
can use their stuff to try to conquer new and better statuses in the Society.
A good strategy, when designing gamified systems, is to keep players
active in a kind of cycle (Figure 8.12) ) to improve their status, by acquiring
access to positions that give them power to gain new stuffs. In other words,
gamified systems must implement mechanics, dynamics and components to
create a positive flow in their users, that is defined as: “The mental state
of operating in which a person in an activity is fully immersed in the feeling
of energized focus, full involvement and the success in the process of the
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Figure 8.13: Gamified Components, mechanics and dy-
namics for each type of player. Courtesy of Gamasutra
(hhttp://www.gamasutra.com/view/feature/168230/gamification dynamics flow and art.php)
activity” [295]. When users of systems are in the flow, they are proved to be
more productive and more predisposed to learn and improve their capacities
[296] [297]. However, as exposed in figure 8.13, in order to create the flow
status and, so, productive activity loops, gamified systems must be designed
to balance the difficulties of the challenges that they give to users with their
actual capacity [211, pp. 135-142].
For the sake of balancing between challenges and skills of players, gamified
systems must implement proper progression mechanisms to master all the
gamified tools that they offer. On one hand the user progress must not be
linear, to not cause in them frustration or anxiety. On the other hand it
must not be too simple, to not bore users. In the first steps the system must
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Figure 8.14: The progression to mastery in gamified systems
be simple to learn and, as soon as users progress, must supply to them new
contingencies, options and challenges. This process is called the progression
to mastery [280, p. 30], as showed in Figure 8.14.
In order to welcome players in the first steps of their progression to mas-
tery, gamified systems must implement on-boarding mechanisms [223, p. 97]
[280, p. 61], that are processes to orient new users to the system [281]. Thus,
the very first interactions allowed to users must be intended to teach them
the functioning of the system, and in this step users must be allowed to
not do mistakes that could irreparably damage their experience. As soon
as users learn the basic features of the system, they must be supplied with
new options, and the system must explain to users the functioning of them.
This process of adding new features step by step is called scaffolding, and it is
proved to be effective to both teach complex activities [283] [298]] and engage
users in remaining active into systems [295]. Figures 8.15 and 8.16 show, re-
spectively, the on-boarding system and the scaffolding system of Plants Vs.
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Figure 8.15: The on-boarding system of Plants Vs. Zombies
Zombies14.
On-boarding and scaffolding systems, especially in systems aimed to com-
munication and discussion like online Deliberative Systems, in some situa-
tions could have the opposite effect and, so, contribute to drive users to
abandon the system in the very first moments they approach it. This can
happen because on-boarding and scaffolding systems are usually designed as
layers on the top of systems and not as integrated parts of them, and this
causes too much friction. Also, and most important, on-boarding and scaf-
folding systems are usually not based on the behavior of users, but they are
designed in generic ways that try to accommodate all new users. A good on-
boarding and scaffolding strategy in systems aimed to communications can
be the so called Batman on-boarding Batman on-boarding15. With Batman
on-boarding and scaffolding methodologies, it is possible to teach users the
14Plants vs. Zombies is a series of tower defense games developed by PopCap Games
(http://plantsvszombies.wikia.com/wiki/Plants vs. Zombies).
15The full article on the Batman on-boarding is publicly available for reading on
the Medium Web Page of Jan Ko¨nig (https://medium.com/welcome-aboard/batman-
onboarding-999d19f0cab9).
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Figure 8.16: The scaffolding system of Plants Vs. Zombies
Figure 8.17: The Batman On-boarding System in Slack. Extracted by the Medium
Web Page of Jan Ko¨nig (https://medium.com/welcome-aboard/batman-onboarding-
999d19f0cab9)
8.5 Points, Badges and Leader-boards in Gamification 255
basic features of systems, as well as the new features added step by step, by
means of non-intrusive and non-blocking interactive graphical widgets, for
instance by means of chat robots. Figure 8.17 shows an example of Batman
on-boarding system in the Slack Chat application.
As I have exposed in the previous section 8.3, when users are involved
in their process toward the mastery of gamified systems, their motivation
must be nurtured by proper dynamics, mechanics and components according
to the type of players they belong to, and to specific purposes of gamified
systems. While progressing, users must always have feedback on the results
of their actions in the system. The points/badges/leader-boards framework,
that I expose in the next section 8.5, supplies the very first set of components
to give feedback to users on their actions.
8.5 Points, Badges and Leader-boards in Gam-
ification
The Points/Badges/Leader-boards (PBL) triad is the most used set of
components to reward users of gamified systems, and give them feedback on
the results of their interactions with gamified systems [223, p. 70-86] [280,
pp. 36-50], [211, pp. 81-98].
Points are the most common, and the simplest, form of reward and can
be used for a variety of purposes, such as display the score of players, or
determine the victory or defeat of players. In gamified systems players can
earn different types of points according to their engagement in the system
and to the ways they interact with it [299]]. Scholars of gamification expose
five different types of points: Experience Points, Redeemable Points, Skill
Points, Karma Points and Reputation Points [280, pp. 38-39].
Experience Points (usually called XP) represent the experience level of
the user in the system. In gamified systems, in addition to being efficient
rewards, Experience Points are useful to give a prompt feedback in response
to each action of the user. Redeemable points are used in a lot of situations,
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for instance as virtual coins in virtual economies, or to foster interactions
among users. Redeemable points can also be used to buy objects useful to
the game or in contexts external to the game. Karma points are used in
systems that want to emphasize altruism. The system periodically creates a
specific amount of karma points and dispatches them to the users according to
well-defined algorithms. Usually, users have no advantage in receiving karma
points but only in redistributing their karma points to the other users. Skill
Points, together with the Experience Points, are the most common type of
points used in role playing games, used to determine the level of a user in a
specific skill. In a gamified system, skills points are useful when there is the
need to give different roles and permissions to the users. Reputation points
are used to create trusting systems. Like Karma Points, they are distributed
by players to other players but, unlike Karma Points, they are infinite and the
system does not assign to the user a specific amount of Reputation Points.
However, they must be perceived by users as very precious resources and, so,
gamified systems must teach users the correct ways to use reputation points.
Badges are used in gamification to show users specific and special achieve-
ments [280, pp. 55-59]. They are an effective way to display the progress
of users toward mastery and are usually used together with level progres-
sion mechanisms [223, p. 74-76]. Levels are used to show users their overall
progression inside the system, whilst badges are used to display the status
of users in gamified experiences. Sometimes, badges can be used as a re-
placement of levels, but in most situations it is better to use both of them
separately.
While points and badges are used to show the individual status of players,
leader-boards are used to display relations of users based on their scores,
levels and statuses. Leader-boards are defined in literature as [300]:
Definition 16 (Leader-Board). A game element that displays the perfor-
mances of players in comparison to other players. It lists the players in
order of the points they have achieved in the game.
Leader-boards are proved to be very effective to drive users to perform
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Figure 8.18: The use of Points, Badges and Leader-boards in SalesForce
(https://www.salesforce.com)
tasks [301] [302] and to foster social connections and collaboration [303].
Figures 8.18, 8.19, and 8.20 show the use of Points, Badges and Leader-
boards in three well-known and successful gamified application, respectively
SalesForce16, CodeCademy17, and Samsung Nation18.
A very critical point when implementing gamified systems for online
Democracies is the use of Leader-boards. Indeed, although it is possible
to use different kinds of leader-boards in different systems to produce dif-
ferent effects in users [304]], such as absolute, relative and non-competitive
leader-boards[211, pp. 88-91], there is a need to investigate proper leader-
boards that do not harm the legitimacy of online Democracies by producing
biases in users. Especially in ballots, Citizens could be driven to change
their opinion not on the basis of rational reasoning, but simply because of
16SalesForce is a gamified web application for Customer Relationships Management
(https://www.salesforce.com).
17CodeCademy is a gamified web application aimed to teach software development to
novices of computer science (https://www.codecademy.com).
18Samsung Nation is a web application for the community of users of Samsung’s products
(https://www.samsung.com).
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Figure 8.19: The use of Points, Badges and Leader-boards in CodeCademy
(https://www.codecademy.com)
Figure 8.20: The use of Points, Badges and Leader-boards in Samsung Nation
(https://www.samsung.com)
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the “power of leader-boards”. For instance, the rational reasoning of voters
can be distorted by means of a Bandwagon Effect (hereinafter BE) [305], so
people may choose to vote for an option not because they like it, but simply
because the majority of people has already voted for it. Also, due to the Goal
Gradient Hypothesis (hereinafter GGH), people can modify their preferences
when they see that an argument is likely to win the ballot [306].
In the next section 8.6, I define a type of leader-board that can be used in
online ballots and, so, in online Democracies and Deliberative Systems, and
I show how leader-boards and some of the other gamified components that I
have exposed in this chapter can be used in the design and implementation
of online ballots.
8.6 Using Leader-Boards in Online Ballots
In this section, I expose a gamified software for managing the ballot for the
Symbol Of The Year, that I have designed and implemented at the Stanford
University to investigate one of the research question of this research, and
so, to investigate if gamified components may affect biases of human beings
involved in online Democracies.
The Symbol Of The Year (hereinafter SOTY) ballot19 has been held by
the Symbolic Systems Program (hereinafter SYMSYS) 20 since 2012. Each
year, alumnae/i, students and faculty of Stanford’s SYMSYS vote for a
SOTY and for Other Notable Symbol (hereafter ONS). In a first phase of the
ballot, a set of eligible users are requested to propose their favorite symbols.
They can specify if the symbol is proposed for SOTY or for ONS, and the
category of the symbol. After this first phase, users are requested to vote
symbols by selecting one of the four allowed votes: NN (Not Notable symbol),
ABST (abstained), ONS (Other Notable Symbol) or SOTY (Symbol Of The
19See https://symsys.stanford.edu/SOTY for more information about the Symbol Of
The Year ballot.
20See https://symsys.stanford.edu for more information about the Symbolic Systems
Program.
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Year). The algorithm to designate the SOTY and ONS is a variant of com-
bined approval voting [307]. It allows for the expression of positive, negative
and neutral sentiments on each nominated symbols, and on the distinction
between the worthiness of nomination for a SOTY and for a ONS.
Until 2014, the ballot was managed by using a third party online soft-
ware for surveys. For ballot of 2015, I have developed, in the context of
my doctoral research, a dedicated software to manage the SOTY ballot21,
to investigate effects of the introduction of gamified components, random
presentation order, and discussion components in the voting system, and to
analyze the effects of displaying other users’ votes and the number of voters
before the ending of a ballot.
Ballots are already intrinsically structured as games. Indeed, they have
games’ and gamified components, like points (votes) and scores (the algo-
rithms used to compute the ballots’ winners), and game’s mechanics, like
the rules of ballot. Moreover, ballots can be defined as democratic only if
they rely on two of the essential characteristics of games: voluntariness and
voters’ intrinsic motivation to participate [223, p. 41].
Voting systems based on Combined Approval Voting, like SOTY, add
even more rules to ballots and so even more gamified elements. In SOTY,
voters can change their preference at any time, and they can choose among
four different types of vote to express negative, positive and neutral senti-
ments on each nominated symbol. Symbols themselves in SOTY can be seen
as game’s components because, even if they are the subjects of scores and
points, they do not interact directly with the system, so they are not iden-
tifiable as players. Also, the deliberative election of the SOTY and ONS is
designed to activate two games’ dynamics. Firstly, because in the end only
one symbol must be designated as SOTY, we want our voters to compete for
the election of the SOTY. Secondly, we want them to cooperate to elect one
of more ONS. The reason behind this second dynamic is that there is no need
not to elect a symbol as ONS, if it is already near ONS’ election threshold.
21The SOTY’s ballot software is available at this address: http://soty.stanford.edu
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In order to enact a gamified system for SOTY, two more things were
needed. The first one, obviously, was to render the gamified components
and mechanics in a more gameful way. This means making users feel the
system as a gamified one, and presenting the online voting system through a
graphical and modern web-styled user interface. The second one was to find
a gamified component to display the scores of the symbols, while the SOTY
ballot is running. The most suitable gamified component for this purpose is
a leader-board, as I have exposed in the previous section 8.5.
By starting from the above definition of leader-boards that I have exposed
in the previous section 8.5, it is possible to define a new kind of leader-
board more suitable for ballots that rely on combined approval voting. The
motivations on behalf of the definition of a new leader-board is that players
in ballot do not directly achieve points. As I have stated before, symbols
can not be considered as players, and the actual players (the voters) are
requested to choose the symbols they want to support; this means that they
are requested to assign points to the symbols. The name of the new kind of
leaderboard is sticked leader-board and it is defined as the following:
Definition 17 (Sticked Leader-Board). A sticked leaderboard is a randomly-
sorted visual representation of score-related relationships among the partici-
pants in competitive or collaborative processes.
The Figure 8.21 shows a fragment of the sticked leader-board used in the
SOTY online ballot.
In order to give SOTY voters a proper feedback about rules and deadlines
of the on-going ballot, and the perception of the number of other players,
two other gamified components were used. The first one, is a reminder of the
ballot’s deadlines and a display of participants, updated in real-time. These
were positioned at the top of those pages where users could perform vote-
related actions. The last gamified element involved is a set of alerts that was
sent to voters by email in specific time points of the ballot.
Eventually, the following is the list of the gamified elements on which our
experiment on online SOTY ballot relies:
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Figure 8.21: Example of sticked leader-board.
Gamified components : symbols, vote types, points, scores, sticked leader-
board, deadlines reminders, display of voters and email reminders;
Gamified mechanics : specific rules for voting;
Gamified dynamics : competition for election of SOTY, collaboration for
election of ONS.
The whole ballot process started on December 18th, 2015 and ended
on January 1st, 2016. The ballot was not public and voters and nominators
were selected from a list of eligible users, supplied by SYMSYS center. Voters
were divided into two categories; one category was allowed to deliberate on
nominations and the ballot, the other was only able to cast its vote without
seeing, nor participating in the discussion. All users had the same user
interface with the exception of log-in page and, of course, with the exception
of the forum section. In the first stage of SOTY ballot, starting on December
18th, 2015 and ending on December 25th, 2015, users were asked to nominate
their preferred symbols. Users were allowed to specify a category for symbols
they have proposed and if they were competing for SOTY or ONS.
Even if users were allowed to indicate a specific ballot type (SOTY or
ONS), proposed symbols run for both the ballots. The proposers’ name
and affiliation were showed only during the symbols nomination phase. The
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Figure 8.22: The dedicated section of a symbol proposed for SOTY.
system computed for each user a random order for listing symbols. The
sorting was recorded and it changed only if other symbols were proposed
during the nomination phase. Figure 8.22 and 8.23 show, respectively, the
section related to a specific proposed symbol, and a fragment of the page
dedicated to the discussion on nominated symbols.
The actual ballot started on December 26th, 2015 and ended on January
1st, 2016. In this phase eligible users were asked to cast their votes on sym-
bols. When this phase started, a first email was sent to users, in order to
remind them that the ballot had started. Users could express neutral, posi-
tive and negative preference on each symbol. They were enabled to change
their preference at any time and they could choose among four types of vote,
NN (Non Notable), ABST (Abstained), ONS (Other Notable Symbol) and
SOTY (Symbol Of The Year). Default votes of every user on every symbol
were set up to be ABST until users cast their first vote. Users that were
allowed to deliberate could choose to cast their vote without discussion, or
after having replied to a comment in the discussion about the symbol they
were going to vote. In this phase, the names of symbols’ proposers were
hidden and we activated another section in the discussion forum dedicated
to the discussions on the voting phase. Figures 8.24 and 8.25 display the in-
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Figure 8.23: The page dedicated to discussion on nominations.
terface for voting symbols without and with deliberation. To improve overall
usability inline manuals were added to each widget that users were allowed
to interact with.
The leader-board was introduced after two days from the start of the
ballot (on December 28th, 2015). It added visual feedback to the ONS and
SOTY score in the index section of the proposed symbols’ page. In the
sections dedicated to each symbol, the leaderboard added visual feedback on
amount of NN, ABST, ONS and SOTY votes. Figure 8.21 shows a fragment
Figure 8.24: The interface for voting symbols without discussion.
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Figure 8.25: The interface for voting symbols after deliberation.
Figure 8.26: A symbol proposed for soty after the introduction of the leaderboard.
of the leaderboard in the index section. Figure 8.26 shows a symbol proposed
for SOTY after the introduction of the leaderboard.
Three alerts were sent by email during the ballot. The first one was sent
right after the ballot opened, and its aim was to make voters aware that the
ballot had started. The second one was sent on December 28th, 2015, right
after the leader-board was introduced, to alert the users of this change. The
third one was sent on December 30th, 2015, and its aim was to remind the
users that the leaderboard was introduced and that the ballot was going to
end in two days.
The system was developed in order to be updated in real-time. To avoid
any bias related to devices and usability, and so to give to ballot some of
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Figure 8.27: The timeline of total amount of votes in the SOTY ballot.
the legitimacy features that I have exposed in the chapter 5, the system was
developed by means of responsive design, that I have exposed in section 6.1.
The final users’ set was composed of 124 users, 73 of them without access
to deliberation and 51 of them with access to deliberation. 85 users cast
at least one vote. Users proposed a total of 20 symbols, 12 of them were
proposed for SOTY, 8 of them were proposed for ONS. The final winner for
SOTY is the symbol depicting the flag of the Black Lives Matter Movement.
10 symbols were designated as ONS22.
In order to analyze the behavior of the users before and after the intro-
duction of the leader-board and the delivery of alerts, timeline of users’ votes
and a representation of votes in different periods of the ballot were produced.
Figure 8.27 shows the timeline of total amount of votes, and the total amount
of NN, ABST, ONS and SOTY that voters cast during the whole period of
the ballot.
Figures 8.28 and 8.29 show, respectively, the amount of votes, for each
type, that have been cast in every interval of four hours and in every day of
the ballot. By considering only the explicit ABST votes, users cast a total
amount of 1398 votes during the whole ballot. Tables 8.2 and 8.3 summarize
the amount of votes for each interval of four hours and for each day of the
ballot.
22The official page of results lists the symbols elected as ONS.
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Table 8.2: The amount of votes for each interval of four hours in the SOTY ballot.
PERIOD NN ABST ONS SOTY TOTAL
Dec 26, 9am-1pm 39 5 30 19 93
Dec 26, 1pm-5pm 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 26, 5pm-9pm 92 0 77 21 190
Dec 26, 9pm-1am 28 1 23 9 61
Dec 27, 1am-5pm 14 2 29 12 57
Dec 27, 5am-9pm 16 0 14 7 37
Dec 27, 9am-1pm 0 0 5 3 8
Dec 27, 1pm-5pm 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 27, 5pm-9pm 6 0 5 1 12
Dec 27, 9pm-1am 25 6 29 3 63
Dec 28, 1am-5am 5 0 8 3 16
Dec 28, 5am-9am 14 0 27 9 50
Dec 28, 9am-1pm 17 22 20 7 66
Dec 28, 1pm-5pm 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 28, 5pm-9pm 10 0 4 1 15
Dec 28, 9pm-1am 22 1 18 17 58
Dec 29, 1am-5am 10 0 12 7 29
Dec 29, 5am-9am 8 1 7 1 17
Dec 29, 9am-1pm 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 29, 1pm-5pm 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 29, 5pm-9pm 13 0 11 7 31
Dec 29, 9pm-1am 13 0 8 2 23
Dec 30, 1am-5am 5 0 7 3 15
Dec 30, 5am-9am 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 30, 9am-1pm 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 30, 1pm-5pm 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 30, 5pm-9pm 8 5 6 2 21
Dec 30, 9pm-1am 107 42 69 43 261
Dec 31, 1am-5am 27 10 29 12 78
Dec 31, 5am-9am 25 6 29 8 68
Dec 31, 9am-1pm 14 7 17 8 46
Dec 31, 1pm-5pm 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 31, 5pm-9pm 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 31, 9pm-1am 8 5 15 6 34
Jan 1, 1am-5am 0 0 0 1 1
Jan 1, 5am-9am 0 0 0 0 0
Jan 1, 9am-1pm 0 0 0 0 0
Jan 1, 1pm-5pm 11 0 5 4 20
Jan 1, 5pm-9am 1 1 4 1 7
Jan 1, 9pm-1am 10 3 5 3 21
Jan 2, 1am-5am 0 0 0 0 0
Jan 2, 5am-1am 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 8.3: The amount of votes for each day in the SOTY ballot.
PERIOD NN ABST ONS SOTY TOTAL
Dec 26, 9am - Dec 27, 9am 189 8 173 68 438
Dec 27, 9am - Dec 28, 9am 50 6 74 19 149
Dec 28, 9am - Dec 29, 9am 67 24 61 33 185
Dec 29, 9am - Dec 29, 9am 31 0 26 12 69
Dec 30, 9am - Dec 30, 9am 167 63 133 65 428
Dec 31, 9am - Jan 1, 9am 22 12 32 15 81
Jan 1, 9am - Jan 2, 9am 22 4 14 8 48
Figure 8.28: The amount of votes that were cast in each interval of four hours in the
SOTY ballot.
Figure 8.29: The amount of votes that were cast each day in the SOTY ballot.
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Figure 8.30: The timeline of votes for the winner of the SOTY ballot.
Figure 8.31: The timeline of votes for the first competitor of the winner of the SOTY
ballot.
For the analysis of the BE timelines of votes for each symbol were pro-
duced. The most significant two, showed in Figures 8.30 and 8.31, are the
timeline related to the final winner of the SOTY ballot, and the timeline
related to the image depicting the drown refugee Alan Kurdi, that was the
first competitor of the winner of the SOTY ballot.
To analyze the production of the GGH, for each symbol the probabil-
ity of SOTY votes was computed and compared to the SOTY score and
the probability of ONS votes compared to the ONS score. To analyze the
position-related biases, the percentage of votes for each symbol listed in a
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specific position was computed. Figure 8.52 and table 8.4 show the results
of the above computation.
Figure 8.32: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “blacklivesmatter” in SOTY ballot
Figure 8.33: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “Alan Kurdy” in SOTY ballot
Figure 8.34: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “Peace For Paris” in SOTY ballot
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Figure 8.35: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “Je Suis Charlie” in SOTY ballot
Figure 8.36: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “Face With Tears of Joy Emojy” in SOTY ballot
Figure 8.37: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “Boat Full Of Syrian Refugee” in SOTY ballot
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Figure 8.38: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “Donald Trump’s Combover” in SOTY ballot
Figure 8.39: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “Electric Charging Station” in SOTY ballot
Figure 8.40: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “Certified Vegan Symbol” in SOTY ballot
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Figure 8.41: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “Spinning Wheel of Death” in SOTY ballot
Figure 8.42: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “The Button” in SOTY ballot
Figure 8.43: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “Emoji” in SOTY ballot
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Figure 8.44: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “Darth Vader Helmet” in SOTY ballot
Figure 8.45: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “The Swipe” in SOTY ballot
Figure 8.46: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “Confederate Flag” in SOTY ballot
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Figure 8.47: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “ISIS/ISIL/Da’esh” in SOTY ballot
Figure 8.48: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “Deep Dream” in SOTY ballot
Figure 8.49: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “Representing Migration” in SOTY ballot
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Figure 8.50: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “The Dress” in SOTY ballot
Figure 8.51: Probability of SOTY and ONS votes when SOTY and ONS scores change
for symbol “Make America Great Again ” in SOTY ballot
As showed in Figures 8.28 and 8.29, and in tables 8.2 and 8.3, the leader-
board and the email alerts seem to have produced behavioral changes in
voters. Before the introduction of the leaderboard, the total amount of votes
was 653, which represents the 46.7% of the votes that were cast during the
whole ballot’s period. After the introduction of the leaderboard, voters cast
745 votes, which is the 53.3% of the total amount of votes. By summarizing,
we noticed a total increment of 6.6% of the amount of votes after the intro-
duction of the leaderboard. By looking at the amount of votes in each day
of the ballot, there seem to be three peaks.
The first peak can be seen on the first day of the ballot, when the first
alert by email was also sent. In our opinion, this is a quite normal effect
because voters were aware of the starting date of the the ballot and they
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Table 8.4: Table of percentages of votes for symbols listed in specific positions in the
SOTY ballot.
POSITION NN ABST ONS SOTY
Pos. 1 37.487 6.171 39.430 16.912
Pos. 2 40.688 6.068 36.643 16.601
Pos. 3 41.111 6.159 36.059 16.671
Pos. 4 41.447 6.009 37.928 14.615
Pos. 5 45.028 6.075 34.151 14.747
Pos. 6 41.537 6.586 37.450 14.427
Pos. 7 38.109 6.506 37.870 17.514
Pos. 8 45.094 5.803 34.002 15.102
Pos. 9 37.931 6.173 38.444 17.452
Pos. 10 38.110 5.925 38.994 16.970
Pos. 11 40.330 6.069 36.491 17.111
Pos. 12 39.317 5.826 38.570 16.287
Pos. 13 47.835 5.682 33.071 13.412
Pos. 14 38.596 5.647 38.360 17.398
Pos. 15 41.747 6.060 36.543 15.650
Pos. 16 39.694 6.132 36.516 17.658
Pos. 17 43.154 5.576 36.047 15.223
Pos. 18 37.663 6.349 39.924 16.064
Pos. 19 47.525 6.211 33.053 13.211
Pos. 20 43.482 6.445 35.681 14.392
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Figure 8.52: The percentage of votes for symbols listed in specific positions in the SOTY
ballot.
were expecting the opening of the ballot.
The second peak was on the day of the introduction of the leaderboard.
By analyzing the amount of votes in each interval of four hours, as showed
in Figure 8.28 and Table 8.2, two interesting facts are evident. Firstly, as
theorized, there was a significant amount of votes cast right after the intro-
duction of the leader-board. Secondly, and even more interesting, there was
a significant increase of voting activity right before the introduction of the
leader-board. I argue that also this effect is to bestow on the leader-board,
because users were aware of the time when the leader-board would be in-
troduced. This can have created a sort of expectation in the voters and,
therefore, they might have changed their votes more frequently during the
hours right before the introduction of the leader-board.
The third peak was on the day in which voters received the last alert, in
which there was an amount of votes quite similar to the amount of the first
day of the ballot. By looking at the intervals of time in which votes were
cast, it is possible to see that most votes were cast right after we sent the last
email alert. I argue that all of the above are evidences that the introduction
of gamified elements produces behavioral changes in voters.
The results of the ballot also show interesting psychological effects due
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to the introduction of the leader-board. I argue that the result of the ballot
highlight three significant psychological effects that can be addressed to the
introduction of gamified elements in online ballots. Firstly, by matching
the behavior of users and the timelines of users’ votes depicted in Figures
8.30 and 8.31, I argue that the sticked leader-board is effective to produce
the BE. When the leaderboard was introduced, the amount of SOTY votes
for symbol in Figure 8.31, that in that moment was supposed to be elected
SOTY, significantly incremented. This happened also when the last alert by
email was sent, but this time it happened for the symbol in Figure 8.30, that
eventually won the SOTY ballot.
Secondly, as showed in Figures 8.32 to 8.51, when voters are aware of
the other users’ votes, by means of GGH, they vote SOTY or ONS the
symbols that are likely to be elected as such. For all those symbols that were
designated ONS (Figures 8.33, 8.34, 8.35, 8.36, 8.37, 8.43, 8.45, 8.46, 8.47,
8.49), the probability of receiving a vote of type ONS was higher when the
symbol was near to score 0 for ONS, that was the threshold for being elected
as ONS. Also, for the two symbols that were competing for SOTY (Figures
8.32 and 8.33), the probability to receive a SOTY vote was higher when they
had an higher SOTY score.
Thirdly and lastly, as showed in Figure 8.52 and Table 8.4, there seems
to be no correlations between the position of symbols in the voting page and
the probability of receiving specific vote types. This happens both when the
lader-board is not present in the system and when it is present. By merging
the above outcomes and this last outcome, we can state that the introduc-
tion of unsorted leader-boards in online ballots produces desired behaviors
without introducing position-related and undesired biases.
Finally, the software developed for the SOTY and the result of the ballot,
highlighted that the introduction of a leader-board is not effective to engage
voters in textual online interaction. Only 2 of the 51 users that were allowed
to deliberate sent comments in the forum section of the online system. This
means that the sticked leader-board and the other gamified components that
280 8. Games and Gamified Systems
was introduced in the online ballot were not enough to motivate users to
deliberate.
In the next section 8.7, I expose the literature on the common gamified
element used to improve deliberation and participation in software for online
Democracy, and in the next chapter 9, I expose a meta gamified model for
the Design of engaging Deliberative Systems.
8.7 Gamification in Online Democracies
In the previous sections of this chapter I have exposed games and gam-
ification concepts and showed, particularly in the previous section 8.6, that
specific gamified dynamics, mechanics and components, when properly used,
are useful to drive users’ behavior and to engage them in specific actions.
However, gamified concepts are not universally valid and must be wisely
used depending on the context in which the gamification is implemented and
the purposes of its implementation [279]. For instance, as I have found by
implementing and experimenting the gamified ballot exposed in the previous
section 8.6, leader-boards seem to be effective to drive voters to agree more
naturally on ballot candidates, but to have no effects on engaging voters to
deliberate.
At the moment of writing this work, the study on gamification applied
to online Democracies is very lacking. Literature reviews of 2016 and 2017
show only a few applications for Civic Engagement using at least one gamified
concept and developed after 2011 [308] [309]. The surveys found that these
applications mostly, and effectively, revolve on a set of gamified concepts that
are: (1) achievements ; (2) challenges ; (3) competitions ; (4) customization;
(5) feedback ; (6) points ; (7) progress ; (8) status ; and (9) time constrains.
Even more lacking is the literature on gamified Deliberative Systems,
indeed, although it is not a goal of this research to deeply analyze this lit-
erature . No meaningful results in literature match any combinations of
the terms: “Game Elements”, “Gamification”, and “Deliberative Systems”.
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Also, it seems that there are no entry in literature on Gamified tools for
Online Participatory Democracies whose design is based on the principles
of legitimacy of Deliberative Democracies and Systems, or whose design is
focused on avoiding biases of human beings involved in deliberations.
In the next chapter 9, I expose a meta design process for Online Gamified
Deliberative Systems that I have defined after my research and personal
experience on Democracies, Deliberations, Deliberative Systems, Games and
Gamification, described in all the previous chapters of this work.
282 8. Games and Gamified Systems
Chapter 9
Gamified Online Deliberative
Systems
In this chapter I expose the gamification design of an online Deliberative
System. Firstly in the section 9.2, I define Gamified Online Deliberative
Systems and Extensions of Gamified Online Deliberative Systems. Secondly
in the sections 9.3 and 9.4, I describe the deliberation spaces offered by the
systems. Thirdly in sections 9.5, 9.6 and 9.7, I expose the players involved
in Gamified Online Deliberative Systems, their goals, and their progression
to master the gamified system. Eventually, in sections 9.8 and 9.9, I de-
scribe gamified sessions for deliberation in general and a practical example
of gamified session.
9.1 Preliminary Statements
In this chapter I describe the design of Gamified Online Deliberative Sys-
tems and their Extensions. For the purpose of this chapter I assume that
systems are designed, implemented and deployed to environments that are
already compliant to some of the requirements that I have listed in section
6.6. More specifically, the system is designed to be deployed to environments
that already have the following characteristics:
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Institutions have enacted articles of Constitutions, regulations, or laws, to
avoid to dominate the systems, to avoid rooted partisanship in delibera-
tions, and to avoid to bound the deliberations in any authoritative way.
Also, Institutions grant authority to deliberations, grant egalitarianism
to participants, grant freedom to deliberate to players, and grant polit-
ical equality to players. Lastly, I assume that any monetary incentive
needed for the correct functioning of the Deliberative System is granted
by default by Institutions.
Gamified Online Deliberative Systems are intended to be deployed on
the Internet as Web applications. For this reason, by default deliber-
ations that occur in systems are open, reliable, and transparent. The
access to deliberations is unobstructed, and communications are asyn-
chronous, continuous, distributed and ubiquitous. Internet technologies
and the Web technologies also grant, at least partially, diversity and
pluralism of inputs, and they grant to players involved in decision-
making procedures their anonymity and egalitarianism.
The design of Online Gamified Deliberative Systems does not make any
assumption on the inclusiveness, responsivity and usability of the final
systems, that must be taken care at implementation level. All of them
are assumed to be satisfied by default.
The data on which systems rely on and systems produce, are assumed to
be by default Linked Open Data. All the features granted by the cre-
ation of outputs compliant to standards of Linked Open Data must be
taken in consideration at the implementation level. For these reasons,
the strategies followed at the design level of Gamified Online Delibera-
tive Systems do not affect in any way accountability, effectiveness, the
efficacy, monitarability, and revisability of outputs.
In the next sections I describe the design of Gamified Online Deliberative
Systems, and all their gamified aspects. For the design of gamified systems, I
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have followed guidelines and strategies exposed by the most known entries in
literature about Game Design and Gamification Design [211] [223] [310] [311]
[312] [280], merging them with my personal explorations. For this reason, in
the next sections of this chapter, unless strictly necessary I do not expose
any reference to the literature on Game Design and on Gamification Design.
9.2 Definition of Gamified Online Delibera-
tive Systems
Gamified Online Deliberative Systems (hereinafter GODS) are extensible
and flexible gamified meta-systems that specify meta-requirements, meta-
structures, meta-rules, meta-mechanics, meta-dynamics and meta-components
for the creation of expansions of GODS (hereinafter eGODS) compliant with
GODS specifications and interoperable among themselves. By being flexible
and extensible, GODS allow the creation of eGODS specifically intended to
address diverse deliberative issues. For instance, Countries can implement
eGODS to discuss Bills according to their legislative traditions, Business
Companies can create eGODS to deliberate on their business models, and
Citizens that belong to Social Streets1can create eGODS to allocate funds
collected by means of crow-funding actions in their streets. Each eGODS is a
Deliberative Space, that is at the same time independent and interconnected
with other eGODS. Figure 9.1 shows a depiction of a GODS that contains
three eGODS. GODS and eGODS are defined, respectively, as follows:
Definition 18 (Gamified Online Deliberative System). A flexible and exten-
sible gamified system that specify meta-requirements, meta-structures, meta-
rules, meta-mechanics, meta-dynamics and meta-components for the creation
of interoperable gamified extensions.
1The Social Street is an idea firstly introduced in Via Fondazza of Bologna, in Italy.
The scope of Social Streets is to link streets’ neighbors in order to create connections,
to deliberate, and to solve any issue related to the neighborhood. More information are
available on the Social Street Web site (http://www.socialstreet.it).
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Definition 19 (Extension of Gamified Online Deliberative System). A stand-
alone, independent and interoperable gamified environment aimed to foster
players to reach a consensus on values, beliefs and preferences about specific
issues in specified contexts.
Figure 9.1: A depiction of Gamified Online Deliberative Systems
According to the components of Deliberative Systems that I have exposed
in section 5.8 of this work, each eGODS has its own Deliberative Space (De-
liberations) that hosts players belonging to one of the two possible categories
of players (Citizens and Institutions) involved in gamified sessions (Decisions-
Making Procedures) to persuade other players to accept their Societal needs
(Inputs) and, so, create collaboratively Democratic outcomes (Outputs) to
satisfy them.
In the next section 9.3, I expose the game spaces and the game dimensions
that belong to eGODS.
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9.3 Spaces and Dimensions in eGODS
Deliberations in eGODS occur in a continue two-dimensional space com-
posed by three sub-spaces, and in a zero-dimensional space2.
The continue two-dimensional space is the Deliberative Space, and it is
the main-board of the eGODS. In each gamified session, inputs must move
into the Deliberative Space by stepping through its three Sub-Spaces, that
are the Normative Values Space, the Epistemic Values Space, and the Pref-
erential Values Space3.
When inputs are in the Normative Values Sub-Space, they are ideas (the
why) that must be supported by players to step forward into the Epistemic
Values Sub-Space. If inputs receive a sufficient amount of endorsements,
they move into the Epistemic Values Sub-Space, in which players supporting
them deliberate about possible solutions to implement the ideas (the how).
After a specified period of time the inputs, with all their possible solutions,
move to the Preferential Values Sub-Space. In the latter sub-space, players
choose their preferred options (the what) among the ones created in the
previous step by means of ballots compliant to specified rules. If inputs
reach the Preferential Values sub-space, and at least one of their possible
solutions or implementations passes the ballot, they become outputs and
exit the gamified session, while remaining available to become inputs for
other gamified sessions of the eGODS. When players are in one of the three
sub-spaces, they must stay focused on the specific actions required by that
2Although eGODS are online gamified systems, they can be conceived as board-games.
Board-games usually involves an out-door continue and two-dimensional space (the board),
and a series of other sub-spaces (for mini-games). Aesthetics of games’ boards give to
players a first impression of the complexity of games [310, pp. 132-134]. In eGODS it
is important to simplify the Deliberation Space to do not give players the feeling of a
complex platform.
3Sub-spaces are useful to deal with sub-games phases, and they are very useful to drive
players to focus on specific situations. For instance, in soccer, when striking penalty kicks,
players are focused on that kick and they do not focus on the whole match, even if the
kick may seriously affect the match outcome [310, p. 134].
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Table 9.1: The transition of inputs from the normative sub-space to the preferential
sub-space in three instances of eGODS
eGODS for
Legislative Process
eGODS for
Business Company
eGODS for
Social Street
BILLS BUSINESS MODELS FUNDS
Normative Values
Sub-Space
Preserve the anonymity on the Web Enter the Video Games Market Spaces for children
Epistemic Values
Sub-Space
1) Modify the Bill XYZ
2) Create a new Bill
1) Create a new Video Game
2) Acquire a Video Games Company
1) Create green areas
2) Create areas for sports
Preferential Values
Sub-Space
1a) Abrogate the Article j
1b) Modify the Article k
2a) Bill titled Norms for the
protection of the Web
2b) Bill titled Right of anonymity
for users of the Web
1a) Create an Occasional Video Game
1b) Create a Massive Online Role Game
2a) Acquire the XYZ inc.
2b) Acquire the ABC inc.
1a) Demolish abandoned building
and plant trees
1b) Join private gardens to create
a shared garden
2a) Build a soccer field
2b) Build a tennis court
sub-space. However they must feel free, and they must indeed be free, to
move around the other sub-spaces to explore them.
Figure 9.2 shows a depiction of the Deliberative Space and its three sub-
spaces, and table 9.1 shows the transition of inputs from the normative sub-
space to the preferential one in the three examples of eGODS introduced in
the previous section 9.2.
Figure 9.2: The Deliberative Space and its Sub-Spaces
In the whole Deliberation Space and in each one of its sup-spaces there
is also a zero-dimensional space, that I expose in the following section 9.4.
9.4 The Deliberative Interactions Dimension 289
9.4 The Deliberative Interactions Dimension
The zero-dimensional space is the Deliberative Interactions Dimension, a
sub-game dimension itself aimed to connect the minds of players by means
of Deliberative Interactions4. In eGODS, players have ideas of their values
(their why) and, by using the modes of communication supplied by the Delib-
erative Interactions Dimension, must describe their ideas in the best possible
way to obtain the endorsement of the other players. Players can also use the
Deliberative Interaction Dimension to communicate with the eGODS itself.
Figure 9.3 shows a depiction of the Deliberative Interactions Dimension.
Figure 9.3: The Deliberative Interactions Dimension
The Deliberative Interactions Dimension is present in the whole Delib-
erative Space and in each one of its sub-spaces. In other words, players
can use Deliberative Interactions in each moment of every gamified session,
but also when they are not strictly involved in a gamified session and, so,
when they are simply exploring the system. Deliberative Interactions are
4To better understand zero-dimensional games consider, for instance, a game where by
means of five questions one player must guess who is the person that the other player is
thinking to.
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classified into two abstract classes, Continuous Deliberative Interactions and
One-Shoot Deliberative Interactions. The first category includes for instance
chats among players. The second category includes for instance clicks on
buttons to vote inputs. The set of Deliberative Interactions can include a lot
of diverse Types of Deliberative Interactions, but each eGODS must supply
at least Deliberative Interactions aimed to the following:
Exploration of the system : players must be allowed to explore eGODS
by navigating their sections and by interacting with their graphic wid-
gets.
Creation of inputs : players must be allowed to create inputs that start
gamified session.
Endorsement of inputs : players must be allowed to support inputs cre-
ated by other players in one or more ways.
Persuasion of players : players must be allowed to persuade other players
in one or more ways in order to convince them to support inputs.
Chat with players : players must be allowed to persuade other players in
one or more ways in order to convince them to support inputs.
Every time players properly perform Deliberative Interactions, they gain
Deliberation Points that increase their Deliberation Score. As I expose later
in section 9.7, when players reach specified amounts of Deliberative Points,
they progress in their Player Level, and when they reach specific Player
Levels they change their Player Status. This process is the Flow of Gamified
Deliberations depicted in figure 9.4.
9.4 The Deliberative Interactions Dimension 291
Figure 9.4: The flow of Gamified Deliberations
Deliberative Interactions award players with Deliberation Points, but
some of them may have a cost, according to their category and to their
type. One-shot interactions have constant costs, whilst continuous interac-
tions have variable costs according to specific parameters. For instance, the
cost to vote inputs can be unitary, and the cost to send chat messages can
be equal to the number of characters used in the message. To properly deal
with costs of Deliberative Interactions, eGODS must implement two kinds
of Exchangeable Points, the Deliberation Tokens and the Deliberation Inks.
Different implementation of eGODS can implement one or more types of
Deliberation Tokens and one or more types of Deliberation Inks.
The amount of Deliberation Points that result from performing Delibera-
tive Interactions must be specified by specific instances of eGODS. However,
as a generic rule, every interaction of players with the eGODS or with other
players must be rewarded at least with one Deliberative Point. In order to
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Table 9.2: Deliberation Tokens and Deliberation Inks for three examples of eGODS
type of eGODS
Deliberative
Interactions
Deliberative Tokens
Deliberative
Interactions
Deliberative Inks
Legislative Process
1) Propose Bills
2) Support Bills
1) Blue Pencils
2) Green Pencils
1) Chat with Institutions
2) Persuade Citizens
1) Blue Pens
2) Green Pens
Business Company
1) Vote For
New Video Game
1) Stamps
1) Persuade Owners of
Company to fund a Video
Game
1) Blue Pens
Social Street
1) Rate Sports
Facilities
1) Stars 1) Chat with Inhabitants 1) Blue Pens
discriminate between purposed interactions and interactions merely aimed
to earn points, eGODS must implement mechanisms to foster long term re-
wards rather than immediate ones. For instance, eGODS can give players
one Deliberative Point every time they visit the Preferential Sub-Space of
the system, and one million points to players for inputs they have supported
and that became outputs. The levels progression of players must then be de-
signed to allow them to step forward when they gain millions of Deliberative
Points. Table 9.2 shows instances of Deliberation Tokens and Deliberation
Inks for the three examples of eGODS that I have exposed in the previous
sections of this chapter.
When players create inputs they start new gamified sessions, in which
they must try to achieve their goals by means of Deliberative Interactions.
Players have different goals according to their categories and to the gamified
sessions in which they are engaged. I describe categories of players and their
goals in in the next sections 9.5 and 9.6.
9.5 Players in eGODS
Although eGODS are mostly intended to be designed to implement fea-
tures of Deliberative Systems, in which players are Citizens and Institutions,
for the definition of meta eGODS players must be abstracted into two cate-
gories, the Undergraduates and the Graduates.
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Implementations of eGODS must choose proper and not discriminatory
names for the two abstract categories. Undergraduates access eGODS in
anonymous way, always voluntarily and in any moment they desire to do so.
Graduates access eGODS in non-anonymous way, only if they are granted
the access by other Graduates or when other Graduates engage them to enter
the eGODS. Specific implementations of eGODS, according to requirements
of agencies supplying them, may ask players to sign-up with their names and
other personal information. However, as I have exposed in part I of this
work, this information should not be visible to other players for the sake of
legitimacy and proper functioning of Deliberative Systems.
Players that belong to the Graduates category are a kind of Gamemasters
Gamemasters5. They can check the fairness of gamified sessions, distribute
incentives to foster activities, and create special gamified sessions that allow
players to gain special bonuses. Players that belong to the Graduates cat-
egory are not allowed to block gamified sessions, censure gamified sessions
or players, or assign bonuses directly to players. Players are not allowed
to subscribe to eGODS as Graduates, and only Graduates can create other
players belonging to the Graduates category, or promote other players from
Undergraduates to Graduates if they want. The rules of eGODS can allow a
promotion from the Undergraduates category to the Graduates one in auto-
matic ways when players perform specified actions. Graduates also have the
final word on outputs of gamified sessions, that must be certified by one of
more Graduated in order to become official outputs.
Undergraduates are the most common kind of players in eGODS. They
create gamified sessions and they participate in them according to their pur-
poses, motivations, goals and strategies. They can create gamified sessions
by introducing inputs in eGODS, participate to gamified sessions created
by other players, and stay engaged in eGODS in other ways that I will ex-
pose later in this chapter. Undergraduates are engaged simultaneously in
competitive tasks, for instance when they introduce their inputs in eGODS
5Gamemasters are special players, mostly present in Role Playing Games
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and attempt to persuade other players to prefer them instead of the ones
introduced by others. They are also engaged in collaborative tasks, for in-
stance when they support ideas of other players or when they work with
other players to find possible solutions to their needs.
For both the categories of players, the eGODS must supply a set of roles
and a set of tasks that players can perform according to their roles. Roles
must not be mutually exclusive and can be shared between the two categories
of players, and tasks must not be blocking, meaning that players can be
involved in more tasks simultaneously. The eGODS must specify rules and
implement mechanics to allow players to master one or more roles. I describe
the design of the progression to the mastery for roles in the following section
9.7 of this chapter. Table 9.3 summarizes possible categories of players, their
tasks, and their roles in eGODS. Tables 9.4, 9.5, 9.6 are the players, tasks
and roles for the three eGODS instances that I have exposed in the previous
sections of this chapter.
For the sake of the diversity and pluralism of players accessing eGODS
and inputs initiating gamified sessions, eGODS designers must not make
any assumption on the types of players that may access eGODS and their
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Every eGODS must be designed to satisfy
motivations of all the types of players exposed in section 8.3. The motivations
of players must be nurtured to foster them to achieve their goals and the
eGODS purposes exposed in the next section 9.6.
9.6 Goals of Players in eGODS
eGODS instances must be designed to achieve goals according to the
specific purposes of the eGODS, and allow players to achieve their personal
goals. However, each eGODS must be designed for at least two mandatory
and ultimate purposes, called Primary Goals. The first one is to improve the
Deliberative Capacities of players, and the second one is to drive players to
achieve a Deliberative Consensus on issues.
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Table 9.3: Category of players, roles and tasks in eGODS
NAME OF
THE eGODS
Names of Categories of players
NAME OF THE CATEGORY
FOR UNDERGRADUATE
PLAYERS
NAME OF THE CATEGORY
FOR GRADUATE
PLAYERS
Allowed TASKS for the category
of players
TU-1:
TU-2:
TU-3:
...
TU-N:
TG-1:
TG-2:
TG-3:
...
TG-N:
Allowed ROLES for the category
of players
RU-1:
RU-2:
RU-3:
...
RU-N:
RG-1:
RG-2:
RG-3:
...
RG-N:
Table 9.4: Category of players, roles and tasks of an eGODS for Legislative processes of
Countries
eGODS for the
Legislative Process
Players Categories Citizens Institutions
Players Tasks
TU-1: Propose Bills or Amendments
TU-2: Support Bills of Amendments of
other Citizens of Institutions
TU-3: Explore inputs to
warn proposers on
issues related to their legal validity
TG-1: Check the fairness of
gamified sessions
TG-2: Propose special Bills
according to Institutional requirements
TG-3: Create incentives to
foster Citizens to improve
their Deliberative Capacities
Players Roles
RU-1: Proposer
RU-2: Supporter
RU-3: Legal Expert
RG-1: Proposer
RG-2: Subsidizer
RG-3: Arbitrator
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Table 9.5: Category of players, roles and tasks of an eGODS for Business Companies
eGODS for a
Business Company
Players Categories Employers Company Owners
Players Tasks
TU-1: Propose new Video Games
TU-2: Check the technical
feasibility of proposed
Video Games
TU-3: Find markets for new
Video Games
TG-1: Propose new Video Games
TG-2: Supply incentives to foster
the creativity of Employers
Players Roles
RU-1: Proposer
RU-2: Technical Expert
RU-3: Markets Expert
RG-1: Proposer
RG-2: Subsidizer
Table 9.6: Category of players, roles and tasks of an eGODS for Social Streets
eGODS for a
Social Street
Players Categories Inhabitants Street Majors
Players Tasks
TU-1: Propose new facilities
for sports in the street.
TU-2: Draw projects for
proposed facilities
TG-1: Allocate funds for
new facilities
TG-2: Facilitate Deliberations
among neighbors
Players Roles
RU-1: Proposer
RU-2: Architect
RG-1: Funds Manager
RG-2: Facilitator
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Besides the two Primary Goals, each eGODS could be designed to achieve
other Primary Goals and other non-mandatory goals, called Secondary Goals.
The goals are divided into three categories: the goals of deliberations, the
goals of undergraduate players accessing the eGODS, and the goals of grad-
uate players. The first category includes all the community goals and, so, all
those goals that are inherent to the purposes at the heart of deliberations.
The second category and third category include all the goals that specific
players may want to achieve according to their individual purposes. The
eGODS and the rules of their gamified sessions must be designed starting
by enumerating the goals of deliberations, then the goals that may nurture
motivations of players and, so, drive them to achieve their individual goals.
The goals of undergraduate and graduate players could be different. How-
ever, to improve deliberations, eGODS must be designed to reach at least one
mandatory goal for each one of the two categories of players. The Primary
Goal for undergraduate players is to achieve a Deliberative Consensus on the
inputs that they create, and so to transform their inputs into outputs. The
Primary Goal for graduate players is to keep the eGODS active, and so to
keep all the players engaged into deliberations.
In summary, eGODS must be designed to achieve three levels of goals: the
goals of the eGODS itself, the goals of undergraduate players, and the goals of
graduate players. For each one of them, there are mandatory goals (Primary
Goals) and non-mandatory goals (Secondary Goals). Each eGODS must
be designed for achieving at least the four mandatory goals exposed in this
section. Table 9.7 can be used to specify goals of eGODS implementations.
Tables 9.8, 9.9 and 9.10 show the goals for the three examples of eGODS
exposed in the previous sections of this chapter (eGODS for the Legislative
processes of Countries, for a Business Company, and for a Social Street).
The primary main goal of eGODS and their players can be achieved by
implementing proper dynamics and mechanics, driving players through an
improvement of their level and status, and supplying them engaging gamified
sessions to achieve a consensus, as described in the following sections 9.7 and
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Table 9.7: Primary and Secondary Goals for eGODS and players
Goals of eGODS
Primary Goals Secondary Goals
eGODS
PGeG-1: improve the Deliberative Capacities of players
PGeG-2: drive players to achieve a Deliberative Consensus on issues
PG-eG-3:
...
PG-eG-N:
SGeG-1:
SGeG-2:
SGeG-3:
...
SGeG-N:
Undergraduate Players
PGU-1: transform inputs into outputs
PGU-2:
PGU-3:
...
PGU-N:
SGU-1:
SGU-2:
SGU-3:
...
SGU-N:
Graduate Players
PGG-1: keep players engaged in deliberations
PGG-2:
PGG-3:
...
PGG-N:
SGG-1:
SGG-2:
SGG-3:
...
SGG-N:
9.8.
9.7 Progression of Players in eGODS
All eGODS must be designed to drive their players to improve their De-
liberative Capacities, regardless of other purposes that they may have. As I
have exposed in section 8.1, the best strategy to motivate players of gamified
systems to improve their skills is to design a proper progression system .
In eGODS, both Undergraduate Players and Graduate Players have a
Player Level and a Player Status. The Player Level is the overall level of
players in eGODS and their overall progression in the activities for which
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Table 9.8: Goals of deliberations and goals of players of an eGODS for Legislative
processes of Countries
Goals of eGODS for the
Legislative Process
Primary Goals Secondary Goals
eGODS
PGeG-1: improve the Deliberative Capacities of players
PGeG-2: drive players to achieve a Deliberative Consensus
on Bills and amendments
PGeG-3: supply to Citizens transparent information about
legislative processes and law making procedures
SGeG-1: acquire Citizens societal needs
SGeG-2: improve Communnications
among Citizens and Institutions
Citizens
PGU-1: transform needs into bills aimed to satisfy them
PGU-2: make the society aware of particular Societal issues
SGU-1: become more powerful in
deliberative processes
SGU-2: check the legal validity and the
legitimacy of Bills before they become
laws
Institutions
PGG-1: keep players engaged in deliberations
PGG-2: allocate funds for pubblic commons
SGG-1: appease Societal conflicts
Table 9.9: Goals of deliberations and goals of players of an eGODS for a Business
Company
Goals of eGODS for a
Business Company
Primary Goals Secondary Goals
eGODS
PGeG-1: improve the Deliberative Capacities of players
PGeG-2: drive players to achieve a Deliberative Consensus
on new Video Games projects
SGeG-1: improve knoweldge of players
about Video Games markets
Employers
PGU-1: transform ideas into implemented Video Games
PGU-2: advance in career
SGU-1: develop Video Games whose
implementation does not require technologies
not owned by the company
Company Owners
PGG-1: keep players engaged in deliberations
PGG-2: improve Company incomings
SGG-1: individuate best employers to
better allocate year-end bonuses
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Table 9.10: Goals of deliberations and goals of players of an eGODS for a Social Street
Goals of eGODS a
Social Street
Primary Goals Secondary Goals
eGODS
PGeG-1: improve the Deliberative Capacities of players
PGeG-2: drive players to achieve a Deliberative Consensuson
new facilities for sports that must be built in the street
PGeG-3: improve social connections among neighbors
SGeG-1: allocate collected money in more
transparent ways
Inhabitants PGU-1: transform ideas into sport facilities or green areas
SGU-1: acquire new competences in
architectural issues related to Social Streets
Street Majors
PGG-1: keep players engaged in deliberations
PGG-2: create connections with other Social Streets
SGG-1: acquire demographic information
on the inhabitants of the street
eGODS are designed. Player Statuses are checkpoints that, when reached,
increase the power of players in eGODS by giving to players new abilities, or
by granting them the access to new eGODS areas.
Before moving forward and explain the meta design of Player Levels and
Player Statuses, it is very worth of notice that levels and statuses of players
are always the only public information about them and, thus, also represent
the identity of players in eGODS. When players visit the sections of eGODS
related to other players, they must always be able to see their level and their
status. As I have explained in the section 9.5, the other information about
players can be public only if authorities or agencies that supply eGODS
require them, or if eGODS allow players to participate in specific gamified
sessions in non-anonymous ways in order to achieve special bonuses.
The previous statements also mean that inputs entering gamified sessions
are never accounted to specific players, but to Deliberative Groups composed
by the player who has created the input and each other player supporting
it. If the implementation of the eGODS does not specify different rules, the
summation ofthe values of all Players Statuses that compose the Deliberative
Group is the Consensus Power of the input. As I expose in the following
section 9.8, the more the Consensus Power, the more the input is likely to
reach a Deliberative Consensus, and to be transformed into an output.
The Player Levels progression must be designed as a non-linear progres-
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sion, as I have exposed in section 8.1. When players enter eGODS, they start
by Level 0, and the level progression must be designed to be infinite. When
players reach a specified amount of Deliberation Points, they increase their
level. The abilities granted to players when they reach specific levels must
be defined according to the eGODS purposes , however the first progression
levels must always be designed to create on-boarding systems and, every
time players change their status, they must be granted to access new areas
of eGODS or to use new tools, in order to implement scaffolding systems.
The set of statuses that players can unblock must follow a metaphor to
be more engaging and clear to players. The eGODS statuses systems can be
designed in a similar way to the ranking system of fighters in Martial Arts6,
thus every change of status of players is related to a specific colour. The
eGODS must supply nine coloured statuses, or a subset of them, and enable
the infinity of progression of statuses: when players reach the last status they
start again by adding strings or dots to it (always according to the chosen
system of colours). Each Player Status must be related to a status value
representing the Deliberative Power of players.
The table 9.11 shows a generic example of required points to move from
the level one to the level ninety in eGODS, and the figure 9.5 shows the non-
linear progression through levels. The figures 9.6 and 9.7 show, respectively,
the infinite statues that players may unblock in eGODS, and the relation
between Player Levels and Player Statuses. Table 9.12 shows the an example
scheduling of values of statuses of eGODS.
6In Japanese and Korean Martial Arts the ability of fighters is indicated by means of
colored belts. When fighters improve their level of ability they gain a new belt and even
when they achieve the last belt, fighters are able to improve their status by adding colored
strings to their belts (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dan (rank)).
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Figure 9.5: Non-linear progression of Player Levels
Table 9.11: Required points to increase Player Level in eGODS
Level
Required
Points
Change
Status
Level
Required
Points
Change
Status
Level
Required
Points
Change
Status
Level
Required
Points
Change
Status
1 1 YES 10 35.000 YES 19 350.000 NO 28 1.350.000 YES
2 500 YES 11 50.000 NO 20 400.000 NO 29 1.400.000 YES
3 1.000 NO 12 70.000 NO 21 500.000 NO 30 1.550.000 NO
4 2.000 YES 13 95.000 NO 22 550.000 NO 31 1.600.000 YES
5 3.500 NO 14 150.000 YES 23 650.000 NO ... ... ...
6 6.000 NO 15 170.000 NO 24 850.000 NO ... ... ...
7 10.000 YES 16 190.000 NO 25 1.000.000 YES ... ... ...
8 15.000 NO 17 210.000 NO 26 1.100.000 NO ... ... ...
9 20.000 NO 18 250.000 YES 27 1.300.000 NO 90 1.000.000.000 NO
Specific eGODS implementations can use subsets of the meta statuses
set that I have exposed in this section. They can also use evocative names
for the different statuses, and different levels and statuses for Undergradu-
ate Players and Graduate Players. Table 9.13 shows the Player Statuses for
three examples of eGODS. Players gain Deliberation Points and, so, improve
their levels and change their statuses, by continuing to be engaged in delib-
erations, and by using proper strategies to foster the Deliberative Consensus
in gamified sessions. In the next session 9.8, I expose the generic and meta
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Figure 9.6: The progression of Player Statuses
Figure 9.7: The progression of Player Levels and Statues
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Table 9.12: Player Statues and their related Deliberative Powers
Role
Status
Color Value
Role
Status
Color Value
Role
Status
Color Value
White white 1 Black D1-1
Black with
one white dot
9 + (9 x 1) = 18 Black D2-1
Black with
one black dot and
one white dot
90 + (9 x 1) = 98
Yellow yellow 2 Black D1-2
Black with
one yellow dot
9 + (9 x 2) = 27 Black D2-2
Black with
one black dot and
one yellow dot
90 + (9 x 2) = 108
Orange orange 3 Black D1-3
Black with
one orange dot
9 + (9 x 3) = 36 Black D2-3
Black with
one black dot and
one orange dot
90 + (9 x 3) = 117
Purple purple 4 Black D1-4
Black with
one purple dot
9 + (9 x 4) = 45 Black D2-4
Black with
one black dot and
one purple dot
90 + (9 x 4) = 126
Blue blue 5 Black D1-5
Black with
one blue dot
9 + (9 x 5) = 54 Black D2-5
Black with
one black dot and
one blue dot
90 + (9 x 5) = 135
Green green 6 Black D1-6
Black with
one green dot
9 + (9 x 6) = 63 Black D2-6
Black with
one black dot and
one green dot
90 + (9 x 6) = 144
Brown brown 7 Black D1-7
Black with
one brown dot
9 + (9 x 7) = 72 Black D2-7
Black with
one black dot and
one brown dot
90 + (9 x 7) = 153
Red red 8 Black D1-8
Black with
one red dot
9 + (9 x 8) = 81 Black D2-8
Black with
one black dot and
one red dot
90 + (9 x 8) = 162
Black black 9 Black D1-9
Black with
one black dot
9 + (9 x 9) = 90 Black D2-9
Black with
two black dots
90 + (9 x 9) = 171
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Table 9.13: Players Levels and Players Statuses for three examples of eGODS
Statuses And Levels
of eGODS for the
Legislative Process
Statuses And Levels
of eGODS for a
Business Company
Statuses And Levels
of eGODS for a
Social Street
Citizens Employers Inhabitants
Player
Level
Status
Name
Status
Color
Player
Level
Status
Name
Status
Color
Player
Level
Status
Name
Status
Color
1 Underage White 1 Developer White 1 Street Friend White
4 Citizen Orange 7 Designer Purple 7 Street Lover Purple
10 Deputy Blue 10 Project Manager Blue 10 Street Worker Blue
18 Senator Red 14 Team Manager Green 14 Street Officier Green
25 President Black 25
Business Area
Manager
Black 25 Street Architect Black
Institutions Company Owners Street Majors
Player
Level
Status
Name
Status
Color
Player
Level
Status
Name
Status
Color
Player
Level
Status
Name
Status
Color
1
Public
Administration
White 1 Associate Black 1
Street
Manager
Green
10
Minister of
Economy
Blue 10
Street
Administrator
Blue
25
Minister of
Defense
Black
rules for Gamified Sessions and for the Deliberative Consensus.
9.8 Gamified Sessions and Deliberative In-
teractions in eGODS
Gamified Sessions start when players create inputs that must be pushed
through the three sub-spaces of the eGODS to reach a Deliberative Consensus
and become outputs. Created inputs are Deliberation Cards that have a
Consensus Power. The more the Consensus Power, the more Deliberation
Cards will be visible to players, and the more players that support the idea
will progress in eGODS by gaining points.
When inputs enter eGODS, they start a new gamified session entering it
with an initial Consensus Power equal to the Deliberation Power of players
who have created them. Inputs are called Deliberation Cards, and structured
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Table 9.14: Example of costs for the creation of Deliberation Cards
Type of eGODS
Allowed Modes of
Communication for
Cards’ Title
Cost
(Deliberation
Tokens)
Allowed Modes of
Communication for
Cards’ Solution
Cost
(Percentage of
Deliberation Ink or
Deliberation Tokens)
Legislative Process 1) Text (max 140 characters) 1
1) Text (max 140 characters)
2) URL of a bill or of a law
1) 1 Del. Token
2) Percentage of Del.
Ink according to the number
of laws modified by the bill
Business Company 1) Text (max 140 characters) 1
1) Text (max 140 characters)
2) Image
1) 1 Del. Token
2) Percentage of Del. Ink
according to the number of
sharing of the image
Social Street 1) Text (max 140 characters) 1
1) Text (max 140 characters)
2) Video
1) 1 Del. Token
2) Percentage of Del. Ink
according to the number of
sharing of the video
as actual Cards. The creation of Cards must be structured in one simple
phase. Players enter a Card Title and a Possible Solution. The cost for
card creation must be measured in Deliberative Tokens and Deliberative
Inks. Both the card title and the possible solution by the player can be
expressed in different communication modes , according to the set of types
of Deliberative Interactions allowed by the eGODS in which the Card is
created. Table 9.14 shows examples of costs for the creation of Deliberation
Cards for three examples of eGODS.
When players create Deliberation Cards, inputs start their journey through
the three Deliberative Spaces to reach a Deliberative Consensus. In the first
step, Deliberation Cards are ideas (values) that must reach the highest pos-
sible Normative Consensus and Consensus Power. When Deliberation Cards
are introduced in gamified sessions the players, with the exclusion of the cre-
ator of the Deliberation Card and of Graduate players, are neither allowed
to see the possible solution that creators have thought, nor the Consensus
Power that Deliberation Cards have reached.
In this initial step, players can only see the amount of Normative Con-
sensus that Deliberation Cards have received, that is a number from zero
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Table 9.15: Example of costs of Normative Consensus and received Deliberation Points
Type of eGODS
Cost of Normative Consensus
(Deliberative Tokens)
Amount of Deliberation Points Received
Legislative Process 1 10.000
Business Company 1 10.000
Social Street 1 10.000
to a maximum equal to the number of players subscribed to the eGODS. If
Deliberation Cards receive the maximum amount of Normative Consensus,
all the players and the card itself must receive special bonuses. If players
give to Deliberation Cards their Normative Consensus, they are able to see
the possible solution by the creator of the Deliberation Cards, and enter a
second voting phase. The act of giving the Normative Consensus is a Delib-
erative Interaction and for this reason it must have a cost in term of tokens.
Table 9.15 shows examples of costs of the Normative Consensus and the
Deliberation points that players receive by giving it.
In the second voting phase, players are able to give their epistemic and
preference consensus to Deliberation Cards by voting the solution that cre-
ators of Deliberation Cards have indicated when they created the Card. The
second ballot is structured as a variant of combined approval voting, in which
players can positively or negatively vote the solution, or abstain. There is
no default vote but, if players do not vote, they are not able to see the Con-
sensus Power that Deliberation Cards have already received. The vote that
players give in this phase is a Deliberative Interaction too, so it must have a
cost in terms of Deliberation Tokens. Table 9.16 shows examples of costs of
this voting phase and the amount of Deliberative Points that players receive
according to the Consensus Power of Deliberation Cards.
When players positively or negatively vote solutions of Deliberation Cards,
their Consensus Power is increased or decreased according to the Delibera-
tive Power of players that have voted. Players are always enabled to change
their vote, but changes have costs in terms of Deliberation Tokens. Figure
9.8 shows a depiction of this phase of the gamified session.
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Table 9.16: Example of costs to increase or to decrease the Consensus Power
Type of eGODS
Cost for Increasing or Decreasing
the Consensus Power
(Deliberative Tokens)
Amount of Deliberation Points Received
Legislative Process
1) 3 if the Consensus Power is
in the Neutral Space
2) 2 if the Consensus Power is
in the Approval Space
3) 1 if the Consensus Power is
in the Disapproval Space
1) 10.000 if the Consensus power is
in the Neutral Space
2) 10.000 + (Bonus according to the value
of the Consensus Power) if the Consensus Power is in
the Approval Space
3) 10.000 - (Malus according to the value
of the Consensus Power) if the Consensus Power is in
the Approval Space
Business Company
1) 3 if the Consensus Power is
in the Neutral Space
2) 1 if the Consensus Power is
in the Approval Space or in
the Disapproval Space
1) 10.000 if the Consensus Power is
in the Netrual Space
2) 10.000 + (fixed value) if the Consensus Power
is in the Approval Space or in the Disapproval Space
Social Street 3
10.000 + Bonus according to the value of
the Consensus Power
Figure 9.8: The first step of a gamified session
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Figure 9.9: Example of range of the Consensus Power
The Consensus Power is a number in a range computed according to the
summation of Deliberation Powers of players that have voted the Deliberation
Card. Figure 9.9 shows the range of Consensus Power from -100% to +100%
of the maximum possible amount. If the Deliberation Card receives the
minimum or the maximum consensus, all the players who have given the
Normative Consensus to the card receive a Bonus. Until the Consensus
Power of Deliberation Cards is in the Neutral Space, they are not allowed
to move to the second step of the gamified session. When the Consensus
Power reaches the Approval Space, cards can move to the second step after a
specified amount of Graduate Players give to the Card a special vote called
Approval Vote. If the Deliberation Cards reach the maximum Consensus
Power, Approval Votes are not needed.
In the first step of the gamified session, players receive Deliberation Points
every time they perform Deliberative Interactions, and receive other points
when Deliberation Cards are approved and move to the second step of the
gamified session. The eGODS must specify rules to assign different amounts
of Deliberation Points according to the Deliberative Interactions performed
by players in the first step. For instance, players who have given only the
Normative Consensus must gain less points than players who have positively
or negatively voted the possible solution indicated by the creator of the Card.
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Also, if the card reaches an approval, the players who have negatively voted
must not gain more points than the ones who have positively voted.
In the second step of gamified sessions, players share and argue possible
solutions to issues or ideas exposed by Deliberation Cards. The second step
is structured as a Deliberation Chat and only players who have positively or
negatively contributed to the Consensus Power of the Card in the first step
of the gamified session are allowed to participate. Other players can enter
in this step only if they are granted with special access permissions specified
by the eGODS rules. The second step finishes after a specific period of time,
computed according to the Consensus Power received by Deliberation Cards
in the first step.
The Deliberation Chat is a kind of driven chat in which messages are
Deliberative Interactions and have costs in terms of Deliberation Inks. In
Deliberation Chats, players can use all the modes of communication allowed
by eGODS rules, but messages must always have a subject that is a possible
solution to issues highlighted by Deliberation Cards. The first solution is the
one proposed by the creator of the Deliberative Card in the first step of the
gamified session.
Undergraduate Players can generically chat about solutions or propose
new ones. Proposals of new solutions have costs in terms of Deliberation
Tokens. Undergraduate players can also reply to other messages by changing
their position on a solution and, if they do so, the message to which they have
replied is the justification of their position change. Undergraduate players
are also allowed to change their position on a solution without replying to
any message, but in this case they have to justify their position change. In
this step of gamified sessions, Graduate Players are allowed to give a special
vote to solutions called Technical Approval, and they are allowed to perform
other special Deliberative Interactions according to the eGODS rules. For
instance, Graduate Players could be allowed to mark a solution or a chat
message with an out-of-topic tag.
Solutions have a Consensus Power, computed in the same way of the
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Figure 9.10: The second step of a gamified session
Consensus Power of Deliberation Cards in the first step of gamified sessions.
Deliberation Chats have a Consensus Power, that is the sum of the absolute
values of the Consensus Powers of all the solutions proposed, and an Epis-
temic Consensus, that is equal to the number of solutions that players have
proposed. The initial value of the Consensus Power is equal to the Consensus
Power that Deliberation Cards received in the first step of gamified sessions,
and the initial Epistemic Power is equal to one. Figure 9.10 shows a depiction
of the second step of gamified sessions.
In the second step of gamified sessions players receive Deliberative Points
every time they perform Deliberative Interactions but, as in the first step,
each Deliberative Interaction has a cost. The cost to propose new solutions
must be quantified in terms of Deliberation Tokens, as well as the costs to vote
solutions, positively or negatively, while the cost of messages in Deliberative
Chats must have a cost in terms of Deliberation Inks.
Solutions have dedicated Consensus Power. Like in the first step of gami-
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fied sessions, the Consensus Power of a solution can be in the Neutral Space,
in the Approval Space, and in the Disapproval Space. If the solution receives
the maximum or minimum amount of Consensus Power, players receive a
Bonus. If the Consensus Power of solutions reaches the Approval Space,
they become Approved Solutions if at least one Graduate Player gives a
technical approval. If solutions receive the maximum amount of Consensus
Power, the technical approval is not required.
When the time allowed for the second step of gamified sessions ends, the
final Epistemic Consensus and the final Consensus Power are computed. The
Epistemic Consensus is equal to the number of solutions that have reached
an approval in their dedicated ballots. The Consensus Power is computed by
summing the Consensus Power of all the Approved Solutions, and by dividing
the resulting number by the Epistemic Consensus. This means that the more
the Players have agreed on a small set of solutions, the more Consensus Power
Deliberation Cards will have when moving to the thirds step of gamified
sessions.
The third step of gamified sessions is aimed to deliberate on actual im-
plementations of the solutions proposed in the first and second step. The
design of the third step can be very different in eGODS, because it is strictly
related to their purposes.
The third step of gamified session ends after a specific amount of time,
that eGODS must compute according to the Power Consensus that Deliber-
ation Cards have when they enter this step, and may occur in more than one
gamified sub-space. Each solution that has reached an approval in the second
step generates a different gamified sub-session, and players are placed into
these sub-sessions according to the approvals they have given in the second
session. If players gave their approval to more than one solution they are al-
lowed to play in more than one gamified sub-session. Gamified sub-sessions
are intended to propose and discuss implementations of specific solutions.
One third of the total amount of time of the third step is dedicated to pro-
pose implementations, the remaining two thirds of the time are dedicated to
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discuss and vote the proposed implementations.
Players, both Graduate and Undergraduate, can propose implementa-
tions and approve other implementations. Both the proposal and the vote
are Deliberative Interactions, so they have a cost in terms of Deliberation
Tokens and Deliberation Inks. Graduate Players may also give their techni-
cal approval or, according to specific eGODS rules , are allowed to perform
other Deliberative Interactions on implementation proposals. Implementa-
tion proposals have their dedicate Deliberation Chat in which players can
send generic messages or messages involving particular Deliberative Interac-
tions, like replies to other messages with a position change in their prefer-
ence. Deliberative Interactions in contextual chats have costs both in terms
of Deliberation Inks and Deliberative Tokens, if they are related to other
interactions.
To enter contextual Deliberation Chats, players must give their Prefer-
ential Consensus to implementation proposals and, so, must indicate their
position about them. Players are always allowed to change their position
on proposals. Players who have proposed implementations have always the
possibility to modify them, but only by means of a specific Deliberative In-
teraction in the contextual chat. For instance, players may choose to modify
information about the implementation in reply to a specific message that
other players have sent into the contextual chat. Players who have proposed
implementations can also retire the proposal or ask other proposers to merge
their implementations. The latter actions are special ones, with special costs
in terms of Deliberation Tokens.
Implementations proposals have a Consensus Power that is managed and
computed in the same way as the Consensus Power in the other two steps of
the gamified sessions. Gamified sub-sessions have a Preferential Consensus
that is equal to the number of proposals that have reached an approval,
and a Consensus Power too, equal to the sum of the Consensus Power of
all implementation proposals, multiplied by the Preferential Consensus. The
Consensus Power of Deliberation Cards that have generated gamified sub-
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Figure 9.11: The third step of a gamified session
sessions is computed by summing the Consensus Power of all the gamified
sub-sessions. Figure 9.11 shows a depiction of the third step of gamified
sessions.
When the time allowed for the third step gamified session ends, and all the
gamified sub-session of this step finish, the consensus power of each gamified
sub-session is computed. After this step, Graduate players choose the im-
plementations to be approved according to the Consensus Power they have
received, or to the rules of the specific eGODS. For example, eGODS can
specify that Graduate Players must approve the gamified sub-session with
the highest Consensus Power, or approve more than one gamified sub-session.
However, Graduate Players must always transform at least one gamified sub-
session into an output, and so they must approve at least an implementation
proposal.
In this section I have exposed the flow of gamified sessions of eGODS and
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the dedicated rules of each of their steps. However, all the three steps of
gamified sessions must rely on shared rules. In order to describe the generic
rules, in the next section 9.9, I illustrate an example of gamified session.
9.9 Example of a Gamified Session and Generic
Rules of eGODS
In this section I describe an example of gamified session of an eGODS for
Legislative Process of Countries. In this example, I assume that a Govern-
ment has supplied Citizens an eGODS in which, starting from their needs,
they can propose amendments to Laws or Bills. If proposals reach the end
of gamified sessions, Graduate Players can decide to discuss the proposal or
amendment in the Parliament. In this example, the Undergraduate players
are called Citizens, and the Graduate players are called Institutions.
For the sake of simplicity, I assume that there are one-hundred players
in the eGODS, but I consider only five of them, three Citizens and two
Institutions. The levels and statuses of the two Institutions are not relevant
for the sake of this explanation. The three Citizens have levels, statuses
and deliberative powers showed in table 9.17 and figure 9.12. The eGODS
implements one type of Deliberation Token and one Type of Deliberation
Ink, the Deliberation Tokens are called Pencils and the Deliberation Inks
are called Ink. According to their level and their status, Citizens have a
maximum amount of Pencils and Ink as shown in table 9.12.
The three Citizens are all allowed to see the Deliberation Cards proposed
by other players. Each player sees the Deliberation Cards randomly sorted,
but specific eGODS implementations can supply mechanisms to sort the
cards is the way players prefer. Figure 9.13 shows the Deliberation Cards
already presented in the eGODS as the player Citiz-2 sees them. The player
Citiz-2 has also already given her negative vote to the card titled “Private
Healthcare”, so she is able to see the Consensus Power of that Deliberative
Card. Three players that have status Deputy whit Deliberative Power of
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Table 9.17: The status and level of three players in an example of Gamified Session
Player Level Status
Deliberative
Power
Allowed To
Citiz-1 Level 4 Citizen 4
1) Participate in the first step
of Gamified Sessions.
Citiz-2 Level 10 Deputy 18
1) Participate in the first and in the second step
of Gamified Sessions.
2) Create Deliberation Cards
Citiz-3 Level 18 Senator 90
1) Participate in the first, in the second
and in the third step of Gamified Sessions.
2) Create Deliberation Cards
3) Propose new solutions in the second step
Figure 9.12: The status and the level of three players in a sample of Gamified Session
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Table 9.18: The maximum amount of Deliberative Tokens and Deliberative Ink for
Players in a sample of gamified session
Player Level Status Max Pencils Max Ink
Citiz-1 Level 4 Citizen 4 40
Citiz-2 Level 10 Deputy 10 100
Citiz-3 Level 18 Senator 18 180
Figure 9.13: The Deliberation Cards in a sample of Gamified Session
eighteen have voted the card Private Healthcare, so it has a maximum amount
of Consensus Power equal to thirty-six. Two of them have voted negatively,
one of them has voted positively, so the current Consensus Power of the
card is -27, and the Deliberation Card is in the Disapproval Space. The
positive vote was implicitly given by the author of the Deliberation Card at
the moment of its creation and, for this reason, that Card has entered the
eGODS with a Consensus Power of eighteen.
Since the player Citiz-2 has already entered the gamified session relative
to the Deliberation Card titled “Private Healtcare”, she has already used
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Table 9.19: The amount of Deliberative Tokens and Deliberative Ink for Players in a
sample of gamified session
Player Level Status
Amount of Pencils
current/max
Amount of Ink
current/max
Citiz-1 Level 4 Citizen 4/4 400/400
Citiz-2 Level 10 Deputy 8/10 1000/1000
Citiz-3 Level 18 Senator 18/18 1800/1800
some of her Pencils. More specifically, she has used one Pencil to look at the
possible solution proposed by the creator of the card, and one Pencil to give
her negative vote to the solution. According to the rules of this example of
eGODS, Pencils are recharged weekly, and Ink is recharged daily. The table
9.19 shows the current amount of Pencils and Ink for the three players.
The player Citiz-2 decides to create a new Deliberation Card because of
her interest to protect the anonymity of the Web. The eGODS shows to the
player a form similar to the one displayed in figure 9.14. The player decides
to create a card titled “Anonymity of the Web”, and her proposed solution is
to modify a Law that contains 37 normative references. For the creation of
the Deliberation Card, the Citiz-2 spends one pencil and 427 inks, 370 for the
normative references in the target law, and 57 for an introduction text that
is: “A modification of the article 3 of the following Law would be perfect”.
The Card enters the eGODS, all players can see it in different positions as
showed in figure 9.15, and both the players Citiz-1 and Citiz-2 decide to give
their Normative Consensus to the Card.
The three players gain Deliberation Points and the player Citiz-2 increases
her level after the creation of the card and, because of this, also gains a refill
of her pencils and ink. The Normative Consensus scores ten multiplied by
the level of the player. The used ink scores the amount of ink multiplied by
the level of the player that uses it. The players gain, respectively, 40, 4.370,
and 180 Deliberative Points. Table 9.20 shows the new situations of points,
pencils and ink for the three players.
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Figure 9.14: The creation of Deliberation Cards in an example of Gamified Session
Figure 9.15: The visualization of Deliberation Cards for three different players in an
example of Gamified Session
320 9. Gamified Online Deliberative Systems
Table 9.20: The Deliberation Points of three players after they have performed Deliber-
ative Interactions in an example of Gamified Session
Player Level Status
Amount of Pencils
current/max
Amount of Ink
current/max
Deliberation
Points
Citiz-1 Level 4 Citizen 3/4 400/400 2.752
Citiz-2 Level 11 Deputy 11/11 1100/1100 53.371
Citiz-3 Level 18 Senator 17/18 1800/1800 341.180
Table 9.21: The computation of the Consensus Power of a Deliberation Card in a sample
of Gamified Session
Levels
Amount of
Citizens
Deliberative Power
Of Citizens
Votes
Total
Positive Negative Abstained
Level 4 23 4 17 5 1 (4 x 17) - (4 x 5) + 0 = 48
Level 11 23 27 17 5 1 (27 x 17) - (27 x 5) + 0 = 324
Level 18 23 90 19 3 1 (90 x 19) - (90 x 3) + 0 = 1.440
1.812
According to the rules of the eGODS, the first step of the Gamified Session
for the Deliberation Card ends after seven days. At that time, 69 Citizens
have given their Normative Consensus. For simplicity, we assume that Cit-
izens are divided among only three levels: 23 of them are at level 4, 23 of
them are at level 11, and 23 of them are at level 18. In the first group,
17 Citizens have positively voted, 5 have negatively voted, and one has ab-
stained to vote. In the second group 70 Citizens have positively voted, 5 have
negatively voted, and one has abstained to vote. In the third group 19 Citi-
zens have positively voted, 3 have negatively voted, and one has abstained to
vote. The consensus power is computed by summing the Deliberation Power
of the players who have positively voted, and by subtracting the Deliberation
Power of Citizens who have negatively voted. Eventually, the Deliberation
Card reaches a total Consensus Power equal to 1.709 as showed in table 9.21
and figure 9.16.
Since the Deliberation Card received an approval, all the players giving
their normative consensus, or their positive or negative vote, gain other De-
liberation Points. The computation of this bonus is made in relation to the
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Figure 9.16: The Consensus Power of a Deliberation Card in a sample of Gamified
Session
Normative Consensus and the votes of players. Players who have positively
voted receive an amount of Deliberation Points equal to the sum of the Delib-
erative Power of all the players who have positively voted. Players who have
negatively voted receive an amount of Deliberation Points equal to the sum
of the Deliberative Power of all the players who have negatively voted. Since
not all the players participating in the eGODS have given the normative con-
sensus to the card, the amount of points that I have listed in the previous
statement are adjusted according to the percentage of players who have given
normative consensus. Citiz-1 gave a positive vote to the Card and increased
his level with the received points. Citiz-3, after having changed three times
his position, finally gave a negative vote to the card. Table 9.22 shows the
new scores and the overall information of Citiz-1, Citiz-2, and Citiz-3. If
Deliberation Cards receive a full approval, or full disapproval, all the players
receive further bonuses. More specifically, they receive a double amount of
points to the one they would normally receive. Specific implementations of
eGODS may reward players with other bonuses when this situation occurs.
After scores are computed, the Deliberation Card moves to the second
step of the gamified session. This step lasts for a period of time related to the
Consensus Power and the Normative Consensus that the card has received
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Table 9.22: The Deliberation Points of three players after the first step in an example
of Gamified Session
Player Level Status
Amount of Pencils
current/max
Amount of Ink
current/max
Deliberation Points
received in
the first step
Deliberation
Points
Citiz-1 Level 5 Citizen 5/5 500/500
round(1.543,53) = 1.544
(4 x 10) for having voted = 40
4.336
Citiz-2 Level 11 Deputy 11/11 1100/1100
round(1.543,53) = 1.544
(11 x 10) for having voted = 110
55.025
Citiz-3 Level 18 Senator
18/18
(refilled after a week)
1800/1800
round(293,25) = 293
(18 x 10 x 4) for having voted = 720
342.193
in the first step. Fifteen minutes of chat time are granted for each player
who has given the Normative Consensus to the card. Only a percentage of
the total amount of minutes is allocated to the second step of the gamified
session, equal to the percentage of Power Consensus that the Deliberation
Card did not receive. The players have a maximum amount of time that
they can use for Deliberative Interactions in the second step. The amount of
time granted to each player is equal to the total amount of minutes for the
session divided by the number of players who participate to the session.
Table 9.23 shows the total amount of time allocated to the second step of
the sample gamified session described in this section. If the Deliberation Card
has received a total consensus in the first step, the card skips the second step
and players receive special bonuses if specified by the eGODS rules . However,
in such a situation, players receive the same amount of Deliberation Points
they would receive if the second step was played, according to the rules that
I expose later in this section.
The countdown for the second session starts 24 hours after the first session
has finished. Countdowns for the allowed interaction time for players start
in the moment they begin Deliberative Interactions, and stop when they
finish them. If players, at the end of the second step, have not used all their
minutes, they are rewarded with an amount of Deliberation Points equal to
the number of minutes left multiplied by the player level.
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Table 9.23: The total amount of hours for the second step in a sample of Gamified
Session
Total Number
of Players
Participating players in
the second
session
Total minutes
according to
participating players
Max Consensus
Power
Starting
Consensus Power
Percentage of
Consensus Power
Received
(rounded)
Not Received
(rounded)
100 69 (69 x 15) = 1.035 2.783 1.812 65 35
Total amount of minutes
Duration of the second step Allowed minutes of Deliberative Interactions for players
(1.035 x 35) / 100 = 362,25 minutes = 6 hours (rounded) ((1.035 x 35) / 100) / 69 = 5 minutes (rounded)
Deliberation Chats have a Consensus Power and an Epistemic Consensus.
The initial Consensus Power is equal to the one that the card has received in
the first step, whilst the initial Epistemic Power is equal to one, because the
chat starts with only one possible solution (the one proposed by the players
who have created the Deliberation Card in the first step). The solution has
itself an initial Consensus Power equal to the one of the Deliberation Chat.
Figure 9.17 shows the initial status of the Deliberation Chat in the second
step.
During the Deliberation Chat players can use all the modes of communi-
cation allowed by the eGODS. For the sake of simplicity, in this example we
assume that players are only allowed to write text messages. When players
begin to write a message their timer starts, and when they send the message
their timer stops, but the time is actually decreased only if players send the
message. Each message has a cost in terms of ink (one ink for each character
used in messages), and it rewards players with an amount of Deliberation
Points that is equal to the number of characters used for the message mul-
tiplied by the level of the player. While chatting players can change their
position on solutions, and the position change has a cost in terms of Pencils
but rewards players with Deliberation Points. More specifically, each posi-
tion change in this step costs two pencils and rewards players with a total
amount of points obtained by multiplying the player level by 20. Figure 9.18
shows an example of chat among Citiz-1, Citiz-2, Citiz-3 and Inst-1, from
the perspective of Citiz-1.
324 9. Gamified Online Deliberative Systems
Figure 9.17: The initial status of the Deliberation Chat in a sample of Gamified Session
Figure 9.18: Example of messages in the Deliberation Chat in an example of Gamified
Session
9.9 Example of a Gamified Session and Generic Rules of eGODS 325
Figure 9.19: The creation of a Solution in the second step of an example of Gamified
Session
Because of her level, as I have previously exposed in this section, Citiz-3
is the only player allowed to create another solution in this step. The player
creates a new solution with a mask similar to the one in figure 9.19. Like in
the first step of the gamified session, the creation of the solution has a cost in
terms of Pencils and Inks, and it rewards the player with Deliberation Points.
More specifically, the player spends 5 pencils, 1.052 ink, and receives a reward
of 11.420 Deliberation Points, according to her level and to the Pencils and
the Ink used for the creation of the Solution. Figure 9.20 shows the second
step of the gamified session after the creation of the second Solution.
As the Deliberation Cards displayed to players in the first step, also the
solutions in the second step are randomly ordered and presented to players.
As showed in figure 9.20the overall Consensus Power of the Deliberation Chat
doubles and the Epistemic Consensus becomes two. After the introduction of
the new solution, all the players that gave their negative consensus to the first
solution, give their positive consensus to the second one, and players Citiz-1
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Figure 9.20: Two different solutions in an example of Gamified Session
and Citiz-3 change their position on #si-1 from positive to negative, giving
their positive consensus to #si-2. Besides, the three players who abstained in
the first step change their position and give positive consensus to the solution
#si-1. Lastly, all the players who gave positive consensus to the solution #si-
1, give their negative consensus to the solution #s1-2. Figure 9.21 shows a
depiction of the new status of the Deliberation chat.
After the introduction of the solution, the players Inst-1 give her technical
approval to the solution #si-1 as showed in figure 9.18, and she gives technical
disapproval to the solution #si-2. Because of the technical disapproval, all
the players decide to give a negative consensus to the solution #si-2, and
all of them give their positive consensus to the solution #si-1. Figure 9.22
shows a depiction of the new status of the gamified session.
The Deliberation Chat ends in this status with a final Consensus Power
equal to 5.566 divided by two, that is the Epistemic Consensus and so the
number of proposed solutions in this step. All the players receive two bonuses,
one for the full negative consensus on the solution #si-2 and one for the full
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Figure 9.21: Two different solutions in an example of Gamified Session
Figure 9.22: The final status of the Deliberation Chat in an example of Gamified Session
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Table 9.24: The amount of time dedicated to the third step in an example of Gamified
Session
Participating players in
the second
session
Total minutes
according to
participating players
Max Consensus
Power
Received
Consensus
Power
Percentage of
Consensus Power
Received Not Received
69 (69 x 30) = 2.070 5.566 5.566 100% 0
Total amount of minutes
Duration of the third step Allowed minutes of Deliberative Interactions for players
(2.070 x 100) / 100 = 2.070 minutes = 35 hours (rounded) + 72 hours = 107 hours ((2.070 x 100) / 100) / 69 = 30 minutes
positive consensus on the solution #si-1. The amount of bonus is calculated
by multiplying the player level by 100. The players also received other De-
liberation Points for the consensus received by the Deliberation Chat and
they are computed like in the first step, as I have previously exposed. After
having received the points, both Citiz-1 and Citiz-2 increase their level and,
because of her new level, Citiz-2 is enabled to participate in the third step
of the gamified session, whilst Citiz-1 increases her level to seven and she is
still not allowed to participate in the third step.
Like in the second step, the final Consensus Power is used to compute the
amount of time allowed for the third step, but unlike the second step, the
time is computed in function of the positive consensus that the Deliberation
Chat received, and each player has thirty minutes allowed for Deliberative
Interactions in contextual chats for proposals. In addition, the third step
grants 72 hours of Deliberation on proposals. Table 9.24 shows the time
allocated to the third step of the gamified session.
The third step is dedicated to deliberate and choose the actual imple-
mentation of the solutions. In this example, the eGODS supplies tools to
propose modification to laws or to bills. The eGODS supplies the players an
interface similar to figure 9.23, that is focused on the law or on the bill to
modify.
The third step has an initial Preferential Consensus that is equal to zero,
and it has an initial Consensus Power that is equal to the consensus power re-
ceived in the Deliberation Chat. According to their level, players are enabled
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Figure 9.23: The third step in an example of Gamified Session
to propose modifications, integrations or abrogations of all the partitions of
the subject of the step. Proposals have costs in terms of pencils and ink and,
if players decide to create proposals, the eGODS supplies them interfaces
similar to figures 9.24 and 9.25. In the example, Citiz-3 and Citiz-2 decide
to propose, respectively, an abrogation and a modification, and both enter
the step with their dedicated Consensus Power.
When proposals are created, other players are able to see them as showed
in figure 9.26. Players can access the list of proposals dedicated to specific
partitions and deliberate on them by means of contextual chats, whose rules
and implementation are identical to the Deliberation Chat of the second step.
Players can also cast positive or negative votes on the proposals, and also
these interactions are managed in identical ways as the others steps of the
gamified session. The figure shows the list of proposals on a specific partition
and the Deliberation Chat dedicated to one of the proposals.
After the Deliberation on proposals ends an outcome is created and, in
this example, the eGODS produces an amendment to the Law and a report
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Figure 9.24: An abrogation proposal in a sample of Gamified Session
Figure 9.25: An modification proposal in a sample of Gamified Session
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Figure 9.26: Different proposals in an example of Gamified Session
Figure 9.27: The list of proposals related to a partition in an example of Gamified
Session
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that includes all the Deliberative Interactions that players have performed
during the gamified session. According to the requirement of agencies supply-
ing the eGODS, the outcome of the Deliberation can be directly introduced
into to the Democratic system of the country, or dispatched to the proper
Institutions.
Since the gamified session eventually produced an outcome, all the players
who have participated into it are rewarded with special bonuses and can
be allowed to enter other eGODS that manage the produced outcomes for
other purposes. For instance, if the outcome is going to be discussed in the
Parliament, there could be another eGODS dedicated to this discussion, and
Citizens who have performed well in the creation of the outcome may be
allowed to enter this eGODS.
In case the initial Deliberation Cards are transformed into outputs, they
are added to the profile pages of players who have participated into the
Deliberation. Players can always see all the Cards that other players have
and these Cards can be used for other gamified purposes; for instance, when
there are no active gamified sessions, the cards can be used in mini-games
aimed to improve the Deliberative Capacity of Citizens.
As I expose in the following section, the eGODS features that I have
described in the previous sections of this chapter and the gamified session
that I have described and exemplified in the previous section 9.8 and in this
section are properly designed to implement some of the requirements of online
Deliberative Systems.
9.10 Towards an implementation of eGODS
The gamified system described in this chapter is designed to implement
the requirements for the legitimacy of Deliberative Systems related to the
motivations and the biases of human beings. Also, the system is designed
around mechanisms of Deliberative Interactions and Deliberative Consensus,
in order to implement other needed requirements for its legitimacy.
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More specifically, the eGODS implements mechanisms of Deliberative In-
teraction by allowing player to use different communication modes. Indeed,
players can communicate by means of chats in which they can link images,
videos, Web pages and other resources, or they can use generic text. Also,
players can communicate by simply interacting with the system for reach-
ing the Deliberative Consensus, by casting votes or creating new inputs to
nurture the deliberation. Final decisions are made by using the ballot mecha-
nisms described in the previous sections of this chapter, based on the majority
rule. However, players are allowed to change their position at any moment,
their egalitarianism and anonymity are granted and, although they can have
different statuses and levels, the eGODS avoids any form of hierarchy, be-
cause players have equal possibilities to increase their level. For the same
reasons, the design of the Deliberative Interaction and Deliberative Consen-
sus also avoid social domination, and allow players to persuade other players
to accept their points of view.
The Players Levels and the Players Statuses are designed to foster the
motivations of users to learn and improve their deliberative capacities, and
to master the system and the deliberation. The deliberation and the voting
system, combined with the scaffolding system and the on-boarding system
implemented by the levels and the statuses design, are useful to check the
capability, conscientiousness, education and the purposes of players. Also,
the gamified session gives interesting options to players to select.
The eGODS is also designed to avoid common biases of human beings,
like the filter bubble effect, the confirmation bias, the authority bias and the
Lucifer effect. All of them are avoided by combining the anonymous access to
gamified sessions and the sticked leader-boards. Indeed, although players can
see the Power Consensus of any item introduced in the system, Deliberation
Cards, solutions and proposals are always ordered randomly when they are
showed to players.
In the next chapter 10, I describe the mock-ups and the other salient
traits of a Web application aimed to implement the eGODS that I have
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described in this chapter, the gamified session that I have described in the
section 9.9, and designed to exploit Web technologies in order to implement
other legitimacy requirements of online Deliberative Systems.
Chapter 10
WONSAMU, an eGODS
implementation
The aim of this chapter is to expose WONSAMU, an implementation of
eGODS that I have designed to accomplish the goals of my research work.
In the next section 10.1, I describe the generic aspects of the system and the
technologies on which it relies. In the sections 10.2, 10.4, and 10.5, I expose
the three steps of gamified sessions of WONSAMU and, eventually, in the
section 10.6, I expose the legitimacy features that WONSAMU implements.
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10.1 Description of The System
WONSAMU1, is an open source implementation of eGODS, developed
with Node.js2, Meteor.js3, HTML54, and AkomaNtoso5. Although WON-
SAMU is easily customizable, localizable and extendable, it was originally
designed to fulfill the exigency of Italian Institutions that want to engage
Citizens in the discussions of Bills proposed by the Italian Chambers, and
in the proposals of new Bills. At the moment of writing the system is fully
designed and partially implemented. WONSAMU design strongly relies on
four main aspects in order to satisfy the legitimacy requirements of online
Deliberative Systems, as I have exposed in chapter 6.
Firstly, all the discussions and the other interactions among users are
serialized in reports marked-up with AkomaNtoso. According to the Ako-
maNtoso standard and naming convention, the reports have their own Uni-
form Resource Identifier6 and contain expansive metadata sections. For this
reason, although Citizens are allowed to interact anonymously, deliberations
are traceable, transparent, monitorable, accountable and revisable.
Secondly, by leveraging on Meteor, Node.js and HTML5, WONSAMU
in easily portable on different devices, and it is possible to connect it whit
other systems developed with other technologies. This means that users
can deliberate asynchronously and they can access the deliberation at any
time, also with their mobile devices. Because of its portability, WONSAMU
fulfils the legitimacy requirements of deliberation since, indeed, it allows
1The name WONSAMU is derived by the Adrinka Symbol of West Africa WO NSA DA
MU A, that means “if your hand are in the dish”. The symbol represents the Democracy
for the Ashanti People of Ghana (http://www.adinkra.org/htmls/adinkra index.htm).
2Node.js is a Javascript run-time for developing javascript code that can be run server-
side (https://nodejs.org/en/).
3Meteor is an open source framework based on Node.js to develop cross-platform live
applications that can be developed on the Web, on smart-phones, and on other devices
(https://www.meteor.com).
4See the section 6.2.
5See the section 6.2.
6See the section 6.2.
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distributed, continuous, interconnected, interdependent and ubiquitous de-
liberation. Node.js and Meteor also enable other interesting features because
they are based on asynchronous event-driven architectures, meaning that
systems can emit special events when particular situations happen. This is
useful for the implementation of online Deliberative Systems, because sys-
tems could be connected to other systems that, for instance, may control
the fairness of deliberations when specific events are emitted. Moreover, Me-
teor strongly relies on the Distributed Data Protocol7 and is predisposed to
use the GraphQL language8. These technologies, used in combination with
AkomaNtoso, allow an easier interconnection among Deliberative Systems.
Indeed, Deliberative Systems can be designed to share data among them-
selves and this is useful, for instance, to recognize the activities that users
perform in different systems.
Thirdly, the interface of WONSAMU is designed to follow the most recent
guidelines and standards on usability and accessibility. The interface is based
on Material Design and, as I have exposed in section 6.1, it is designed to
be responsive. This means that not only the system is cross-platform, but it
can also be properly displayed on screens of different sizes. As I have already
stated previously, WONSAMU is designed to be simply localized, but it
can also use different types of languages according to the characteristics of
users who access the deliberation. This leads to another main aspect of
WONSAMU.
Lastly, WONSAMU is not designed to be natively gamified. The gamifi-
cation is an over layer that can be activated or deactivated. This is important
to not confuse users already used to deliberate in “old-fashion” ways, or to
respect the requirements of specific Institutions that for bureaucratic reasons
7The Distributed Data Protocol is a simple protocol to synchronize dif-
ferent clients according to changes that may occur on server side databases
(https://guide.meteor.com/methods.html).
8GraphQL is a query language for software APIs developed by Facebook. It allows
to query data to software by using a simple syntax regardless of the storage engine that
systems use (http://graphql.org/).
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Figure 10.1: A screen-shoot of the desktop and non-gamified version of WONSAMU
can not use gamification. For this reason, WONSAMU is designed to use dif-
ferent languages, and it has a different aspect when gamification is activated
or not activated. Figures 10.1 and 10.2 show, respectively, a screen-shoot of
WONSAMU in its desktop and non-gamified version, and a screen-shoot of
its mobile and non-gamified version.
Although the general structure of the gamified version of WONSAMU is
very similar to the non-gamified version, as showed in figures 10.3 and 10.4,
due to its gamified nature it leads to very different user experiences. In the
next sections of this chapter, starting by the on-boarding phase of WON-
SAMU, I will show the design of its gamified version. The design is made
according to the rules of eGODS that I have exposed in the previous chap-
ter 9. More specifically, WONSAMU is implemented to model the gamified
session that I have exposed in sections 9.8 and 9.9.
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Figure 10.2: A screen-shoot of the mobile and non-gamified version of WONSAMU
Figure 10.3: A screen-shoot of the main structure of the gamified version of WONSAMU
(Browser)
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Figure 10.4: A screen-shoot of the main structure of the gamified version of WONSAMU
(Mobile App)
10.2 The On-boarding Phase
WONSAMU implements both types of on-boarding systems that I have
exposed in section 8.4. The first is a classical one, and the second is a
Batman on-boarding. The aim of the first on-boarding system is to drive
users to learn the system, teach them the main parts of the user interface
and the meaning of the gamified components that the system exposes, and
to give users a first insight on the actions that they may perform in order to
progress into the game and the deliberation. The second on-boarding system
is a kind of continuous on-boarding, and is used to give hints on the actions
they can perform while they are involved in Deliberative Interactions. In this
section, I expose the classical on-boarding system, whilst in section 10.4, I
show screen-shoots of the Batman on-boarding.
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Figure 10.5: A screen-shoot of the on-boarding system of WONSAMU (Mobile)
When users sign-in for the first time into WONSAMU, they start from
level zero and the underage status, and have to progress until the fourth level
in order to change their status to Citizens and, so, to be able to actually start
to deliberate. Although they are enabled to dismiss the on-boarding system
whenever they want, it is designed to drive users to reach level four.
When users sign-in, the system assign them a random user name and the
on-boarding starts by asking users to change their name as showed in figures
10.5 and 10.6. If they dismiss the message, they are able to explore the
sections of the system but they can not see any content, as showed in figures
10.7, 10.8 and 10.9. In these situations, the system will display a floating
action button in the bottom-right corner of the screen. By tapping or clicking
the button, users can have access again to the on-boarding instructions. The
button is also used after the on-boarding phase to display notifications to
users, and the color of its border changes according to the “seriousness” of
the notification.
If users decide to change their name, the system shows them a form
that they can fill-in with the name they prefer, as showed in figure 10.10.
The users fill in their name and click the “done” button. This action rewards
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Figure 10.6: A screen-shoot of the on-boarding system of WONSAMU (Browser)
Figure 10.7: A screen-shoot of the ideas section when users are not able to see the
contents
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Figure 10.8: A screen-shoot of the discussions section when users are not able to see the
contents
Figure 10.9: A screen-shoot of the proposals section when users are not able to see the
contents
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Figure 10.10: A screen-shoot of the form to change the user name
Figure 10.11: A screen-shoot of the on-boarding system when users gain their first
Deliberation Point
them with a first Deliberation Point and, by means of it, users reach level one.
The on-boarding system congrats users, and supplies them further actions
and instructions to progress in the game, as showed in figure 10.11.
When users click on the highlighted icon that displays their current
amount of points, they start a kind of wizard that drives them to reach
the fourth level and upgrade their status to the Citizen one. The first three
steps of the wizard are aimed to teach to users the meaning of the Points, the
Levels, and the Power, and they are aimed to drive users to reach the level
3. The figure 10.12 shows the first three steps of the wizard in the mobile
version of WONSAMU. In the browser version the wizard is identical, with
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Figure 10.12: A screen-shoot of the on-boarding system when users click on the points
icon
the only exception of the size of the messages.
The fourth, fifth and sixth step of the wizard, showed in figure 10.13, are
aimed to explain users the functioning of the pencils and the ink. At the end
of the sixth step, users are requested to insert their skills, if they want to do
so. By doing it, users understand the costs of Deliberative Interactions by
practicing a sample of them, as showed in figure 10.14, and gain 300 further
points needed to increase their level. Figure 10.14 also shows the two steps of
the on-boarding system that drive users to reach level four. In these last two
steps, users learn how to close the icons set that displays their gamified status
and, eventually, the system asks them to move to the ideas section, where
they are now able to see the list of Deliberation Cards that have already
entered the system. The last step of the on-boarding system starts when
users scroll the Deliberative Cards.
I describe the last step of the on-boarding systems in the next section
10.3, in which I also expose the interface of the ideas section of WONSAMU.
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Figure 10.13: A screen-shoot of the on-boarding system when users click on the pencils
icon
Figure 10.14: A screen-shoot of the on-boarding system to teach users the cost of
Deliberative Interactions
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10.3 The Deliberation Cards
When users reach level four, they can see in the ideas section of WON-
SAMU the Deliberation Cards that have already entered the system. If they
see the cards for the first time, WONSAMU insert a fake card among the
others, as showed in figure 10.15. As soon as users start to scroll the cards
or they tap or click them, the last part of the on-boarding starts, as showed
in figure 10.16. The last step of the on-boarding is structured as a contex-
tual help, because the card and the on-boarding messages must be showed
simultaneously.
Figure 10.15: A screen-shoot of the ideas section of WONSAMU and the Deliberation
Cards
The last step of the on-boarding is aimed to teach users the first voting
mechanism of WONSAMU. Firstly, the on-boarding shows users how they
can start a gamified session by giving to a card their normative consensus
and, so, by looking at the first solution for the issue inserted by the creator
of the card. Secondly, the on-boarding gives instructions to users about the
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Figure 10.16: A screen-shoot of the contextual on-boarding in WONSAMU
consensus power and how they can give their positive or negative consensus
to the proposed solution. Thirdly, the on-boarding teaches users the rules
of the combined approval voting, on which the ballot system of WONSAMU
relies. Fourthly and lastly, the on-boarding system shows users how they can
access the information about the deliberation group and, so, about all users
who have given their positive or negative consensus to the card. Figure 10.17
shows the first three steps of the last part of the on-boarding in the mobile
version of WONSAMU.
When users have learned how to vote for ideas, the floating button to
request help to the system, that I have exposed in the previous section 10.2
appears again in the bottom-right corner of the screen and users are finally
ready to start the actual deliberation, as showed in figure 10.18. The on-
boarding shows-up again automatically when users reach certain statuses
and levels in the system. More specifically, other on-boarding sessions are
scheduled when users enter for the first time the discussions section and the
proposals section of WONSAMU. Also, as soon as users increase their level
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Figure 10.17: A screen-shoot of last part of the on-boarding in WONSAMU
Figure 10.18: A screen-shoot of the ideas section in WONSAMU when the on-boarding
ends
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Figure 10.19: A screen-shoot of the floating menu button in WONSAMU
and, so, have more options to interact with the system, for instance when
they can create Deliberation Cards, the floating button changes and becomes
a floating menu button that contains several options contextual to the area
users are currently visiting. Figure 10.19 shows the floating menu button in
the ideas section for a user that has reached the deputy status.
Users can access other information on the idea by interacting directly
with cards. For instance, as depicted in figure 10.20, by tapping or clicking
consensus power icons cards flip and show the situation of the current con-
sensus power and other information, such as the amount of consensus that
the card must receive to reach the approval space. If users tap or click the
question mark icon, they can see the solution proposed by the proposers of
ideas and all the motivations they have given to justify their ideas. Figure
10.21shows an idea whose solution is to modify an Article of an Italian Bill.
The proposer of the idea has justified it by inserting a personal text, a video,
and a link to an article of the Italian Constitution.
Although users can link directly into the app videos, images and laws or
bills, they are retrieved by dedicated Web sites and the metadata is used
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Figure 10.20: A screen-shoot of a flipped card in WONSAMU
Figure 10.21: A screen-shoot of the motivations of an idea in WONSAMU
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Figure 10.22: A screen-shoot of a Bill from the Italian Senate displayed in WONSAMU
to compute the cost for the creation of cards. For instance, WONSAMU
allows to link videos on youtube, images on instagram, and laws and bills
supplied as Linked Open Data by the Italian chamber of Deputies and the
Italian Senate. Figure 10.22 shows the Bill number 2688 retrieved by the
Italian Senate and displayed into the WONSAMU application. As showed
in figures 10.21 and 10.22, when users navigate solutions of ideas and their
motivations, they can always see the consensus power that ideas currently
have, their position about the idea, and they can change their position at
any time.
Users having at least the Deputy status are allowed to insert ideas and, so,
to create cards in WONSAMU. Figure 10.23 shows the form for the creation
of ideas. When users create ideas, they can see the total cost for the creation
and the cost of each motivation that they insert. Users can insert as much
motivations they want, provided that they have enough ink, and the only
mandatory information are the title of the idea and the initial solution to it,
that can be a modification of a Law or Bill, or a generic text.
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Figure 10.23: A screen-shoot of the form to propose an idea in WONSAMU
When users reach level 6, they can access the discussions section of WON-
SAMU, and take part to Deliberation Chats. In the next section 10.4, I
expose the interface and functioning of Deliberation Chats in WONSAMU.
10.4 The Deliberation Chat
The discussion section of WONSAMU is where deliberation chats among
users occur. Deliberation chats are aimed to drive Citizens to reach a con-
sensus on different alternatives to implement proposals created in the ideas
section. As showed in figure 10.24, users who have reached at least level six
can access the discussions section where WONSAMU shows them the list
of deliberation cards that have passed the first step and in which they have
participated. Deliberation cards have their current power consensus, equal
to the sum of the absolute value of the power consensus of each solution, and
their epistemic consensus, equal to the number of solutions proposed for the
idea. Cards have also a countdown that displays the remaining time until
the deliberation in that idea ends.
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Figure 10.24: A screen-shoot of the list of Deliberation Chats in WONSAMU
If users tap or click a card, they are able to see all the proposed solutions
for that card, but they can see only the power consensus of the solution that
they have already voted (figure 10.24) and, so, the solution proposed in the
ideas section or the ones for which they have already joined the chat. If users
can see the power consensus of a solution, they can also access all the other
information about the solution, by tapping or clicking it. As showed in figure
10.25, in this page users can also change their preference about the solution
without accessing the chat, but this action is more expensive than a change
of opinion in the chat.
Users who have reached at least level eighteen, and so have at least the
deputy status, are allowed to create new solutions. The interface for the
creation of solutions, displayed in figure 10.26, is very similar to the one for
the creation of ideas that I have explained in the previous section 10.3. All
the users owning at least three pencils can enter deliberation chats dedicated
to specific solutions.
Deliberation chats in WONSAMU are structured as classical chats, but
provide additional features useful to deliberate. More specifically, in WON-
SAMU chats, users can send generic messages, reply to messages and simul-
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Figure 10.25: A screen-shoot of a solution in WONSAMU
Figure 10.26: The creation of a new solution in WONSAMU
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Figure 10.27: An example of Deliberation Chat in WONSAMU
taneously change their position on solutions, and every time users send a
message in the chat they can send it in conjunction to a position change,
meaning that the message is the justification of their opinion change. Figure
10.27 shows an example of chat in WONSAMU.
During the Deliberation Chat, the floating menu button is filled with new
options. More specifically, if users simply tap it, they send the message with-
out changing their position. If users hold it the floating contextual menu
appears and they can send the message and change their position simultane-
ously. Users can also directly reply to a message by tapping on the message
to which they want to reply. If they do so, a contextual floating menu ap-
pears on the message and they can chose to send a simple reply or a reply
with a position change, as showed in figure 10.28.
Deliberation chats allow any modes of communication allowed in the other
sections of WONSAMU. Users can link video, Bills and Laws in their message
and, if they do so, WONSAMU instantaneously retrieves the metadata of
linked resources and updates the cost of messages. Figure 10.29 shows a
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Figure 10.28: A reply with position change in WONSAMU
message that contains a link to the Italian Constitution and its cost.
Institutions, thus graduate players as I have exposed in section 9.5, are
allowed to participate in Deliberation Chats too. Although WONSAMU does
not require technical approvals of solution in order to transform them in bill
proposals, hesitant users can ask for technical approval of institutions, as
showed in figure 10.30. If solutions receive one or more technical approvals
and gain enough power consensus to become a bill or an amendment proposal,
all the players who have given their positive consensus to the solution gain
a special bonus.
When the time allocated to a deliberation chat ends, the deliberative
power of Deliberation Cards is computed and, if at least one of their solu-
tions has received a consensus, as I have exposed in sections 9.8 and 9.9,
the solutions enter the proposal section of WONSAMU. In the next section
10.5, I expose the functioning and the interface of the proposals section of
WONSAMU.
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Figure 10.29: A chat message with a normative reference in WONSAMU
Figure 10.30: A technical approval in a Deliberation Chat in WONSAMU
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10.5 The Discussion of Proposals
The proposals section of WONSAMU collects all the deliberative cards
for which Citizens have found at least a solution. Deliberative cards enter the
proposals section with the power consensus they have received in chats section
and all the Citizens can propose actual implementations of the solution.
The number of proposed implementations is the preferential consensus of the
card. When users tap a card they access the discussion of implementations
as showed in figure 10.31.
Figure 10.31: The proposals section in WONSAMU
In WONSAMU, the implementations in the proposals section are mod-
ifications that Citizens would like to apply to solutions found in the chats
section, and so to laws or bills. Users are only allowed to propose modifi-
cations on specific partitions, and they are not allowed to modify the whole
document.
To propose modifications, users must select the text they would like to
modify. If they do so, a floating action button appears and by tapping on it
users can create their modification proposal inline, as showed in figure 10.32.
The mask for the creation of modifications is quite similar to the one for the
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Figure 10.32: The creation of a modification proposal in WONSAMU
creation of solutions that I have exposed in the previous section 10.4, with
the exception that it allows users to modify the text they have selected, and
immediately see the difference among the old text and the new one.
When users click on the paper-clip showing the number of proposed mod-
ifications of a partition, all of them appear as post-its attached to the right
of the clicked partition. At this stage, users are only able to see the power
consensus that each proposal of modification received, as showed in figure
10.33. When users click on the post-it, they can see more information about
the proposals, as showed in figure 10.34.
Modification proposals have their own dedicated deliberative chats; if
users have already accessed the chat they can change their opinion about the
modification without accessing the chat again, but this vote is more expensive
than the one they could do in the chat (figure 10.34). If users spend pencils,
they access the chat related to the modification that are identical to the
ones of solutions that I have exposed in the previous section 10.4, with the
exception that in this section the chats are displayed inline.
When the allowed time for the discussion of modification proposals ends,
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Figure 10.33: The proposed modifications in WONSAMU
Figure 10.34: The information about proposals of modifications in WONSAMU
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Figure 10.35: The dedicated chat of a modification proposal in WONSAMU
the total power consensus of the card is computed, as I have exposed in sec-
tion 9.9, and WONSAMU merges automatically all the modifications that
have reached the approval space and creates an amendment or a bill in Ako-
maNtoso.
If there are no overlapping modifications the gamified session ends. If
users have created modifications that overlap, WONSAMU creates different
versions of the amendment or the bill, as many as the number of overlapping
modifications. In this case, WONSAMU generates a mini-game called “puz-
zling” that lasts for twenty four-hours. As showed in figure 10.36, proposals
that are in the puzzling phase have inverted colours, and users who have
given their negative or positive consensus to at least a modification proposal,
can access the mini-game by clicking on proposals with inverted colours.
The goal of the mini-game is to divide the total power consensus received
by the proposal among the different documents that WONSAMU has pro-
duced. In order to do so, users can see all the different documents, (figure
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Figure 10.36: A proposal with overlapping modification in WONSAMU
10.37) and order them according to their preferences. At the end of the
twenty-four hours allocated to the mini-game, the winner is computed by
means of the Condorcet theorem, that I have introduced in chapter 3.
In the puzzling mini-game users drag the documents in the version they
prefer in order to assign them a position. For instance, as showed in fig-
ure 10.38, the user “Pluto” chooses to place “document c” in first position,
“document b” in second position, and “document a” in third position.
As I have previously stated in this section, the preferences of citizens are
evaluated by means of the Condorcet theorem, and the power consensus is di-
vided among the documents according to the preferences they have received.
Table 10.1 exposes the calculation of the power consensus for the example
showed in figures 10.37 and 10.38.
The output created by means of gamified sessions in WONSAMU can be
used in different ways, according to the purposes that Citizens and Institu-
tions have, or can be used by other software. For instance, figure 10.39 shows
screen-shoots of WONSAMU-social, an eGODS that can take as input a doc-
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Figure 10.37: An example of puzzling mini-game in WONSAMU
Figure 10.38: An example of document sorting in the puzzling mini-game in WONSAMU
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Table 10.1: The results of an example of the puzzling mini-game in WONSAMU
AGAINST
document a document b document c
FOR
document a 64 65
document b 497 32
document c 496 529
RESULTS
POSITION Document Consensus Power
First c
2 x (Total Consensus Power / 3)
2 x (71.017 / 3) = 47.346
Second b
2 x [(1 x (Total Consensus Power / 3) ) / 3]
2 x [(1 x (71.017 / 3)) / 3] = 15.782
Third a
2 x [(1 x (Total Consensus Power / 3) ) / 3]
1 x [(1 x (71.017 / 3)) / 3] = 7.891
Figure 10.39: A screen-shoot of WONSAMU-Social
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ument produced with WONSAMU or in other ways, and engage Citizens in
persuading Italian Senators and Deputies to discuss them in the Chambers.
In this section and in the previous sections of this chapter, I have de-
scribed the user interface and the functioning of WONSAMU, an implemen-
tation of eGODS that I have created for one of my research goals: to demon-
strate the feasibility of legitimated Gamified Online Deliberative Systems
and Extensions of Gamified Online Deliberative Systems. In the next sec-
tion 10.6, I summarize the legitimacy features implemented by WONSAMU,
and I conclude by briefly discussing them.
10.6 Legitimacy features of WONSAMU
In this chapter I have exposed the interface and functioning of WON-
SAMU, an eGODS implementation for the deliberation about amendments
and bills proposed by Citizens. WONSAMU was specifically designed to fol-
low the requirements that I have exposed in chapter 6 and, for this reason,
implements all the legitimacy features of Deliberative Systems that I have
exposed in chapter 5.
As the other systems that I have described in chapter 7, and according
to the preliminary statements that I have given in sections 9.1 and 10.1, all
the legitimacy features of WONSAMU related to the requirements of Insti-
tutions, the Internet and the Web must be considered as implemented by
default. Table 10.2 and the following list, expose a summary of the other
legitimacy features implemented by WONSAMU in relation to the require-
ments for their implementation that I have exposed in the chapter 6.
Linked Open Data Technologies: WONSAMU strongly relies on Ako-
maNtoso and all the produced documents, the report of discussions
among Citizens and the other resources used in deliberations and pro-
duced by deliberations are univeocally accessible both by human-beings
and machines. For this reason all the legitimacy features related to this
requirement are considered as implemented.
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Inclusiveness, Responsiveness and Usability: the design of WONSAMU
relies on the Material design and follows the best design practice that
I have exposed in section 6.1. For this reason, all the features related
to these requirements are considered as implemented.
Deliberative Interaction: WONSAMU allows different communication modes.
Users can interact with the system and with other users by using tex-
tual chats and videos or normative references. Also, WONSAMU users
can perform deliberative interactions by simply acting on specific parts
of the interface. Although users are granted anonymous access to de-
liberations, every action that they perform is logged and inserted in
final reports that describe the creation of the deliberative outputs pro-
duced with WONSAMU. The design of deliberative interactions, in
conjunction with the design of the process to reach the deliberative
consensus described in the following paragraph, grant WONSAMU all
the features of legitimacy related to these two requirements.
Deliberative Consensus: the deliberative consensus in WONSAMU is de-
signed as a composed consensus, as I have exposed in section 6.3. Citi-
zens who agree on normative values (the ideas section in WONSAMU)
can discuss and agree on their beliefs and, so, on their epistemic val-
ues (the discussions section in WONSAMU). After having reached a
consensus on these values, Citizens can discuss on different preferences
to implement their needs and, so, try to reach a preferential consensus
(the proposals section in WONSAMU).
During the three phases of the process to reach a consensus, citizens can
persuade other citizens by means of different communication modes,
as I have previously stated. Although WONSAMU drives Citizens to
agree on shared values, users can change their mind at any moment of
decision-making procedures, and the consensus is measured by means
of ballots relying on the majority rules in different ways based on the
techniques of Combined approval voting and on the Condorcet theorem.
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The design of Deliberative Interactions and of the process to achieve the
consensus in WONSAMU has the purpose to avoid social domination
and hierarchies, and grant egalitarianism to all the Citizens involved
in deliberations. All the legitimacy features granted by the design of
deliberative interactions and deliberative consensus are considered as
implemented.
Nurture Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: WONSAMU is a com-
plete gamified system and, for this reason, implements the features of
Citizens, inputs, decision-making procedures and outputs related to
these requirements. As I have exposed in this chapter and in previ-
ous chapter 9, the game design of gamified sessions in WONSAMU is
specifically intended to nurture intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of all
the types of players who can access the system.
Avoid/Exploit Biases: WONSAMU relies on the anonymity of Citizens
and on gamified widgets, like the sticked leader-boards, to avoid the
raise of biases in Citizens involved in deliberations, and to exploit biases
that can be useful to drive Citizens to reach a consensus.
The filter bubble effect can not be produced in WONSAMU because
all the arguments discussed in decision-making procedures are always
displayed to Citizens in random order. Citizens are able to see the
arguments that received more consensus by checking their consensus
power, and they can find arguments near to their positions, but they
have to explore the system in order to find them.
The anonymity grants Citizens a possibility to stay safe from online
firestorm effects and from the authority bias and the Lucifer effect,
and these effects are also avoided by means of the gamification design
assigning a cost to each interaction users perform. By doing so, Citizens
are driven to use their resources to persuade other Citizens on their
beliefs, and they do not waste resources to denigrate other Citizens
and other arguments.
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The consensus power is specifically designed in order to foster the pro-
duction of the Goal Gradient Effect. Indeed, by dispatching bonuses
when full consensuses are achieved, WONSAMU drives Citizens to fully
agree on arguments that have reached the approval space and are near
to the full consensus. Also, by leveraging on the loss and risk aversion,
WONSAMU drives Citizens to not spend resources on arguments that
are not receiving approval in deliberations.
In this chapter, and in the previous chapters of this part, I have described
the design of Gamified Online Deliberative Systems and their Extensions and,
by describing WONSAMU, I have showed that gamified Deliberative Systems
whose design follows the guidelines exposed in this research work implement
all the features needed for the legitimacy of Deliberative Systems. In the
following chapter11, I summarize the research results that I have achieved in
my doctoral research period, and I briefly expose the future work that could
be done starting from my findings.
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Table 10.2: The legitimacy features implemented by WONSAMU
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DELIBERATIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
D-MUST-1 Must be accessible 3 3 3 3
D-MUST-2 Must be open 3 3 3 3 3 3
D-MUST-3 Must be reliable 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
D-MUST-4 Must be traceable 3 3
D-MUST-5 Must be transparent 3
D-MUST-6 Must be unobstructed 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
D-COULD-1 Could be asynchronous 3 3
D-COULD-2 Could be continuous 3 3 3 3 3
D-COULD-3 Could be distributed 3 3
D-COULD-4 Could be interconnected 3
D-COULD-5 Could be interdependent 3
D-COULD-6 Could be ubiquitous 3 3 3 3 3
CITIZENS
CODE DESCRIPTION
C-MUST-1 Must be capable 3 3 3 3 3
C-MUST-2 Must be conscientious 3 3 3 3
C-MUST-3 Must be educated 3 3 3 3 3
C-MUST-4 Must be motivated 3 3 3 3 3
C-MUST-5 Must be purposed 3 3 3 3
C-MUST-6 Must be respectful 3 3 3 3
INPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
I-MUST-1 Must be balanced 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
I-MUST-2 Must be diverse 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
I-MUST-3 Must be informed 3 3
I-MUST-4 Must be interesting 3 3 3
I-MUST-5 Must be justified 3 3
I-MUST-6 Must be pluralistic 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES
CODE DESCRIPTION
DMP-ALLOW-1
Must allow mind
changing
3 3
DMP-ALLOW-2
Must allow majority
rule
3 3
DMP-AVOID-1
Must avoid social
domination
3 3 3 3 3 3
DMP-AVOID-2 Must avoid hierarchies 3 3 3 3 3 3
DMP-FOSTER-1 Must foster learning 3 3 3 3 3 3
DMP-FOSTER-2 Must foster mastering 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
DMP-FOSTER-3 Must foster persuasion 3 3 3 3
DMP-GRANT-1 Must grant anonymity 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
DMP-GRANT-2 Must grant egalitarianism 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
OUTPUTS
CODE DESCRIPTION
O-MUST-1 Must be accountable 3 3
O-MUST-2 Must be effective 3 3 3 3 3
O-MUST-3 Must be monitored 3 3
O-MUST-4 Must be revisable 3 3
O-SHOULD-1 Should be efficient 3 3 3 3 3
O-SHOULD-2 Should be satisfying 3 3 3 3 3 3
INSTITUTIONS
CODE DESCRIPTION
IN-AVOID-1 Must avoid domination 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
IN-AVOID-2
Must avoid rooted
partisanship
3 3
IN-AVOID-3 Must avoid tightness 3 3
IN-GRANT-1
Must grant authority
to deliberations
3
IN-GRANT-2
Must grant egalitarianism
to participants
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
IN-GRANT-3
Must grant freedom
to deliberate
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
IN-GRANT-4
Must grant incentives
to deliberate
3 3 3 3
IN-GRANT-5
Must grant political equality
to citizens
3 3 3
Chapter 11
Conclusions and Future Works
The research work that I have described in this thesis is aimed to answer
ten research questions, listed in chapter 1. All these research questions can
be summarized in the following simple one, from which all the work exposed
in this thesis started:
“Would it be possible to improve Society by engaging People in
continuous and satisfying Democratic Systems based on delibera-
tions?”
The answer to the previous question needs a deep investigation and un-
derstanding of several and diverse contexts, such as Philosophy, Laws, Legal
Informatics, Human Computer Interaction, Games-Design and Gamification,
and in my doctoral research exposed in this work I borrow meaningful con-
cepts from these areas of study and propose a possible answer. To put it in
the simplest possible way, as I have demonstrated in this thesis, the answer
is:
“Yes. It is possible, provided that these kinds of engaging Democ-
racies are built to meet specific requirements in order to imple-
ment specific features needed for their legitimacy.”
In order to build this answer, firstly I found the model of Democracy
that is most suitable to be engaging. To accomplish this task, in part I of
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this work, I have explored the different models of Democracies. Starting by
understanding what the concept of Democracy means, what are the elements
that compose Democracies, and what are the ways to address the legitimacy
of a Democracy, I have studied three models of Democracies: Representative
Democracy, Participatory Democracy and Deliberative Democracy.
After a deep explorations of Representative Democracies, I concluded that
they are not suitable for my research goals, due to their functioning strictly
based on infrequent ballots based in turn on the majority rule and, most im-
portantly, because they are facing a severe crisis all over the world. For these
reasons, Representative Democracies must be replaced or integrated with
more direct models of Democracies. One of them is Participatory Democ-
racy: a model of Democracy that involves Citizens in solving Societal issues
by their own, without delegating their Democratic power to representatives.
Sadly, in the end, Participatory Democracies are not suitable for my research
goals because they rely on mechanisms similar to the ones of Representative
Democracies and, so, on political rhetoric and aggregation of preferences of
Citizens by means of ballots.
Eventually, I find out that Deliberative Democracy has the juice to satisfy
my research goals. Deliberative Democracies are based on genuine delibera-
tions in which Citizens can use diverse communication modes according to
their deliberative capacities. After several properly designed deliberative in-
teractions, Citizens are likely to more naturally agree on values, beliefs and
preferences and, so, the aggregation of preferences is made during discus-
sions, without excluding the possibility to use ballots based on the majority
rule for selecting the most preferred options to satisfy Societal needs.
Studies on Deliberative Democracies in the last fifty years have widely
investigated and exposed the list of features that they must implement to be
legitimated and, eventually, after having evolved through four generations,
have flown into the concept of Deliberative Systems, Democratic Systems
in which Citizens are engaged in continuous, synchronous or asynchronous,
ubiquitous and interconnected deliberations aimed to solve specific Societal
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issues.
Deliberative Systems are perfectly fit for my research goals, provided that
they are designed to follow requirements implementing several legitimacy
features exposed by scholars, collected, listed and catalogued in a framework
for the evaluation of their legitimacy. The framework also introduces two
requirements neglected by scholars of Deliberative Democracies, that I ar-
gue are necessary to implement mandatory legitimacy features. Deliberative
Systems must be designed to motivate Citizens to enter deliberations and
remain engaged in them, and to avoid or exploit cognitive biases in order
to achieve legitimated deliberations or drive users more naturally towards a
consensus.
I used the framework to evaluate a set of online Web applications designed
for deliberations or participation. Although they are not explicitly defined
as Deliberative Systems, I investigated their legitimacy features in order to
understand if they are suitable to be connected to Deliberative Systems.
The result of the analysis shows that, to a greater or a lesser extent, the
analyzed systems implement the mandatory legitimacy features, but none
of them is designed to nurture the motivation of Citizens or to handle the
most-known cognitive biases. However, one of the systems introduces points,
levels, and leader-boards and, so, gamified components that, if properly used,
can motivate Citizens to deliberate.
The Gamification is a brand-new area of studies on Human Computer
Interaction that investigates how to use games elements in contexts external
to games. For instance, in my research period at the Stanford University,
I have implemented a gamified system to handle ballots, make them more
engaging, and drive users to behave in desired ways, for example to check
the results right before the end of the ballot in order to change their prefer-
ences if they wish to do so. I found that, according to my framework for the
evaluation of the legitimacy, in order to implement the mandatory features
neglected by other systems it is possible to design Online Gamified Delib-
erative Systems, and Extensions of Online Gamified Deliberative Systems,
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that are fully gamified environments whose gamified sessions follow specific
guidelines borrowed by game-design theories.
The design of Gamified Online Deliberative Systems relies on engaging
Deliberative Interactions and Deliberative Consensus, that give legitimacy to
deliberations from two perspectives. Firstly, they give motivations to Citizens
to deliberate by means of gamified dynamics that nurture their intrinsic and
extrinsic motivations. Secondly, they drive deliberations and the behaviour
of users in order to not produce biased deliberation or exploit cognitive biases
to help Citizens to reach a consensus in more natural ways.
Eventually, I demonstrated the feasibility of Gamified Online Delibera-
tive Systems by describing the interface and the functioning of a practical
implementation of them called WONSAMU. I described how WONSAMU,
by means of its gamified sessions, drives users to reach a full consensus on
their values, beliefs and preferences, or a partial consensus. In this last case,
and to conclude, I explained how WONSAMU is able to create different
Democratic outcomes, each one of them having a Consensus Power com-
puted on the basis of the consensus that the outcome received. According
to their consensus power, all Democratic outcomes can be reintroduced in
Deliberative Systems for different purposes.
Several researches on diverse fields of study can start by the founding of
my doctoral research exposed in this work. For instance, WONSAMU could
be fully implemented and tested in several ways, in order to adjust the rules
of the abstract model of Gamified Online Deliberative Systems that I have
defined. Also, different implementations of Gamified Online Deliberative
Systems can be developed in order to run experiments on the results produced
by interconnecting them and, so, by interconnecting the Citizens who use
them, the inputs on which they deliberate, and the Democratic outcomes
that they produce.
Among the others, a future work that must be studied from technological,
Institutional, philosophical and cognitive perspectives, is particularly close to
my heart and to my research goals in the long term. It is aimed to investigate
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the effects of an actual introduction of Online Gamified Deliberative Systems
in current Representative Democracies and Democratic process of Countries.
Online Gamified Deliberative Systems can be initially introduced only for
deliberations about restricted contexts, like the proposal and the deliberation
of bills and amendments among Citizens who do not have technical and
legislative skills. Systems like WONSAMU can handle these contexts and it
would be really interesting to conduct empirical studies on the satisfaction
of Citizens involved in these deliberations, and on the effectiveness and the
efficiency of the outcomes produced by deliberations in relation to the Society.
However, from a philosophical and a cognitive perspective this study may
raise several research questions. Since this is a research work, and research
work must necessarily start with doubts and end with doubts, I would like
to conclude by leaving to readers the following thorny one:
“If it is true that representation does not work anymore, what will
happen when everyone will represent herself?”
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